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When a computer program requires legitimate access to confidential data, the
question arises whether such a program may reveal sensitive information to an
unauthorised observer. There is therefore a need to ensure that a program, which
processes confidential data, is free of unwanted information flow. This thesis
presents a formal framework for the analysis and enforcement of secure informa-
tion flow in computational systems such as computer programs.
An important aspect of the problem of secure information flow is the develop-
ment of policies by which we can express intended information release. For this
reason information lattices and maps on these lattices are presented as models,
which capture intuitive notions about information and information flow. A defi-
nition of security is given, based on the lattice formalisation of information and
information flow, that exploits the partial order of the information lattice. The lat-
tice formalisation gives us a uniform way to enforce information security policies
under various qualitative and quantitative representations of information.
An input-output relational model, which describes how a system transforms
its input to publicly observable outputs with respect to a given attacker model, is
presented as a primitive for the study of secure information flow. By using the re-
lational model, various representations of information, which are shown to fit into
the lattice model of information, are derived for the analysis of information flow
under deterministic and nondeterministic system models. A systematic technique
to derive the relational model of a system, under a given attacker model, from the
operational semantics in a language-based setting, is also presented. This allows
the development of information flow analyses parametrised by chosen attacker
models.
A flow-sensitive and termination-sensitive static analysis calculus is presented
for the analysis of information flow in programs written in a deterministic While
language with outputs. The analysis is shown to be correct with respect to an
attacker model that is able to observe all program outputs and which can deter-
mine the termination or nontermination of program execution. The static analysis
also detects certain disjunctive information release. A termination-sensitive de-
pendency analysis is developed which demonstrates how, by employing abstract
interpretation techniques, other less precise but possibly more efficient informa-
tion flow analysis may be obtained. The thesis concludes with further examples to
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Today, society is highly-dependent on information and computer networks. The
convenience of connecting computers and other personal devices, and the ease
with which this can be done, has made it ever more difficult to protect sensitive
information from being released in unwanted ways. The security of information
release has thus become a very important problem.
Secure information release or secure information flow is not a new problem,
but the current standard security techniques do not provide a satisfactory solu-
tion to it. For example, techniques such as cryptography and operating system
access control lists, which can be used to limit access to sensitive information in
computer systems, are of little use once information has been decrypted and re-
leased to a program which requires legitimate access to such information. Such
a program can release sensitive information maliciously, or inadvertently due to
programming flaws in it. There is a need for mechanisms through which we can
specify what information we want to release, and whereby we can check whether a
program that has access to such information conforms to the required information
1
flow specification.
This thesis develops a formal framework whereby we can model information
and information flow, which allows us to specify security policies to capture in-
tended information release. The analysis techniques developed allow us to check
whether a system that processes sensitive data conforms to the information release
specifications in a given policy. By these, we are able to enforce secure informa-
tion flow requirements, which is achieved by preventing programs from process-
ing data for which they have not been certified as having secure information flow
with respect to the release policy of that data.
1.1 Modelling Information Flow
The traditional approach to modelling information flow, or rather, the lack of in-
formation flow for the enforcement of security, is through the noninterference re-
quirement [GM82]. Noninterference prevents any confidential information from
propagating to unauthorised observers and is useful in multilevel security sys-
tems, where information must not flow from high levels of security classifications
to low levels of security classifications. However, in practice (for example, during
authentication, encryption, and when performing statistical analyses), we often
have to, or want to release some information in a controlled manner. Noninterfer-
ence is not suitable under such circumstances. Noninterference as a policy model
is of limited use in practice [RMMG01, Vol99a]. There is thus a need for a general
model for the specification of what information we intend to release.
In [SS05], a taxonomy of declassification mechanisms is introduced based on
what, where, when, and by whom information is released. This thesis focuses
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on the what dimension, where we are interested in regulating what information an
observer can gain from a system that is processing sensitive data. For this purpose,
a lattice-theoretic model of information and information flow is introduced based
on the observation that securing what information an observer can gain alludes
to a notion of the level of information that is considered safe to be released to
the observer. Furthermore, information is intuitively ordered, whereby we say
that one piece of information is greater or more informative than another one.
This suggests an ordering of information, which we exploit in the lattice model of
information to define a notion of secure information flow.
The associated partial order of the information lattice captures the intuition
of information levels or the information order. This allows us to model the flow
of information as maps on the lattice of information, which describe how an ob-
server’s knowledge changes when observing a system that is causing information
flow. By using only the lattice structure in the definition of information flow and
security, we open up the possibility to use the same enforcement technique or
mechanism, regardless of the particular representation of information. Although
lattice-based techniques are often used in language-based security [SM03a], the
lattices are usually of security classes or security types in a multilevel system,
rather than lattices of information. The use of lattices as a general model of in-
formation has the advantage that it unifies various representations of information
under the same model for the enforcement of what declassification policies. This
makes it possible to use the same enforcement mechanism under different lattice-
based information representations.
3
1.2 Deriving Information Flow
Once a choice of information representation has been made, we need to be able
to derive the information that a system may release in order to check whether the
system is secure with respect to an information flow policy. In this thesis, informa-
tion representations based on Equivalence Relations or, more generally, Partial
Equivalence Relations, as well as Families of Sets are considered as qualitative
representations of information. Under quantitative representations, information-
theoretic measures are considered as representations of information. These repre-
sentations are all shown to fit into the lattice model of information.
An extensional input-output relational model is presented in the thesis as a
primitive for the analysis of information flow, which derives the information that
a system releases and links the system’s input-output semantics to its information
flow properties under a given representation of information. The simple idea is
that information released by a system is ultimately linked to how the system trans-
forms its secret inputs to publicly observable outputs. The relational model itself
may be defined parametric to a specified attacker model by relating inputs to the
outputs which that particular attacker can observe. Using the relational model,
analyses of information flow under deterministic and nondeterministic system
models are presented. Furthermore, the thesis demonstrates, in a language-based
setting, that the relational model-based analysis copes very well with information
flows due to nontermination.
4
1.3 Enforcing Secure Information Flow
Our objective is to enforce secure information flow by ensuring that only programs
with secure information flow have access to sensitive data. Thus, given an infor-
mation flow policy, which specifies our intentions about what information we al-
low to be released, an enforcement framework is needed that can decide whether a
system is safe with respect to that policy. A semantics-based approach to the anal-
ysis of information flow, which uses the system’s input-output relational model, is
proposed in this thesis. We demonstrate how to derive the relational model from
the operational semantics in a language-based setting. We also present a static
information flow analysis and a dependency analysis for a deterministic impera-
tive While language with outputs. The analyses are used to check whether a given
program has secure information flow with respect to given policies. By this, we
can enforce the security of information flow by granting access only to programs
which have secure information flow.
1.4 Overview of Thesis
The objective of this thesis is to study the problem of secure information flow
and to develop techniques to model, analyse, and enforce secure information flow
in computer systems. The current chapter concludes by introducing some of the
mathematical definitions and notations used in the thesis. In Chapter 2, important
language-based techniques for the analysis and enforcement of secure information
flow are reviewed.
The goal of Chapter 3 is to model the notions of information and information
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flow suitable for the definition of information flow policies. The lattice-based def-
inition agrees with the intuitive notions of information ordering and provides the
basis for the enforcement of secure information flow, where information release
is considered insecure with respect to a policy when it is greater than the levels
permitted in the policy. The notion of information levels is captured by the lattice
order. This approach has the advantage that the enforcement relies only on the
lattice properties, which can be applied independently of the particular represen-
tation of information that is used. Representations of information based on partial
equivalence relations, families of sets, and information-theoretic characterisations
are all shown to fit into the lattice model. Furthermore, Chapter 3 presents an
extensional, semantics-based, relational model approach to the analysis of infor-
mation released by a system, where the relational model describes how the system
transforms its inputs to publicly observed outputs. The relational model links the
input-output semantics of the system being analysed to the lattice-based represen-
tation of information that the system releases.
Chapter 4 shows how to derive the input-output relational model of a system
from the operational semantics in a language-based setting. It starts by consider-
ing interactive systems formalised as labelled transition systems, where the labels
capture what the attacker can observe during each state transition of the system.
This provides a formalism for studying attackers with different observational pow-
ers. As a concrete example, the While language is introduced as a programming
language for deterministic systems with interactive outputs and buffered input. A
specific semantic attacker model, which is able to observe program outputs as
prescribed by the standard operational semantics of While and can additionally
determine whether the program terminates or not, is introduced in Chapter 4 to
6
illustrate the definition of an attacker model, and the definition of termination-
sensitive analyses. Extensions to the core While language are also presented to
demonstrate analyses of information flow in possibilistic and probabilistic nonde-
terministic systems.
In Chapter 5, a static analysis of the imperative While language is presented.
The analysis, which uses PERs on the set of program states as the representation
of information, is flow-sensitive and termination-sensitive, and is also capable
of detecting certain disjunctive information flows. The static analysis is shown
to be sound with respect to the semantic definition of information flow that the
semantics attacker gains as defined in Chapter 4.
Since the static analysis using PERs may be computationally prohibitive when
the set of states considered is very large, or we may otherwise not want the level
of detail of information that may be represented by PERs over program states,
Chapter 6 demonstrates how the machinery of abstract interpretation may be used
to reduce or simplify the domain over which static analysis is performed, while
maintaining correctness. A flow-sensitive and termination-sensitive dependency
analysis is presented, which is shown to be an abstract interpretation of the con-
crete PER-based analysis of Chapter 5. The dependency analysis also identifies
some disjunctive dependencies.
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis with examples, which highlight various lessons
learnt in the thesis. The chapter reviews the main contributions of the thesis and
suggests areas of future work.
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1.5 Mathematical Preliminaries
The mathematical developments in this thesis rely on the basic theory of sets and
relations [End77, AGM92], as well as principles from ordered sets and maps be-
tween them [DP03, GHK+03]. This section briefly reviews the important defini-
tions and results, and introduces some of the notations that we shall use.
Sets, Binary Relations, and Functions
A set X = {x0, x1, ..., xn} is a collection of objects x0, x1, ..., xn, which are called
its elements, and no other elements. The membership relation ∈, such as x0 ∈ X ,
asserts which element belongs to a set. The opposite relation ∉ asserts that an
object does not belong to a set. The Cartesian product of two sets X and Y is the
set of pairs X × Y = {(x, y) ∣ x ∈X,y ∈ Y }. Sometimes, X ×X is written as X2.
If X and Y are sets, X ⊆ Y asserts that X is a subset of Y , which means that
x ∈ X implies x ∈ Y . The empty set, which has no element, is denoted by ∅. The
powerset of a set X is P(X) = {Y ∣ Y ⊆ X}, which is the set of all subsets of
X . A family of sets over X is a subset of the powerset P(X). The family of sets
{Yi ⊆ X ∣ i ∈ I} is sometimes denoted by Yi∈I or simply YI , where I is an index
set. The union and intersection of the family of sets denoted by Yi∈I is given by
⋃i∈IXi and ⋂i∈IXi respectively.
The set-theoretic difference between the sets X and Y is the set of elements
in X , but not in Y , and is denoted by X/Y = {x ∈ X ∣ x ∉ Y }. The set of natural
numbers is denoted by N = {0,1,2,3, . . .}, and the set of integers is denoted by
Z = {. . . ,−2,−1,0,1,2, . . .}.
We write R ⊆X × Y to denote a binary relation which associates elements of
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the set X with elements of the set Y . When x ∈ X is related to y ∈ Y by R, we
write x R y or (x, y) ∈ R. The assertion (x, y) ∉ R means that x is not related to
y by R. The graph of the binary relation R ⊆ X × Y is the set of pairs, which is
defined as graph(R) ≜ {(x, y) ∈X × Y ∣ x R y}.
A binary relation f ⊆X×Y is a function or map if for any y, y′ ∈ Y and x ∈ X ,
x f y and x f y′ implies that y = y′. The usual notation for functions is to write
f(x) = y whenever xf y holds. It is also customary to write f ∶X → Y to say that
f is a total function from the set X to the set Y . The set of all total functions from
the set X to the set Y is denoted by [X → Y ].
Partially Ordered Sets
A set X is a partially ordered set (poset) if it is equipped with a binary relation ≤,
such that for all x, y, z ∈ X the relation ≤ has the following properties:
• x ≤ x, (reflexivity)
• x ≤ y and y ≤ x implies x = y, (antisymmetry)
• x ≤ y and y ≤ z implies x ≤ z. (transitivity)
If the relation ≤ on X is not necessarily antisymmetric, then X is a pre-order with
respect to ≤. When we wish to lay emphasis on the order relation of a poset we
write ⟨X,≤⟩ to say that the elements of X are partially ordered by ≤.
Duality Principle
The duality principle says that there is a corresponding dual statement (S≥) to each
statement (S≤) about an ordered set ⟨X,≤⟩, which can be obtained by replacing
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each occurrence of ≤ in S≤ by ≥ and vice versa. If S≤ is true in all ordered sets
then so also is S≥.
Upper and Lower Bounds
Let ⟨X,≤⟩ be a poset and let S ⊆ X . An element x ∈ X is an upper bound of S if
for all s ∈ S, s ≤ x. A lower bound is dually defined. The set of upper bounds of
S in X is Su ≜ {x ∈ X ∣ x is an upper bound of S}. The set of lower bounds Sℓ of
S in X is dually defined.
An element x ∈ Su, if it exists, is said to be the least upper bound or supremum
of the set S if for all y ∈ Su, x ≤ y. The greatest lower bound or infimum of the set
S, if it exists, is defined dually on the set Sℓ of lower bounds. The down-set ↓S of
the set S is defined as ↓S = {x ∈X ∣ s ∈ S,x ≤ s}.
Joins and Meets
Let ⟨X,≤⟩ be a poset. The join of two elements x, y ∈ X , if it exists, is the least
upper bound of the set {x, y}u in X . This is usually written as x ∨ y. Similarly,
the meet of these elements is written as x ∧ y and is the greatest lower bound of
the set {x, y}ℓ in X . More generally, for any subset S ⊆ X , the join is denoted as
⋁S, and the meet as ⋀S, both of which are assumed to be elements of the set X
whenever they exist. If the elements of S = {si ∣ i ∈ I} are indexed, an alternative
notation is ⋁i si and ⋀i si for the join and meet of S respectively.
Top and Bottom
A poset ⟨X,≤⟩ is said to have a top or greatest element, written as ⊺ if for all
x ∈ X,x ≤ ⊺. Dually, the bottom or least element  ∈ X , when it exists, has the
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property that for all x ∈ X, ≤ x.
Pointwise Function Ordering
Let X be a set and let ⟨Y,≤⟩ be an ordered set. The order relation ≤ on Y in-
duces an order on the set of all maps [X → Y ] from X to Y , which is called
the pointwise order, which for any f, f ′ ∈ [X → Y ] we have f ≤ f ′ iff for all
x ∈X,f(x) ≤ f ′(x).
Operators on Partially Ordered Sets
An operator on a poset ⟨X,≤⟩ is a function f ∶X →X , which may have any of
the following properties
• extensivity: if ∀x ∈ X. x ≤ f(x)
• reductivity: if ∀x ∈X. f(x) ≤ x
• idempotency: if ∀x ∈ X. f(f(x)) = f(x)
• monotonicity: if ∀x,x′ ∈X. x ≤ x′ Ô⇒ f(x) ≤ f(x′)
Closure operators
An operator on a poset is an upper closure operator if it extensive, monotone and
idempotent. A lower closure operator is an operator which is reductive, monotone
and idempotent.
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Fixpoints and Chain Conditions
Let ⟨X,≤⟩ be an ordered set and let f ∶X →X be a map. We say that x ∈ X is
a fixpoint of f if f(x) = x. The set of fixpoints of f is denoted by fix(f). The
ordered set X is said to satisfy the ascending chain condition (ACC) if for any
given sequence x1 ≤ x2 ≤ ⋯ ≤ xn ≤ ⋯ of elements of X , there exists k ∈ N such
that xk = xk+1 = ⋯. The dual notion to the ACC is the descending chain condition.
Lattices and Complete Lattices
A non-empty ordered set ⟨X,≤⟩ is a lattice if for all x,x′ ∈ X , the join x ∨ x′
and the meet x ∧ x′ exist. If, furthermore, for all S ⊆ X , ⋁S and ⋀S exist, X
is a complete lattice. In order to show that a poset ⟨X,≤⟩ is a complete lattice,
it is sufficient to show that ⋁S exists for arbitrary subsets S of X , because the




This chapter reviews language-based approaches to the problem of secure infor-
mation flow. Language-based approaches to security seek to determine or ensure
program security by analysing the programming language constructs or by using
the language constructs to enforce security.
2.1 Language-based Approach to Security
The term security in this thesis generally refers to the security of information flow
in systems. Although language-based approaches have been used for the protec-
tion of security other than the confidentiality of information, this thesis focuses on
the application of language-based techniques to the problem of secure information
flow.
A traditional approach to the protection of resources in computer systems is
through the use of access control. Access control mechanisms prevent a princi-
pal, such as a user program, from having unauthorised access to resources. How-
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ever, when a user program requires a legitimate access to a resource, such as a
database or file, which contains confidential data, how can we ensure that such
a program does not reveal sensitive information illegally? A language-based ap-
proach to security, which seeks to determine the security of a program by the
analysis of the language-based constructs used in the program, is attractive in
this regard. The semantics of the language constructs provides us with primi-
tives through which we can understanding what a program does with informa-
tion. This makes language-based techniques very powerful. Other techniques
such as those which introduce new security constructs, for example explicit de-
classification constructs [MZZ+08, ZM01, Zda04b, MSZ06, AS07, BNR08], into
the programming language, to ensure safe release of information also fall under
language-based approach to information flow security.
Language-based techniques to security have been used in other areas which are
not necessarily related to information-flow security. Examples include language
and compiler mechanisms to prevent buffer overflow, which may lead to privilege
escalation [NCH+05, CPM+98] vulnerabilities in C programs; and bytecode ver-
ification, stack inspection, and sandboxing techniques to protect local resources
from networked applications and applets [LY99, Ler03, FG03, Gon99, MF97].
Another language-based approach to security is the proof-carrying code [NL97,
CLN00] mechanism, which uses the premise that checking that a proof (of soft-
ware security) is correct is easier to do than directly verifying the security of a
software. Under the proof-carrying code approach, the program author generates
a proof that his or her software has certain security properties, which the program
consumer can easily verify.
For secure information flow, language-based approaches include static typing
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systems and dependency analyses [VSI96, VS97, AB04, HS06] where well-typed
programs are guaranteed to satisfy a noninterference property, semantics-based
analysis of secure information flow [JL00, SS01, GM04], information-theoretic
measures of information flows [Den82, CHM02, PHW02], and specialised lan-
guages with explicit declassification constructs [MZZ+08, ZM01, Zda04b, MSZ06,
AS07, BNR08]. Other language-based approaches to information security include
complexity-theoretic analyses [VS00, Lau01, Lau03, BL06] that characterise the
security of information based on the complexity of extracting such information
from a protected system, and runtime monitor-based approaches where monitors
are attached to a program to prevent insecure executions [BD03, GBJS06, SST07,
CC08].
2.2 Multilevel security
One of the first approaches, which uses static analysis for the enforcement of non-
interference in programs, is due to Denning and Denning [Den76, DD77]. In their
work [DD77], a security policy is a pair ⟨S,→⟩, where S is a finite set of security
classes arranged on a lattice, and →⊆ S ×S is a flow relation, which specifies per-
mitted information flow between pairs of security classifications. Objects x and y
in a system are assigned security classes x and y respectively, and information is
permitted to flow from x to y if and only if (x, y) ∈→ (written as x → y). The flow
relation → is reflexive (so that information may flow within the same class) and
transitive.
The lattice properties of the set S are exploited to make program certification
more efficient. The least upper bound operation (∨) and the greatest lower bound
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operation (∧) on S are defined so that for any index set I such that for all i ∈
I, xi → y then (⋁i∈I xi)→ y. Similarly, if for all j ∈ J,x → yj, then x → (⋀j∈J yj).
The class ⋁i∈I xi is viewed as a common class via which information flows from
the various classes xi to the class y, and similarly the class ⋀j∈J yj is a common
class through which information flows from x to the various classes yj. Under this
framework, information is said to flow from object x to another object y (written
as x⇒ y), when the information stored in x is transferred to, or is used to derive
the information that is transferred to the object y. Information flow is said to be
explicit if the value assigned to object y is computed directly from the value of the
object x such as during the function assignment y ∶= f(⋯, x,⋯), or implicit when
the subprogram that assigns a value to y is executed conditionally on x such as in
the program if(x = 0)then y ∶= 0 else y ∶= 1.
A program P is said to be secure when the information flow x⇒ y is specified
by P only if x → y. A certification mechanism presented in [DD77] checks this
security condition. The certification mechanism uses the observation that check-
ing whether a program P specifies the flow x⇒ y can be efficiently done through
a static certification condition which checks when information might flow from
x to y. For example, the program if(x ≥ 10 & x = 9)then y ∶= 0 else skip
suggests that information might flow from x to y because y may be assigned in a
control-flow context that is predicated on the value of x. However, no information
actually flows from x to y because there is no execution of this program under
which the assignment to y is reached. The certification conditions are purely
syntactic, and they are computed from the security classes of the objects used
in each construct. For example, the certification condition for the assignment
y ∶= x requires that the classification of x must be strictly below or at most equal
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to the classification of y, that is, x ≤ y. For implicit flows such as in the pro-
gram if(x ≤ y)then z1 = 0 else z2 ∶= 1, the certification condition is that
x ∨ y ≤ z1 ∧ z2 - that is, the least upper bound of the classifications of x and y
is at most equal to the greatest lower bound of the classifications of the assigned
variables z1 and z2. The purely syntactic nature of the certification conditions and
the use of lattice operation on the security classes of the objects involved makes
it possible to certify programs quickly. However, a stronger, but generally unde-
cidable variant of the security condition above is also proposed in [DD77], which
says that P is secure if and only if no execution of P results in a flow x⇒ y unless
x → y.
2.3 Type-based Certification
An established language-based approach for the certification of programs for se-
cure information flow is by the use of a security type system [VSI96, HR98, VS00,
Aga00, HS06], where well-typed programs are guaranteed to have a security prop-
erty. For example, the type system of Volpano, Smith, and Irvine [VSI96] proves
the soundness of the lattice-based multilevel-security analysis of [Den76, DD77]
as a statement of the noninterference property of the program. By proving the
soundness with respect to standard program semantics, well-typed programs are
shown in [VSI96] to have the required noninterference property.
Under the type system of [VSI96], program phrases are assigned security
types which are drawn from a partially ordered set ⟨S,≤⟩. The primitive types
τ ∈ S are the so-called “data types”, which are similar to the security classes of
Denning [Den76, DD77]. Program phrases, which are expression phrases and
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command phrases, are assigned phrase types ρ. Expression phrases may be ordi-
nary program identifiers or memory locations. The language does not have input-
output primitives, however input is achieved by dereferencing an explicit location
and output is achieved by assignment to an explicit location. The syntax of the
block-structured language is the following.
(phrases) P ∶∶= e ∣ c
(expressions) e ∶∶= x ∣ l ∣ n ∣ e + e′ ∣ e − e′ ∣ e = e′ ∣ e < e′
(commands) c ∶∶= x ∶= e ∣ c; c′ ∣ if(e)then c else c′ ∣
while(e) do c ∣ letvar x ∶= e in c
Variables are ranged over by x, and l ranges over locations. All expressions
are integers, where n is an integer literal, and, 0 and 1 are used as conditional
guards. The phrase types are defined as follows.
(data type) τ ∶∶= s
(phrase type) ρ ∶∶= τ ∣ τ var ∣ τ cmd
The metavariable s ranges over of security classes in S, and the type τ var is the
type of variables and locations, whereas the type τ cmd is the type of commands.
Under the proposed type system, typing judgements have the form
Λ;Γ ⊢ P ∶ ρ. (2.1)
The finite maps Λ and Γ, which are respectively called location and identifier
typing, assign types to locations and identifiers. These maps may be updated as
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usual, where




ρ if x = x′
Γ(x′) otherwise.
The judgement of (2.1) means that the phrase P has type ρ under the assump-
tion that Λ and Γ respectively prescribe types for the locations and the free iden-
tifiers in P . If the phrase is an expression e, with the typing judgement τ , the
intuition is that e contains expressions at level τ or lower. However, if the phrase
is a command c the type τ cmd means that c only assigns to variables at level τ
or higher. These properties, called the simple security and the confinement prop-
erties are enforced by the typing rules. The full typing rules and the subtyping
conditions are given in Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 respectively. Using both the
simple security and the confinement properties of the typing system, well-typed
programs can be shown to satisfy a noninterference property.
In order to ensure that explicit information flows are secure, the typing rule
for the assignment statement requires that the variable (x) assigned to, and the as-
signed expression (e), must agree on their security levels (τ ). An upward flow is
still allowed during assignment since the type of e can be coerced up by the sub-
typing rule. Conditional commands are made secure with respect to implicit infor-
mation flow by requiring that the type of the conditional guard and the branch(es)
must agree. As the subtyping judgements of Figure 2.2 shows, the subtyping rule
for commands is antimonotone, since if τ ⊆ τ ′, and if a command phrase is judged
to have a type τ ′ cmd, then that command phrase only assigns to variables which
are judged to have type τ ′ or higher.Thus, an even stronger statement is that the
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(INT) Λ;Γ ⊢ n ∶ τ
(VAR) Λ;Γ ⊢ x ∶ τ var if Γ(x) = τ var
(VARLOC) Λ;Γ ⊢ l ∶ τ var if Λ(x) = τ var
(ARITH-op)
Λ;Γ ⊢ e ∶ τ,
Λ;Γ ⊢ e′ ∶ τ
Λ;Γ ⊢ e op e′ ∶ τ
op ∈ {+,−,=,<}
(R-VAL) Λ;Γ ⊢ e ∶ τ var
Λ;Γ ⊢ e ∶ τ
(ASSIGN)
Λ;Γ ⊢ x ∶ τ var,
Λ;Γ ⊢ e ∶ τ
Λ;Γ ⊢ x ∶= e ∶ τ cmd
(COMPOSE)
Λ;Γ ⊢ c ∶ τ cmd,
Λ;Γ ⊢ c′ ∶ τ cmd
Λ;Γ ⊢ c; c′ ∶ τ cmd
(IF)
Λ;Γ ⊢ e ∶ τ,
Λ;Γ ⊢ c ∶ τ cmd,
Λ;Γ ⊢ c′ ∶ τ cmd
Λ;Γ ⊢ if(e)then c else c′ ∶ τ cmd
(WHILE)
Λ;Γ ⊢ e ∶ τ,
Λ;Γ ⊢ c ∶ τ cmd
Λ;Γ ⊢ while(e) do c ∶ τ cmd
(LETVAR)
Λ;Γ ⊢ e ∶ τ,
Λ;Γ[x ∶ τ var] ⊢ c ∶ τ ′ cmd
Λ;Γ ⊢ letvar x ∶= e in c ∶ τ ′ cmd
Figure 2.1: The Volpano-Smith-Irvine Typing rules
command assigns to variables at τ or higher, and hence τ ′ cmd ⊆ τ cmd. This
fact is exploited for upward flows from the guard to the branches, which allows
branches typed at a higher level to be predicated on a lower guard, by either coerc-
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(BASE) ⊢ τ ≤ τ
′
⊢ τ ⊆ τ ′
(REFLEX) ⊢ ρ ⊆ ρ
(TRANS) ⊢ ρ ⊆ ρ
′, ⊢ ρ′ ⊆ ρ′′
⊢ ρ ⊆ ρ′′
(CMD−) ⊢ τ ⊆ τ
′
⊢ τ ′ cmd ⊆ τ cmd
(SUBTYPE)
Λ;Γ ⊢ P ∶ ρ,
⊢ ρ ⊆ ρ′
Λ;Γ ⊢ P ∶ ρ′
Figure 2.2: The Volpano-Smith-Irvine Subtyping rules
ing the type of the branches downwards using the antimonotonicity of commands,
or by using the usual (upward) coercion subtyping rule for the conditional guard.
Various extensions to the programming language and the type system have been
proposed [SV98, VS00, Smi01, Smi03, Smi06].
2.4 Dependency Analysis
Another static approach to checking whether a program satisfies noninterference
is via a dependency analysis of variables in the program [ABHR99, AB04, HS06].
This is based on the premise that in a setting where the attacker can only observe
the final values of public variables on program termination, the static indepen-
dency of the final value of a public variable on the initial secret values stored
in other variables of a program is a static approximation of the noninterference
property of that program.
Amtoft and Banerjee [AB04] presented a framework for the static enforcement
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of noninterference policies via a variable-independency analysis. The analysis is
based on an abstract interpretation of program traces that makes explicit the inde-
pendencies between program variables. Being a data-flow analysis, the inference
logic deems more program secure than security type systems such as [VSI96].
For example, under the [VSI96], if we have Γ(h) = H and Γ(l) = L for some
variables h and l, and where L < H the program, the program l ∶= h; l = 0 is not
typable because the first statement directly assigns a higher security-typed expres-
sion to a variable that has a lower security type. Although the program contains
an insecure subprogram, however the program as a whole is secure because the
high content of l is overwritten by the constant 0 during the second assignment
before the attacker can observe the content of l (on termination). This property is
called flow-sensitivity, where the order of commands matters. Such a secure com-
position of insecure programs is detectable in type systems of [AB04, HS06], for
example, but the type system of [VSI96] cannot detect this. This is because the
type system of [VSI96] does not take into account the order of program execution,
and is therefore flow-insensitive.
The inference rules of [AB04] are presented in a Hoare-like logic, which de-
rives independencies between program variables on termination of a program frag-
ment, given the independencies before the execution of that fragment. In the pre-
vious example, l becomes dependent on h after the first assignment, but becomes
independent after the second assignment (written as [l#h], which means that the
value of variable l is independent of the initial value of variable h). The anal-
ysis of [AB04] conservatively extends the type system of [VSI96], where well-
typed programs in the system of [VSI96] satisfy the invariant [l#h] in the system
of [AB04], which asserts that, on program termination, the value of an L-typed l
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variable is independent of the initial value of an H-typed variable h.
Judgements in the system of [AB04] are of the form
G ⊢ {T#1 } P {T
#
2 }. (2.2)
Given the set Var of variables, the sets T#1 , T
#
2 ∈ Independ = P(Var ×Var) are
sets of variable independencies, and G ⊆ Var is an implicit-flow context describ-
ing the set of variables, values of which the program control flow might depend on.
The set G is used to eliminate implicit information flows. The meaning of (2.2) is
now that if the independencies in T#1 hold before the program P is executed under
the control context G, then, provided that P terminates, the independencies in T#2
hold after the execution of P . The intended meaning of any [z#x] ∈ T#2 is that
the final value of z after executing P is independent of the initial value of x from
the computation preceding P .
The independency inference logic of [AB04] is shown in Figure 2.3. In the
rules FV (e) ⊆ Var is the set of free variables of the expression e and the partial
order relation ⪯ on sets of independencies is defined as the reverse subset inclusion







An equivalent derivation to [AB04] was presented by Hunt and Sands [HS06],
which is based on standard semantics. As opposed to the approach of [AB04],
which computes independencies of variables, the inference rules of [HS06] com-
putes variable dependencies directly when the lattice of dependency is chosen to
be the powerset lattice P(Var) of variables. The dependency result of [HS06]
is the De-Morgan’s dual of the independency computation of [AB04], and both
type systems enforce a partial correctness noninterference property for well-typed
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[Assign]G ⊢ {T#0 } x ∶= e {T#} if ∀[y#w] ∈ T#.
x ≠ y Ô⇒ [y#w] ∈ T#0 ,
x = y Ô⇒ w ∉ G ∧ ∀z ∈ FV (e).[z#w] ∈ T#0
[Seq]G ⊢ {T
#
0 } c {T
#
1 } G ⊢ {T
#
1 } c′ {T
#
2 }





0 } c {T#} G0 ⊢ {T
#
0 } c′ {T#}
G ⊢ {T#0 } if(e)then c else c′ {T#}
if G ⊆ G0 and
w ∉ G0 Ô⇒ ∀z ∈ FV (e).[z#w] ∈ T
#
0
[While] G0 ⊢ {T
#} c {T#}
G ⊢ {T#} while(e) do c {T#}
if G ⊆ G0 and
w ∉ G0 Ô⇒ ∀z ∈ FV (e).[z#w] ∈ T#
[Sub]G1 ⊢ {T
#





0 } c {T
#
3 }







Figure 2.3: Amtoft-Banerjee Independency Logic
programs. The algorithmic version of the dependency type system of [HS06] is
presented in Chapter 6, where it is compared with a dependency analysis proposed
in this thesis.
2.5 Equational Characterisation
Joshi and Leino [JL00] proposed a semantics-based equational characterisation
of the noninterference property of a system, via a special program construct HH
(also known as “havoc on h”, which stands for the “destruction” of the high por-
tion of memory). Under this approach, in the simplest case, it is assumed that
program memory is partitioned to two, namely, the high-security portion h (which
is a tuple over the domains of high-security variables) and the low-security por-
24
tion l (which is a tuple over the domains of low-security variables). Furthermore,
it is also assumed that the attacker has the program sources and can observe the
l-portion of the memory before and after program execution, but cannot directly
observe the h-portion. The intention is that, in a secure program, information
should not flow from the h-portion of the memory to the l-portion, although the
reverse flow is permitted.
A relational semantics is used to describe the properties of programs such that
for any program P , σ ⟨P ⟩ σ′ signifies that there is an execution of P from the
initial state σ to the final state σ′. A special “looping state” ∞ is also considered,
which has the property that for all programs P , ∞ ⟨P ⟩∞ holds, preventing any
program from exiting the looping state. For any variable x, the evaluation of x
at the looping state ∞ is ∞(x) = x, which is taken to be a special value outside
the domain of x. The semantics of HH is defined such that for all states σ,σ′, we
have σ ⟨HH⟩ σ′ iff σ(l) = σ′(l).
Using the program HH, the security property of a program P is formalised as
a total correctness program equivalence as follows.
A program P is secure iff
HH ;P ;HH =l P ;HH. (2.3)
The relation =l in this definition may be viewed as comparing only the l-portions
of the memory. The intuition behind definition (2.3) is that regardless of the initial
values in the h-portion of the memory in the two programs, as long as the initial
l-portion is the same, then the final l-portions of memory agree. The trailing HH
on both sides of =l means that we do not care about the final values in the h-
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portions of memory, since it cannot be observed by the attacker. If programs are
replaced by their relational semantics in (2.3) and ; stands for the relation compo-
sition operator, then the relation =l is simply the equality of relations. This simple
semantic definition captures the noninterference property of the program P be-
cause the initial h-portion of the memory is noninterfering with the final result of
the l-portion of memory whenever P is secure. This definition has motivated the
work of [BGM07], and is related to the PER-based semantic definition of [SS01].
2.6 PER Model of Information Flow
It is a well-known fact in language-based information security that the notion of
noninterference in security is closely related to the notion of (in)dependencies.
Motivated by the work of Hunt, which used PERs to construct the abstract in-
terpretation of strictness properties in higher-order functional programs [Hun91a,
Hun91b], and, in particular, to model dependencies in binding time analyses [HS91],
Sabelfeld and Sands proposed a PER model for the analysis of secure informa-
tion flow [SS01, Sab01]. The PER model, which is semantics-based, was shown
in [SS01] to generalise the semantic characterisation of security of [JL00].
The idea behind the PER-based characterisation is the observation that the
variation (or lack of it) in the publicly observable output of a program relative
to the variation in the private input to the program can be modelled by PERs on
the output and input domains of the program respectively. By fixing all other
inputs in a deterministic program, if no variation is observable in a given public
output under all variations of a confidential input, then there is no information
flow from that input to that output via the program. This intuition is captured by
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PER-transformer relation, _ (defined below), between PERs over the program’s
input and output domains.
For simplicity, it is assumed that program inputs and outputs are partitioned to
two parts, namely, a high-security part (whose domain is the set H , say), which
is not publicly observable. The second part is a low-security part (whose do-
main is the set L) that is observable publicly only before and after, but not dur-
ing, program execution. Programs (P ) whose denotations are maps of the form
JP K ∶ H ×L →H ×L are considered. Now let PER(S) be the set of all PERs over
the set S, and for any two PERs R1 ∈ PER(S1) and R2 ∈ PER(S2), define the PER
R1 ● R2 such that for any (s1, s2), (s′1, s′2) ∈ S1 × S2, (s1, s2)R1 ● R2 (s′1, s′2) iff
s1R1s
′
1 and s2R2s′2. The security property of the program P is described in terms
of its denotational semantics, such that if Q,Q′ ∈ PER(H) and R,R′ ∈ PER(L),
then LP M ∶ (Q ●R) _ (Q′ ●R′) holds iff for all (h, l), (h′, l′) ∈H ×L
(h, l)Q ●R (h′, l′) Ô⇒ JP K(h, l)Q′ ●R′ JP K(h′, l′). (2.4)
The intuition behind (2.4) is that under the PERs Q ● R and Q′ ● R′ defined
respectively over the input and output domains of P , any pair of inputs that is
indistinguishable by Q ● R (that is, pairs of inputs that are are related by this
PER), lead to outputs of P that are also indistinguishable by the PER Q′ ●R′. The
definition is compositional so that for two programs P and P ′ we have
LP M ∶ A _ B, LP ′M ∶ B _ C
LP ;P ′M ∶ A _ C
Let idS,allS ∈ PER(S) be PERs over S defined such that for all s, s′ ∈ S,
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s idS s′ iff s = s′ and s allS s′. Using (2.4) the noninterference security condition
for the program P is now the following.
The program P is secure iff
LP M ∶ (allH ● idL) _ (allH ● idL). (2.5)
This means that if an attacker can observe the value of the public input only (the
idL part of the PER over the input domain), then for each possible value of the
public output (the idL part of the PER over the output domain), all the values of
the secret input are possible (the allH part of the PER over the input domain). That
is, if the public input is fixed, any variation in the secret input is not observable
by the attacker in a secure program. This is a statement of the noninterference
requirement of [GM82]. The security definition of (2.5) is termination-sensitive
by requiring that the termination properties of a secure program must not be in-
fluenced by the values of secret inputs. By defining the PERs over appropriate
powerdomains, the definition of (2.5) is shown to also describe the security prop-
erties of nondeterministic systems.
2.7 Abstract Noninterference
Giacobazzi and Mastroeni introduced in [GM04, GM05] a notion of abstract non-
interference as a semantic description of the information released by a program
based on standard techniques from abstract interpretation [CC77, CC79]. The
core idea is that instead of observing the concrete values of the public input and
output data in a program, the attacker is modelled as an abstract interpretation
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that can observe only the properties of these data, that is, the abstract seman-
tics of the program. By weakening the observational capability of the attacker
so that the attacker is only able to observe properties of data, the noninterference
requirement can be weakened since an otherwise offending program under non-
interference may become safe in the presence of an attacker that cannot observe
public input and output precisely.
The concrete domain C is taken to be the powerset lattice of concrete program
values with the subset order relation. As usual, the concrete domain is partitioned
to two sets H and L, which are the domains of confidential and public values
respectively. Let uco(P(C)) be the set of all upper closure operators on the or-
dered set ⟨P(C),⊆⟩, the abstract domains are based on upper closure operators
η,ρ ∈ uco(P(L)) and φ ∈ uco(P(H)), which are defined over the concrete do-
main of program values. Under this framework, the attacker is modelled as a pair
of abstractions ⟨η,ρ⟩, where η and ρ model respectively the attacker’s observa-
tional power over the public input and output values. The concrete semantics of
the program P is formalised using angelic denotational semantics, which asso-
ciates an input-output function, JP K ∶ H ×L→H ×L, with P and ignores nonter-
mination. Furthermore, the observation of (public) values occur at the beginning
of program execution and on program termination. To slightly simplify the no-
tations, we shall denote the concrete semantics of P as a map JP K ∶ H ×L → L,
throwing away the H projection of state on termination, which is not used. Addi-
tionally, for singleton sets we shall write η(l) instead of η({l}) for the image of
{l} under η. A program P is said to satisfy the narrow abstract noninterference
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(NANI), written as [η]P (ρ), when for all h,h′ ∈H and l, l′ ∈ L
η(l) = η(l′) Ô⇒ ρ(JP K(h, l)) = ρ(JP K(h′, l′)). (2.6)
The intuition behind definition (2.6) is that if the attacker can only observe the
properties η and ρ respectively of the public input and public output, then no
information about the secret input flows via P whenever [η]P (ρ) holds.
A problem with this definition is the so-called notion of deceptive flows, where
a program that fails to satisfy the NANI property may still not reveal any in-
formation about secrets. To see why, let the set of even, odd, positive (includ-
ing 0), and negative integers be respectively defined as Even ≜ {2i ∣ i ∈ Z},
Odd ≜ {2i + 1 ∣ i ∈ Z}, Pos ≜ {i ∈ Z ∣ i ≥ 0}, Neg ≜ {i ∈ Z ∣ i < 0}. Now
suppose h ∈ H ≜ Z and l ∈ L ≜ Z and consider the program l ∶= l × h2 under
the parity and sign abstraction pair ⟨η,ρ⟩ ≜ ⟨Par,Sgn⟩, which are given by their
set of fixpoints1 fix(Par) = {Z,Even,Odd,∅} and fix(Sgn) = {Z,Pos,Neg,∅}.
If an attacker can only observe the parity of l before executing this program and
its sign afterwards, then that attacker cannot gain any information about h since
the sign of h has been destroyed in the final value of l by taking the square of
h. However, the property [Par]l ∶= l × h2(Sgn) does not hold. This is due to
Par-indistinguishable l-input values that are Sgn-distinguishable causing the “de-
ceptive flow”. To eliminate this flow, a check is performed instead on the set of
outputs, with a fixed η-property on the input. This is denoted as (η)P (ρ), which
1Closure operators are completely determined by their set of fixpoints.
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holds if for all h,h′ ∈H and l ∈ L
ρ(⋃
l′∈η(l)
{JP K(h, l′)}) = ρ(⋃
l′∈η(l)
{JP K(h′, l′)}). (2.7)
The definition of NANI, can further be weakened to allow information flow
about secret inputs. This information flow about secret is specified by the upper
closure operator φ ∈ uco(P(H)) on secrets. The resulting notion is called ab-
stract noninterference (ANI), written as [η]P (φ ↝ 8ρ), which holds if for all








{JP K(h2, l′)}). (2.8)
The meaning of the ANI definition of (2.8) is that under the fixed attacker model
⟨η,ρ⟩, the attacker cannot gain the information characterised by the upper closure
operator φ. The idea is that by fixing l to the property η (to eliminate “deceptive
flows”) and evaluating P under all variations of h that are constrained by the
property φ, the attacker observing the ρ property of the public output cannot see
any difference. This is referred to as “declassified ANI via blocking” in [Mas05],
since the property φ cannot be observed. A related notion, called “declassified
ANI via allowing”, allows the property φ to be observed. This is denoted as
(η)P (φ Ô⇒ ρ) and is defined as ∀h,h′ ∈ H and ∀l ∈ L
φ(h) = φ(h′) Ô⇒ ρ(⋃
l′∈η(l)
{JP K(h, l′)}) = ρ(⋃
l′∈η(l)
{JP K(h′, l′)}). (2.9)
Under this notion, we only check that the attacker cannot observe a difference
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under pairs of h-values with the same φ property. Since the attacker may be able
to observe a difference in ρ when φ(h) ≠ φ(h′) information about φ may flow.
2.8 Language-based declassification
Another language-based technique for the enforcement of secure information flow
uses explicit declassification constructs that are added to the programming lan-
guage, so that intentional release of information may only be performed by us-
ing a declassification construct. This approach has been well studied [MZZ+08,
ZM01, SM03b, CM04, Zda04b, MSZ06, AS07, BNR08].
Zdancewic, Myers, and Sabelfeld introduced a notion of robust declassifica-
tion [ZM01, Zda04b, MSZ06], which features a language-based declassification
construct for the controlled release of information. However, the provision of an
information downgrading construct raises the question of whether the declassifi-
cation mechanism can be exploited by attackers to launder information. A notion
of robustness ensures the safety of the declassification mechanism so that neither
attacker-injected values nor attacker-inserted code can be used to control what in-
formation is released, or whether information is released. This means that, due
to robustness, an active attacker, which can both modify and observe a system
cannot gain more information than a passive attacker that can merely observe the
system.
The security model is based on a lattice L ≜ LC ×LI derived from the product
of a confidentiality policy lattice LC and an integrity policy lattice LI , which are
used to reason about both the confidentiality and integrity of data as well as the
integrity of code in the system. The notion of integrity is a dual notion of con-
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fidentiality. High-integrity data (and code) are trusted and are assumed not to be
under the control of attackers, whereas low-integrity ones are not trusted and are
assumed to be under the control of the attacker. The lattice L is partially ordered
by ⊑, and attackers are assigned security levels such that an attacker A, charac-
terised by its level ℓA ∈ L, may only view information at confidentiality level2
π1(ℓA) and below on the confidentiality lattice LC . Furthermore, this attacker can
only modify data at integrity level π2(ℓA) and above on the integrity lattice LI .
Under this framework, a typing environment, Γ ∶Var→ L, assigns security types
to variables. Expression types are derived by taking the least upper bound of the
types of the free variables of that expression. With the exception of the declas-
sification expression, the programming language is largely standard as shown in
Figure 2.4.
e ∶∶= n ∣ x ∣ e1 op e2 ∣ declassify(e, ℓ)
c ∶∶= skip ∣ x ∶= e ∣ c1; c2 ∣
if(e)then c1 else c2 ∣ while (e) do c
Figure 2.4: Language-based Declassification
The operation op stands for the usual arithmetic and boolean operations on ex-
pressions and ℓ ∈ L is a security level. The declassification expression declassify(e, ℓ)
has the same operational semantics as the expression e. However, declassify(e, ℓ)
allows the security level of e to be declassified to the level ℓ ∈ L. Thus, the
declassification mechanism is used to control the security level of information,
which is checked statically, and is intended to have no semantic effect on pro-
2The notation pii(⋅) is the ith projection, and the confidentiality lattice is arranged from top to
bottom with the highest confidentiality at the top, whereas the integrity lattice is arranged with the
lowest integrity at the top.
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gram execution. Since information may flow from variable x to another variable
y only if Γ(x) ⊑ Γ(y), the choice of lattice L and the typing environment Γ spec-
ifies a security policy. The security framework is formalised as a type system so
that well-typed programs satisfy the robustness property. The full type system is
shown in Figure 2.5.
Γ ⊢ n ∶ ℓ
Γ(x) = ℓ
Γ ⊢ x ∶ ℓ
Γ ⊢ e ∶ ℓ Γ ⊢ e′ ∶ ℓ
Γ ⊢ e op e′ ∶ ℓ
Γ ⊢ e ∶ ℓ ℓ ⊑ ℓ′
Γ ⊢ e ∶ ℓ′
Γ, pc ⊢ skip
Γ ⊢ e ∶ ℓ ℓ ⊔ pc ⊑ Γ(x)
Γ, pc ⊢ x ∶= e
Γ ⊢ e ∶ ℓ′ ℓ ⊔ pc ⊑ Γ(x) π2(ℓ) = π2(ℓ′)
pc, ℓ′ ∈ {ℓ′′ ∈ L ∣ π2(ℓA) /⊑ π2(ℓ′′)}
Γ, pc ⊢ x ∶= declassify(e, ℓ)
Γ, pc ⊢ c1 Γ, pc ⊢ c2
Γ, pc ⊢ c1; c2
Γ ⊢ e ∶ ℓ Γ, ℓ ⊔ pc ⊢ c1 Γ, ℓ ⊔ pc ⊢ c2
Γ, pc ⊢ if(e)then c1 else c2
Γ ⊢ e ∶ ℓ Γ, ℓ ⊔ pc ⊢ c
Γ, pc ⊢ while (e) do c
Γ, pc ⊢ c pc′ ⊑ pc
Γ, pc′ ⊢ c
Figure 2.5: Robustness Typing Rules
The typing system is fairly straightforward and is parametric to the environ-
ment Γ and the attacker level ℓA, against which the typable program is robust. The
pc ∈ L level is used to rule out implicit flow of information and also to ensure that
the attacker cannot control whether declassification can take place or not. The
important rule is the typing judgement for the assignment x ∶= declassify(e, ℓ),
where the expression e with type ℓ′ is to be declassified to the level ℓ. For this to
be successful, the security level of the assigned variable x must be at least ℓ ⊔ pc,
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ensuring that no implicit information flows to x and that it cannot be corrupted
by a lower integrity data. Furthermore, it is required that declassification should
not change the integrity of the declassified information (π2(ℓ) = π2(ℓ′)), and that
the “attacker”, which has control over whether the declassification expression is
executed (the pc part) and which might have tainted the data in e (the ℓ′ part)
must have an integrity level that is strictly greater than the integrity level of the
declassified expression e so that pc, ℓ′ ∈ {ℓ′′ ∈ L ∣ π2(ℓA) /⊑ π2(ℓ′′)}.
2.9 Information-theoretic Characterisation
Qualitative definitions of information flow describe what information is released
only in a possibilistic sense. That is, they specify whether it is possible or not that
certain information may be released by a system, but they do not usually capture
the notion of how likely it is for that information flow to occur. While it may be
possible that certain information may be released by a system, it may be extremely
unlikely that such information flow may occur. Quantitative measures of informa-
tion flow, in particular, information-theoretic characterisation can capture a sense
of how likely it is for information to flow in the amount of information released.
In cases where the semantics of a system is characterised by probability dis-
tributions, information-theoretic measures of information flow can be particularly
useful. Even in cases where the semantics of a system is deterministic, but where
the choice of inputs to the system is governed by probability distributions, it is
still possible to apply information-theoretic techniques to characterise the infor-
mation release. The basic model of security under quantitative characterisations
is similar to the qualitative definitions such as the traditional noninterference def-
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inition. However, instead of checking whether information may flow as is done
under noninterference, quantitative approaches seek to assign a quantity to the
amount of information that flows. A system that has no probabilistic information
flow, for example, will also satisfy the standard noninterference requirement.
One of the earliest application of information theory to information flow in a
language-based setting is by Denning [Den82]. Since then, the use of quantitative
techniques, especially information theory, for information flow has been an active
area of research [CHM02, PHW02, Low02, ABG04, CHM05, CMS05, Bac05,
OCC06, Mal07, Smi07, CHM07, AP08].
In [CHM05] an analysis technique is presented, which computes an upper
bound of the amount of information released in programs written in a deterministic
imperative language with a looping construct. The analysis of [CHM05] has two
parts. Firstly, a Use-Definition Graph (UDG) [Muc97, NNH99] of the program is
extracted from the program source, which will be used to guide the quantitative
analysis. Secondly, a quantitative analysis which assigns upper bounds to the
amount of information flow along paths of the UDG is then performed.
Since the probability distribution of the low program input may be in the con-
trol of the attacker, it is assumed that the attacker chooses input values to max-
imise the leakage of information. Each program point, corresponding to a node on
the UDG, is assigned a random variable X (which may be a tuple of variables),
where P (Xn = x) is the probability that X takes on the value x at the node n
of the UDG. Two distinguished nodes are identified, namely, the program entry
and exit nodes, denoted respectively as ι and ω. So, X ι and Xω correspond to the
random variable X at program entry and exit respectively. The main idea is that
in a deterministic program, once the variation in the low input has been accounted
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for, any variation that is observed in the public output must be due to variations in
the secret input. Hence, the leakage of information about secret input to a variable
X at the exit node, denoted as Lω(X), is defined as
Lω(X) = p(ω)H(Xω ∣Lι) (2.10)
The measure H(Xω ∣ Lι) is the conditional entropy of the random variable Xω
given another random variable Lι, and p(ω) is the probability of reaching the exit
node. The variable L, as usual, stands for the low part of the memory. Thus, Lι
is the random variable representing the low input at the program entry point. For
programs which always terminate we have p(ω) = 1. The analysis of information
flow itself is parametric to the program point, and in (2.10), ω may be replaced
by any arbitrary node n to compute the information flow into X at that point. A
more recent work [CHM07], by the authors of [CHM05], uses a syntax-directed
approach to the analysis, which quantifies the amount of information released, as
opposed UDGs.
Information-theoretic approaches, in general, rely on having probability mea-
sures in order to perform the analysis, and conservative assumptions usually have
to be made. Like most language-based approaches to the analysis of information
flow, where the attacker is assumed to supply inputs at the beginning of program
execution and can only observe the final results at the end of program execution,
the model of the analysis in [CHM05] is buffered. However, many practical pro-
grams are interactive, which may accept inputs and produce outputs at any point
during the program execution. Program interaction introduces additional infor-
mation flow problems. Quantitative analyses that consider program interactions
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include [ABG04, OCC06, Bac05, AP08]. In addition to interactions, nontermi-
nation issues are also important when modelling the information released by a
program. Termination-insensitive analyses ignore information release due to non-
termination and may admit insecure programs, which release information during
diverging traces. When program interactions are involved, arbitrary amount of
information may be leaked through nontermination channels. The problem of
information leakage in termination-insensitive analyses is studied in [AHS08].
38
Chapter 3
Lattice Model of Information and
Information Flow
The phrase “secure information flow” alludes to an understanding of the notions
of information and information flow. In this chapter, we present a lattice-theoretic
model of information and information flow and define a notion of security us-
ing the lattice model of information for the enforcement of what declassification
policies.
In order to check whether a system, or its model, conforms to an information
flow policy, we need to analyse its information flow properties. For this purpose
an extensional input-output relational model is presented as a primitive for the
semantic analysis of information flow in both deterministic and nondeterministic
systems. By using the relational model, various representations of information,
suitable for the characterisation of the information flow, are derived. The derived
information representations are all shown to fit into the lattice model of infor-
mation. Later on, in Chapter 4, we show how to derive the relational model of a
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system from the operational semantics under a given attacker model in a language-
based setting.
3.1 Modelling Information and Information Flow
A fundamental property of information is the intuitive notion of information lev-
els, where we say that one piece of information is greater or more informative
than another. For example, information about an integer secret which reveals that
it is a positive even integer is more informative than another one which only re-
veals that the secret is a positive integer. This suggests an ordering of information,
which we shall exploit in our information model and security definition. For this
reason we shall model information as lattices, where the associated partial order
captures the notion of information levels. This lattice-based definition of security
falls under the what dimension of declassification as proposed by [SS05], because
it regulates the level of information or what information that we want to release.
3.1.1 A Lattice Model of Information
We consider information as elements of a complete lattice I , such that a piece
of information in I describes what may be learnt about secrets and such that the
lattice partial order and join operation respectively model the notions of ordering
and combination of information. The ordering of I captures when one informa-
tion is greater than or equal to another, and it is closely related to the notion of
information combination where the combination of a lesser information with a
greater one yields the greater information.
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Definition 3.1.1 (Information Lattice). Any complete lattice ⟨I ,⊑,⊔⟩ is a lattice
of information.
In the lattice ⟨I ,⊑,⊔⟩ of information, the partial order ⊑ models the relative
degree of informativeness of the elements of I , and the join operation ⊔ models
the combination of information in I . The idempotency, commutativity, and asso-
ciativity properties of the join operation agree with natural intuitions about infor-
mation because idempotency says that the combination of a piece of information
with itself should yield the same information [Koh03]. Similarly, the commutativ-
ity and associativity properties respectively agree with the intuitions that the order
and grouping of information combination should not matter to the end result. Fur-
thermore, for any s, s′ ∈ I , the lattice property, s ⊑ s′ iff s ⊔ s′ = s′, agrees with
the idea that the combination of a lesser information with a greater one yields the
greater information, where s ⊑ s′ means that the information s is less than or at
most equal to s′.
3.1.2 Information Flow
We shall define information flow to model how the knowledge of an observer
changes due to information release. Under this model, information flow is defined
as a function which transforms knowledge on a given lattice I of information.
Hence, if f ∶ I → I is an information flow function, then for any initial knowledge
s ∈ I that the observer might have before observing the system which causes
the information flow f , f(s) describes the final information that this observer
might gain after observing the system. To describe the observer’s knowledge after
receiving new information released by a system, the information flow function
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must have certain properties identified in the following definition.
Definition 3.1.2 (Information flow). Let ⟨I ,⊑⟩ be a lattice of information. An
information flow function f ∶ I → I on the lattice I is an extensive and monotone
function. Define F lows ≜ {f ∶ I → I ∣ f is extensive and monotone} to be the set
of all information flows on I .
Similarly to the properties of the lattice of information, the properties of in-
formation flow functions f ∈ F lows are intuitive. Firstly, the extensivity property,
which means that for all s ∈ I , s ⊑ f(s) shows that the observer’s knowledge
may only increase by observing the system causing information flow. Secondly,
the monotonicity requirement means that the greater the initial knowledge of the
observer before observing the system that is releasing information, the greater the
final knowledge afterwards.
The setF lows of all information flows on the lattice I of information itself is a
complete lattice under the pointwise ordering of functions because I is a complete
lattice. The least element of the resulting latticeF lows is the identity map, idI , on
I . This is easily shown because if there exists f ∈ F lows such that f ⊑ idI , then
by the pointwise order we have that for all s ∈ I , f(s) ⊑ idI(s) = s. This means
that f(s) ⊑ s, and since f is extensive, we have that f(s) = s by the antisymmetry
of ⊑. Hence, f = idI . The least element idI ∈ F lows of the set of information
flows is the lattice model equivalent of the notion of noninterference (that is, lack
of information flow) since the attacker cannot change its knowledge via idI .
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3.2 Information Flow Policies
An information flow policy, or simply a flow policy or policy, is a statement of the
(information flow) security requirements for a system. We define policies, which
can be used to regulate what information is allowed to flow through a system.
Definition 3.2.1 (What Policies). Let ⟨I ,⊑⟩ be a lattice of information and let
F lows be the set of information flows over this lattice. An information flow policy
with respect to the lattice I is a subset P of F lows.
An information flow f ∈ F lows is said to be permitted or allowed by a policy
P ⊆ F lows iff there exists a flow function f ′ ∈ P such that f ⊑ f ′. Consequently,
a policy P is fully non-trivial if all elements of P are maximal in P .
The ordering f ⊑ f ′ between information flow functions in this definition is the
usual pointwise ordering of functions induced by the partial order ⊑ on the lat-
tice I . This partial ordering of information flow functions is used to control, or
regulate, the level of information that we allow a system to release because the el-
ements of P set lattice upper bounds on the information flow that the attacker is
allowed to receive when the information release is permitted by the policy P . The
policy model of Definition 3.2.1 falls under the what dimension of declassification
according to the taxonomy of [SS05, SS07].
3.2.1 Information Flow Policy Patterns




By far the most studied type of information flow policy is the noninterference
policy, originally introduced by [GM82], which says that
“one group of users, using a certain set of commands, is noninterfer-
ing with another group of users if what the first group does with those
commands has no effect on what the second group of users can see”.
This requirement abstractly describes a system property, which implies the lack
of information flow, via the system in question, from secret inputs issued by one
(high security) group to public outputs observed by the other (low security) group.
Thus, the noninterference requirement is an information flow policy for a system
(or more precisely, its model), that prevents any flow of information from secret
inputs to public outputs. Under our lattice-based policy model, noninterference
corresponds to the policy {idI}, which is the identity map over the lattice I of
information about secrets. This abstractly describes the fact that the attacker can-
not benefit by observing a system which satisfies1 this policy since any flow that
is permitted by this policy cannot be greater than idI . The intuition is that for all
information s ∈ I in the lattice of information about secrets, representing the at-
tacker’s initial knowledge, we have that the attacker’s final knowledge, idI(s) = s,
after observing the system remains the same. Furthermore, since idI is the least
element of the lattice F lows of information flows, the baseline status of the non-
interference policy {idI} is clear.
Although the noninterference model is very simple, it is however too strong
to be useful in practice [RMMG01, Vol99a]. Policies that allow deliberate (but
controlled) release of information are necessary.




We may wish to have partial (but unconditional) release of information s′ ∈ I but
not more in a system. The pattern for this under the lattice model is captured
by the policy {f ∣ ∀s ∈ I , f(s) = s′ ⊔ s}, which permits an attacker to learn at
most s′ (s in the definition being the attacker’s initial knowledge). Since any flow
f ′ ∈ F lows which is permitted by this policy has the property that f ′ ⊑ f , this
means that any information that the attacker gains from the system that is strictly
greater than s′ is what the attacker could already derive by the combination of the
initial knowledge of the attacker and the declassified information s′. However,
if the attacker’s initial knowledge is less than s′ the greatest information that the
attacker is allowed to gain by this policy is s′.
A scenario where such a policy is necessary is during password authentica-
tion, where we wish to release unconditionally the information about the equal-
ity or not of the stored password and the user-supplied password. If the attacker
knows the user supplied password (for example, by supplying a guess) then the at-
tacker (by combining its initial knowledge with the outcome of the authentication
attempt) either learns the stored password (in the case of a successful authentica-
tion) or learns what it is not (if the authentication attempt fails). However, if the
attacker only observes the result of the authentication without knowing the sup-
plied password (issued, for example, by another user), the most that the attacker
can learn, depending on the outcome of the authentication attempt, is whether
the user-supplied and the stored passwords match or not - which is exactly the
information that we have declassified.
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Conditional Release Policy
Another scheme is the conditional release pattern, where information (s′) is re-
leased based on having some initial knowledge (s′′). This is modelled by the pol-
icy {f} where ∀s ∈ I , f(s) = s′ ⊔ s if s′′ ⊑ s, and f(s) = s otherwise. Under this
scheme, the attacker gains some information on the condition that the attacker has
at least a given initial information s′′. A scenario where such a policy is needed is
during decryption in a symmetric key system, where the plaintext may be learnt
(the knowledge s′) only when the decryption key is known (the knowledge s′′).
Disjunctive Release Policy
Another pattern, called disjunctive flow policy - after the disjunctive flow pattern
of [SS05], is the policy specified by fully non-trivial policies P , where ∣P ∣ ≥ 2.
Take, for example, the disjunctive flow policy {f, f ′ ∣ f /⊑ f ′, f ′ /⊑ f} ⊆ F lows.
This policy permits at most one of f or f ′ to be released but not both at the same
time. It is clear that the notion of disjunctive information flow is only meaning-
ful for incomparable information and information flows, because whenever two
information are comparable then the greater already contains the lesser informa-
tion. An information flow f ′′ ∈ F lows is permitted by the disjunctive policy
{f, f ′ ∣f /⊑ f ′, f ′ /⊑ f}, when f ′′ is smaller than or equal to at most one of f and f ′
- since f and f ′ are incomparable. Also, a flow f ′′ ⊒ f ⊔f ′, which contains both f
and f ′ is not permitted since there is no such f1 ∈ {f, f ′ ∣ f /⊑ f ′, f ′ /⊑ f} for which
f ′′ ⊑ f1.
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3.3 Secure Information Flow
Let us now define a notion of security, which uses the lattice of information to
formalise when the information released by a system is secure.
Definition 3.3.1 (Security Condition). Let P be a program modelling a system,
and let ⟨I ,⊑⟩ be a lattice of information, and let F lows be the set of all infor-
mation flows with respect to the lattice I . Furthermore, let P ⊆ F lows be an
information flow policy; and let JP KI ⊆ F lows be a subset of F lows, called the
information flow property of the system modelled by P . The system modelled by P
satisfies, and is said to be secure with respect to the policy P iff for all f ∈ JP KI
there exists f ′ ∈ P such that f ⊑ f ′.
Intuitively, this definition says that the program P , or the system it models, is
secure (with respect to the policy P) iff every flow f ∈ JP KI that is caused by P
is permitted by the policy (∃f ′ ∈ P such that f ⊑ f ′). The partial order ⊑ regulates
the level of information that we wish to release. This extensional view of policy
enforcement abstractly describes, in terms of the information lattice order, what
information flows are permitted in the system.
In the remainder of this chapter we shall show how to derive the information
released by a system from an input-output relational model of the system, provid-
ing us with a way to check whether the system has secure information flow. Later
on, in Chapter 4, we shall show how to derive this input-output relational model
from the operational semantics in a language-based setting, and show, for a given
program P , how to define JP KI under various representations of the lattice I of
information.
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3.4 System Models and Information Representation
In the following sections we shall formalise the information released by a system
by using an input-output relational model, which describes how the system trans-
forms its inputs to publicly observable outputs. The relational model captures
the input-output semantics of the system through a relation which associates the
public outputs that the attacker may observe with the inputs which generate them.
We shall derive, from the relational model, various representation of information,
which are shown to fit into the lattice model of information. The relational model
technique is applicable to the analysis of information flow under deterministic
system models as well as the more general nondeterministic system models.
Definition 3.4.1 (Relational System Model). The input-output relational model of
a system is defined as a relation S ⊆ Σ × V , over the set Σ of the system’s inputs
and the set V of observable outputs of the system according to an attacker model,
where for all input σ ∈ Σ and possible output v ∈ V , σ S v holds iff the system
can produce the output v when supplied with the input σ. The system model is
said to be deterministic if S is a function from Σ to V , otherwise it is said to be
nondeterministic.
Using the relational model primitive defined above, we shall develop infor-
mation representation suitable for the analysis of information release in deter-
ministic and, or nondeterministic systems. We assume that the model S of the
system is both input-total and output-total, that is, Σ = {σ ∣ v ∈ V, σ S v} and
V = {v ∣ σ ∈Σ, σ S v}.
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3.5 Information Flow in Deterministic Systems
Under the relational model, deterministic systems are modelled by (total) func-
tions of the form f ∶ Σ→ V from an input space Σ (representing the set of all
possible inputs to the system) to an output space V (representing the set of all
publicly observable outputs that the system can generate), such that for any input
σ ∈ Σ supplied to the system in question, f(σ) ∈ V is what the attacker publicly
observes. The system is deterministic, with respect to the attacker’s view, because
f is a function and thus the output observed by the attacker is unique for every
input supplied to the system.
Suppose Σ is the set of all secret values that can be supplied to a system
modelled by f ∶ Σ→ V , then the system is said to be noninterfering if for all
σ,σ′ ∈ Σ, f(σ) = f(σ′). That is, the public output of this system that the attacker
sees is fixed regardless of the chosen secret input to the system, as required by the
noninterference definition of [GM82]. It is thus clear when we say that another
system modelled by the function g ∶ Σ→ V ′ releases more information than the
one modelled by f if there exists at least an input pair σ,σ′ ∈ Σ such that g(σ) ≠
g(σ′). In other words, there are some runs of the system modelled by g which can
be distinguished by observing the output, whereas no run of the system modelled
by f can be distinguished based on the observed output. How do we then represent
more generally that a deterministic system releases more information than another
one?
49
3.5.1 An Equivalence Relation Representation of Information
In the example above, the reason why g releases more information than f can
be explained by the relative granularity of the equivalence classes of the kernels
of the two functions. The kernel of any function f ∶ Σ→ V , is an equivalence
relation (κf ) over Σ which relates a pair of elements in Σ iff they have same
image under f . Since any pair of input values σ,σ′ ∈ Σ that are related by the
kernel κf produce the same output under f , then we say that the inputs σ and σ′
are indistinguishable under the system modelled by f because the attacker cannot
tell which of the two was supplied to the system based on observed output. Using
this idea, we can describe the information released by a deterministic system that
is modelled by the function f ∶ Σ→ V via its kernel:
∀σ,σ′ ∈ Σ, σ κf σ′ ⇐⇒ f(σ) = f(σ′). (3.1)
The finer the partition of Σ under κf , the more the information that is revealed by
the system that f models. In the following, we will sometimes simply refer to the
deterministic system modelled by a function f as “system f”.
We say that a system g ∶ Σ→ V ′ releases more information than another sys-
tem f ∶Σ→ V iff κg ⊆ κf , where κg and κf are respectively the kernels of g and f .
Using the definition of function kernels, this property can be equivalently stated
as follows.
A deterministic system g ∶ Σ→ V ′ releases more information than another deter-
ministic system f ∶ Σ→ V iff for all σ,σ′ ∈Σ
g(σ) = g(σ′) Ô⇒ f(σ) = f(σ′). (3.2)
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This definition simply says that if g cannot distinguish a pair of inputs, neither can
f . Notice the fact that this definition does not rely on the sets V and V ′ because
intuitively we care only about the ability of a system to distinguish its inputs, that
is, how it partitions its domain. It is easy to see that if the systems f and g both
release the same amount of information, then they are equal up to an isomorphism
of their output representations. Thus, the systems modelled by f ∶Σ→ V and
g ∶Σ→ V ′ release the same information if there exists a set isomorphism ι from
the range of f to that of g such that ι ○ f = g. The information released jointly by
two systems f and g processing independently the same inputs can be modelled by
another system (f, g) ∶ Σ→ V × V ′ given by (f, g)(σ) = (f(σ), g(σ)) and whose
kernel is the equivalence relation κf ∩ κg [LR93].
3.5.2 Lattice of Equivalence Relations
The authors of [LR93] first proposed an equivalence relation model as a way to
describe the security properties of systems. Under the equivalence relation repre-
sentation of information, two elements in the domain of an equivalence relation
R are said to be indistinguishable if they are related by R. Alternatively, we say
that a pair of elements in the domain of R are distinguishable when they are not
related by R. This leads to a lattice of information, represented by equivalence
relations, based on the ability to distinguish elements of a set.
Definition 3.5.1 (Lattice of Equivalence Relations [LR93]). LetΣ be a set, and let
ER(Σ) be the set of all equivalence relations overΣ. Define an information order
relation over R,R′ ∈ ER(Σ) such that R ⊑ R′ iff for all σ,σ′ ∈ Σ, σ R′ σ′ Ô⇒
σ R σ′.
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The combination of the information modelled by the equivalence relations R
and R′ is given by the join R ⊔R′ of the two relations, which is defined such that
for all σ,σ′ ∈ Σ, σ (R ⊔R′) σ′ iff σ Rσ′ and σ R′ σ′. The join operation naturally
extends to subsets R ⊆ ER(Σ) such that for all σ,σ′ ∈ Σ, σ ⊔R σ′ iff for all
R ∈ R, σ R σ′.
It should be noted that the order relation ⊑ on equivalence relations is the reverse
subset inclusion (⊇) order on relations, and is thus the dual of the traditional or-
dering of relations that is based on subset inclusion of their graphs. Consequently,
the join operation ⊔ on equivalence relations corresponds to set intersections ∩.
As demonstrated above, the lattice of equivalence relation models informa-
tion release in deterministic systems. Furthermore, the ordering of equivalence
relations by their information content forms a complete lattice of information.
Proposition 3.5.2. The partially ordered set ⟨ER(Σ),⊑,⊔⟩ is a complete lattice.
Proof. Standard.
Under the equivalence relation representation, the greatest information is the
identity relation (id ∈ ER(Σ)) on the set Σ since by definition it distinguishes
any pair of elements in Σ that are not the same, relating an element to itself only.
The identity equivalence relation represents complete knowledge. An example
of a system which releases this kind of information is one that simply reveals its
input, such as the system g ∶Σ→ Σ defined as ∀σ ∈ Σ, g(σ) = σ. At the other
extreme, the least element of the lattice of equivalence relation is the “for all”
relation all ∈ ER(Σ), defined as ∀σ,σ′ ∈ Σ, σ all σ′. This relation represents no
information since it relates all elements of the set and thus cannot distinguish any
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of them. An example of a system with such an information flow property, that
is, which releases no information is the constant function whose kernel is all. We
shall be referring to the equivalence relations id and all defined over some set
(which will hopefully be clear from the context) throughout the thesis.
We can extend this basic idea to partial equivalence relations (PERs) on the
set of system inputs. PERs are particularly useful in the analysis of composite
systems, providing us with the additional ability to specify the knowledge that a
secret does not belong to a given set. This cannot be stated naturally with equiv-
alence relations since they are, by definition, reflexive. The simple generalisation
to PERs gives us some expressive powers, which we briefly illustrate.
Suppose f ∶ Σ→ V and g ∶ Σ→ V ′ are functions modelling two deterministic
systems, where V and V ′ are disjoint and Σ ⊆ Σ. Let us define another system
model which makes a choice between f and g (depending on whether the input
belongs to the set Σ or not), which is given by 'Σ(f, g) ∶ Σ→ V ∪ V ′ and defined





g(σ) if σ ∈ Σ
f(σ) otherwise.
It is easy to see that the information released by 'Σ(f, g) is in general not κg⊔κf -
the join of the kernels of g and f . This is because the choice restricts the domains
of the two subsystems modelled by f and g. This example in fact demonstrates a
kind of conditional information release, where g releases information only about
inputs in Σ and f releases information about inputs in Σ/Σ (a property which we
shall use in the analysis of information flow in conditional statements in Chap-
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ter 5). By dropping the reflexivity requirement, we can precisely describe the
information flow of this system by two PERs R ∩ κg and R ∩ κf , where R and R
are respectively the PERs ∀σ,σ′ ∈ Σ, σ R σ′ iff σ,σ′ ∈ Σ and ∀σ,σ′ ∈ Σ, σ R σ′
iff σ,σ′ ∈ Σ/Σ. The PER R requires that any pair of inputs must belong to the
set Σ, and R requires that the inputs must belong to the complement of Σ. Hence
the PER R ∩ κg models the information that can distinguish all inputs that g can
distinguish subject to the constraint that the input belongs to Σ (that is, an out-
put from g tells us that the input is not in Σ/Σ). The PER R ∩ κf has similar
information interpretation. Note that the overall information flow of the system
'Σ(f, g) is an equivalence relation given by the union of the two disjoint PERs
(R ∩ κg) ∪ (R ∩ κf). It should be noted that if V and V ′ are not disjoint, such
that for some σ ∈ Σ and σ′ ∈ Σ/Σ we have g(σ) = f(σ′), then the equivalence
relation (R∩κg)∪ (R ∩κf) will be greater than the information actually released
by 'Σ(f, g).
3.5.3 A PER Representation of Information
Partial equivalence relations generalise equivalence relations by dropping the re-
flexivity requirement. This leads to a more general representation of information
based on partial equivalence relations on a set,whereby we can also express when
a secret does not belong to a set - the set of elements not in the domain of the PER.
Definition 3.5.3 (Set of PERs). Let Σ be a set. Define PER(Σ) to be the set of all
partial equivalence relations over the set Σ. The domain of definition of a PER R
on Σ is given by dom(R) ≜ {σ ∈ Σ ∣ σ R σ}.
A PER R is reflexive on its domain of definition since for any σ,σ′ ∈ Σ such
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that σ R σ′ holds, then σ′ R σ holds by symmetry and, thus σ R σ holds by
transitivity. Similarly to equivalence relations, we say that a PERR overΣmodels
information (or more precisely, ignorance) by indistinguishability of elements in
Σ. Thus, ifR ∈ PER(Σ) describes the information or the knowledge of an attacker,
then that attacker cannot distinguish two elements σ,σ′ ∈ Σ if σ R σ′ holds (this
may be read as, σ is indistinguishable from σ′ via informationR). The information
modelled by R describes what elements of the set dom(R) are indistinguishable
by an attacker. All elements in the set Σ/dom(R) are considered not possible in
the world described by the information R.
Using PERs to describe information
Let us further illustrate the use of PERs for information representation. Consider
three PERs on the set Z of integers, representing different levels of information
about an integer secret as follows. The first one is the equivalence relation Par
defined as: ∀n,m ∈ Z, n Par m ⇐⇒ n mod 2 = m mod 2. This describes
the knowledge of parity because it can only distinguish two integer values when
they have different parities. The second one is the equivalence relation id, which
is defined over integers and relates an integer to itself only. This models the
ability to distinguish between any two different integers and therefore contains
more information than Par. The third one is the PER idN which is defined as
∀m,n ∈ Z,m idN n ⇐⇒ n = m,n ∈ N. This PER models the fact that the inte-
ger values must be natural numbers (the knowledge that the integer secret cannot
have a negative value), in addition to the ability to distinguish between any two
such integers. Thus, idN contains more information than id because it limits the
set of possibilities to natural numbers. It is clear, in a computational sense, that
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an attacker which knows beforehand that a certain subset of the domain of secret
values is not possible needs to do less work in searching for that secret than one
that does not know beforehand.
3.5.4 Lattice of PERs
The interpretation of PERs as a representation of information content suggests an
information order of PERs. The intuition is that the information content of a PER
R′ is greater than that of another PER R if R′ distinguishes at least all that R can
distinguish and the domain of R′ is contained in the domain of R.
Definition 3.5.4 (Lattice of PERs). Let Σ be a set. Define the order relation ⊑ on
partial equivalence relations over Σ such that for any R,R′ ∈ PER(Σ), R ⊑ R′
iff for all σ,σ′ ∈ Σ, σ R′ σ′ Ô⇒ σ R σ′. The associated join operation ⊔ on
PER(Σ) is defined as σ (R ⊔ R′) σ′ iff σ R σ′ and σ R′ σ′. More generally, for
any subset R ⊆ PER(Σ) define the join of R as the PER ⊔R, such that for all
σ,σ′ ∈ Σ, σ ⊔R σ′ iff ∀R ∈ R, σ R σ′.
Since PERs are reflexive on their domains, R ⊑ R′ implies dom(R′) ⊆ dom(R).
Note that, similarly to equivalence relations, the partial order ⊑ on PERs is the
reverse subset inclusion order on relations and that ⊔ corresponds to set intersec-
tions on the graph of relations. The ordering of PERs by their information content
forms a complete lattice of information.
Proposition 3.5.5. The partially ordered set ⟨PER(Σ),⊑,⊔⟩ is a complete lattice.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of the completeness of the lattice of equiv-
alence relations.
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Partitions of a PER
We refer to the partition of the set dom(R) by the PER R ∈ PER(Σ), which
describes the information about the elements of Σ as modelled by R. This parti-
tioning is defined as the family of sets, which we denote by
[Σ]R ≜ {{σ′ ∈ Σ ∣ σ R σ′} ∣ σ ∈ dom(R)}. (3.3)
If R is an equivalence relation, then [Σ]R is the set of equivalence classes of
R. Similarly to the standard notation for equivalence classes, we write [σ]R for
the equivalence class of the PER R that σ ∈ dom(R) belongs to. This is defined
as
[σ]R ≜ {σ′ ∈Σ ∣ σ R σ′}. (3.4)
Furthermore, like the membership property of equivalence classes in an equiva-
lence relation, if two elements of Σ are related by a PER R then they belong to
the same equivalence class of R.
Proposition 3.5.6. LetR be a PER over a setΣ, then for any σ,σ′ ∈Σ, σ R σ′ Ô⇒
[σ]R = [σ′]R.
Proof. Straightforward.
In terms of information described by PERs, this means that if a pair of values are
indistinguishable via the knowledge described by a PER, then those values belong
to the same equivalence class of the PER.
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3.5.5 PERs and Disjunctive Information
We shall show in this section that we can represent certain disjunctive information
with PERs, contrary to a conjecture in [SS05] that disjunctive properties may
not be expressed by PERs. Disjunctive information modelling can be useful in
applications, where we want to express the fact that at most one of two pieces of
information is released in a system during a run of the system. For example, we
might want to express the fact that a symmetric encryption module which accepts
a parameter to release either the key or ciphertext releases only the key or the
ciphertext to the recipient (depending on the choice of the release parameter), but
not both at the same time. Firstly, we define the property of a PER when it reveals
at most one of two pieces of information.
Definition 3.5.7 (Disjunctive Information). Let V be a set and letR1,R2 ∈ PER(V )
be PERs over V representing some information, and let R = R1 ⊔ R2 be a PER,
which represents a combination of the information modelled by R1 and R2. We
say that the PER R ∈ PER(V ) contains the disjunctive information R1 and R2 iff
any pair of elements in V that is not related by R1 is related by R2, and any pair
of elements in V that is not related by R2 is related by R1.
This definition requires that wheneverR1 has knowledge about a pair of values
(that is, can distinguish the pair because it is not related by R1) then R2 does
not have the knowledge, and vice versa. Thus, R = R1 ⊔ R2 has the knowledge
about a pair of values if that knowledge comes from at most one of R1 or R2.
More formally, this means that for any (v, v′) ∈ V 2 such that (v, v′) ∉ R, then
either (v, v′) ∉ R1 and (v, v′) ∈ R2, or (v, v′) ∈ R1 and (v, v′) ∉ R2. Since the
information in R1 and R2 are mutually exclusive then R contains the disjunctive
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information R1 and R2 - revealing information that comes from at most one of the
two PERs about any pair of values in V . This is illustrated as follows.
For any PER R ∈ PER(V ) over V , let the ignorance set of R be given by
its graph graph(R) = {(v, v′) ∈ V 2 ∣ v R v′}. On one hand, the set graph(R) is
called the “ignorance set” of R because it is the set of pairs in V 2 that R cannot
distinguish. On the other hand, let graph(R) = V 2/graph(R) be the knowledge
set of R - representing the set of pairs in V 2 that R can distinguish. Clearly, for
any PER, the knowledge and the ignorance sets are disjoint. It is also easy to see
that for any R,R1,R2 ∈ PER(V ) such that R = R1 ⊔R2, we have that graph(R) =
graph(R1) ∩ graph(R2), and that graph(R) = graph(R1) ∪ graph(R2). Now
let A = graph(R1) and B = graph(R2), and assume that R contains disjunctive
information R1 and R2 according to Definition 3.5.7, then graph(R) = (A∩B)∪
(A/B)∪(B/A) = (A/B)∪(B/A). This is because by the disjunctive information
requirement (v, v′) ∈ A Ô⇒ v R2 v′, and by the partitioning property of the
knowledge and ignorance sets of a PER, v R2 v′ Ô⇒ (v, v′) /∈ B. Similarly,
for B, (v, v′) ∈ B Ô⇒ v R1 v′ Ô⇒ (v, v′) ∉ A. Thus, A and B are disjoint
sets. Therefore, whenever R can distinguish a pair of values (that is, (v, v′) ∈
graph(R) = (A/B)∪ (B/A)), that pair is distinguishable by at most one of R1 or
R2.
To show an example, suppose X and Y and Z are sets, which are mutually
disjoint, and such that V = X ∪ Y ∪ Z. Now define PERs R1,R2,R ∈ PER(V )
such that for all v, v′ ∈ V , v R1 v′ ⇐⇒ (v, v′) ∈ (X ∪ Y )2 ∪ (X ∪ Z)2, and
v R2 v′ ⇐⇒ (v, v′) ∈ (Y ∪ Z)2, and R = R1 ⊔ R2. It is easy to see that R1
can distinguish elements of Y from those of Z, since it relates no such pairs.
However, R2 can distinguish any pair of elements in X , and elements of X from
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those of Z, and also elements of X from those of Y . Therefore, R, which relates
a pair of elements in V if and only if the pair belongs to Y 2 or Z2 can distinguish
elements of Y from elements of Z (information that comes from R1 precisely);
and, disjunctively, can also distinguish any pair or elements in X , and elements of
X from those of Z, and elements of X from those of Y (information that comes
precisely from R2).
The idea of disjunctive information can be extended to PERs on maps (or
tuples), where we want to express the idea that a PER reveals information about
at most one of two elements in the domain of the function (or at most about one of
two indices, when we consider tuples). Assume thatVar is a set of variables, and
for each variable x ∈Var, let Vx be the set of all the possible values of x. Now let
Σ = [Var → ⋃x∈Var Vx] be the set of all functions from variables to values, such
that for any σ ∈ Σ and x ∈ Var, σ(x) ∈ Vx is the x-image of the function σ. We
shall refer to σ ∈Σ as a state.
Definition 3.5.8. Let Z ⊆ Var be a set of variables and let Σ0 ⊆ Σ. Define the
operation havoc with the signature havoc ∶ P(Var) ×P(Σ)→ P(Σ) as
havocZ(Σ0) ≜ {σ′ ∈Σ ∣ σ ∈ Σ0,∀y ∈Var/Z,σ(y) = σ′(y)}.
Suppose x ∈Var and let X = {x}, we say that the set Σ ⊆Σ is dense with respect
to the values of x if havocX(Σ) = Σ. That is, for any state σ ∈ Σ, all the possible
values of x are already present in the set Σ since havocX({σ}) ⊆ Σ. We can now
define when a PER over Σ contains disjunctive information about two variables
in Var.
Definition 3.5.9. LetR ∈ PER(Σ) be a PER overΣ and let x, y ∈Var be variables
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such that X = {x} and Y = {y}. The PER R contains disjunctive information
about x and y iff for all σ ∈ dom(R)
havocX([σ]R) ≠ [σ]R Ô⇒ havocY ([σ]R) = [σ]R
and
havocY ([σ]R) ≠ [σ]R Ô⇒ havocX([σ]R) = [σ]R.
This definition requires that any equivalence class of R that is not dense with
respect to the values of the variable x (that is, R has some information about x
in that equivalence class) must be dense with respect to y. Similarly, if an equiv-
alence class of R contains any information with respect to y, it must not contain
any information about x. This definition is a specialisation of Definition 3.5.7
by considering each equivalence class of R as a join two PERs on values, each
of which may contain information about the values of x or y, but not both at the
same time.
To illustrate this, supposeVar = {h1, h2, l} such that h1 and h2 are two integer
secrets and l is a boolean public variable. Let R ∈ PER(Σ) be a PER over Σ such
that R reveals the parity of h1 whenever l is chosen to be tt but reveals the value
of h2 whenever l is chosen to be ff . This is defined as ∀σ,σ′ ∈ Σ, σ R σ′ iff
σ(h1) mod 2 = σ′(h1) mod 2, σ(l) = σ′(l) = tt or σ(h2) = σ′(h2), σ(l) = σ′(l) =
ff . The PERR reveals disjunctive information about h1 (its parity) or h2 (its value)
for any pair of states σ,σ′ ∈ Σ. Take, for example, the equivalence class of σ ∈
dom(R) where σ(l) = ff , any variation in the value of h2 alone is distinguishable
by R, whereas, variations in the value of h1 alone are indistinguishable by R
in that equivalence class. Similarly, for any σ ∈ dom(R) where σ(l) = tt, h1
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either has odd or even parity in the equivalence class [σ]R, and varying only the
parity of h1 is distinguishable by R in this equivalence class, whereas, R does not
distinguish any variation in the value of h2 alone.
It is worth noting that for PERs over states Σ that are not necessarily disjoint,
but which contain disjunctive information according to Definition 3.5.9, we can
create another PER which preserves the disjunctive information by taking disjoint
unions. To illustrate, assume that the PERsR1,R2 ∈ PER(Σ) both contain disjunc-
tive information about variables x, y ∈ Var. Then we can define another PER R
preserving the disjunctive information as follows. Let z ∉Var be a variable which
has two possible values (it does not matter what the values are), for example, let
Vz = {0,1}, and let Σz ≜ [(Var ∪ {z}) → ⋃x∈Var∪{z} Vx] be a domain extension
(of maps in Σ by z). Define the PER R ∈ PER(Σz) overΣz as ∀σ,σ′ ∈Σz, σ R σ′
iff σ R1 σ′, σ(z) = σ′(z) = 0 or σ R2 σ′, σ(z) = σ′(z) = 1. The PER R contains
disjunctive information about x and y.
3.6 Information Flow in Nondeterministic Systems
In the following sections we shall consider representations of information for non-
deterministic system models. The nondeterministic system model generalises the
deterministic one because the public output that is observed is not necessarily
unique for each input to the system. Firstly, we propose a qualitative representa-
tion of information for nondeterministic system models, which is based on fami-
lies of sets that generalises the PER representation of information presented ear-
lier. Secondly, we then present a quantitative representation, which uses proba-
bility measures and information theory to describe the attacker’s knowledge (or
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more precisely, uncertainty) about the inputs.
3.7 A Qualitative Representation
We propose a qualitative representation of information, based on families of sets,
to model possibilistic information flow to the attacker. We say the model is pos-
sibilistic because, given the output observation of the attacker, it reveals whether
certain inputs are possible, as opposed to how likely it is for the inputs to generate
the public observation. However, the quantitative information representation pre-
sented in section 3.8 additionally accounts for the likelihood, using probabilities,
of an input to generate a given output.
3.7.1 Possibilistic Information Representation
Let us start by motivating the use of families of sets as a representation of informa-
tion under a nondeterministic system model. Consider a system, whose relational
model is given by S ⊆ Σ × V . We can describe the information that the attacker
gains on observing the output v ∈ V of the system by the inverse image of v under
S. The inverse image S−1(v) = {σ ∈ Σ ∣ σ S v} of v represents the set of all pos-
sible inputs that can produce the output v in the system modelled by S, and thus
describes the attacker’s uncertainty about the inputs given the observation of v. It
is thus easy to see that the family of sets {S−1(v) ∣ v ∈ V} models the uncertainties
of the attacker under the observation of individual outputs of the system modelled
by S. In the special case that S models a deterministic system, in which case S is
a function, it is clear that {S−1(v) ∣ v ∈ V} corresponds to the set of equivalence
classes of the kernel of the function S, which uniquely identifies the equivalence
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relation overΣ used to describe the information released in the previous sections.
In this sense, the family of sets representation generalises the PER representation.
However, unlike the deterministic model, where for any v, v′ ∈ V , v ≠ v′ im-
plies S−1(v)∩S−1(v′) = ∅, the inverse images are not necessarily disjoint under a
nondeterministic model since the outputs resulting from any given input may not
necessarily be unique. This leads to another avenue of information release in non-
deterministic systems. The property that the nondeterministic system modelled
by S does not necessarily partition its domain introduces the possibility that an
attacker might gain further information by repeated execution of the system under
a fixed input. To illustrate this, suppose S ⊆ Σ × V models a nondeterministic
system, where Σ = {σ1, σ2, σ3} and V = {v1, v2} and where the graph of the rela-
tion S is given by graph(S) = {(σ1, v1), (σ2, v1), (σ2, v2), (σ3, v2)}. The model is
nondeterministic since the input σ2 can produce outputs v1 or v2. By observing an
output v1 the attacker learns that the input must be one of σ1 and σ2, as suggested
by S−1(v1) = {σ1, σ2}. Similarly, on observing the output v2, the attacker learns
that the input is in the set S−1(v2) = {σ2, σ3}. However, if under a fixed input
the attacker observes outputs v1 and v2 in different runs of the system, then the
attacker confirms that the input to the system must be σ2 - derived by taking the
intersection S−1(v1) ∩ S−1(v2). This avenue of information leakage is not avail-
able under the deterministic system model since for a fixed input, the output of
the system always remains the same. This leads us to a definition of information
based on families of sets.
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3.7.2 Lattice of Possibilistic Information
In order to account for the possible refinement of knowledge by repeatedly run-
ning a nondeterministic system under fixed input, the families of sets, which rep-
resent the information that the attacker derives by observing the outputs, must be
closed under set intersection.
Definition 3.7.1 (Lattice of possibilistic information). Let ΣJ = {Σj ⊆ Σ ∣ j ∈ J}
be a family of subsets of Σ indexed by some set J . Define the operation ⟨⟨⋅⟩⟩ on
families of subsets of Σ as ⟨⟨ΣJ⟩⟩ ≜ ⋃K⊆J{⋂ΣK}, which closes the family un-
der intersections. Define the possibilistic information set over Σ as FAM(Σ) ≜
{⟨⟨ΣJ⟩⟩∣ΣJ is a family of subsets of Σ} to represent information contained in fam-
ilies of subsets of Σ. For any ΣJ ,ΣK ∈ FAM(Σ) define the join operation as
ΣJ ⊔ΣK ≜ ⟨⟨ΣJ ∪ΣK⟩⟩ and define the partial order ⊑ to be the subset ordering of
families in FAM(Σ).
The intuition behind the partial ordering ΣJ ⊑ ΣK , for some ΣJ ,ΣK ∈ FAM(Σ),
is that every information token X ∈ ΣJ is also present in ΣK . Thus, from the
relational model S ⊆ Σ × V , we can derive the information that an attacker gains
from the induced family of sets ΣV = {S−1(v) ∣ v ∈ V}, describing the attacker’s
uncertainty under various observations of the outputs of the system modelled by
S. The information that the attacker can gain is then described by the family
⟨⟨ΣV⟩⟩, whose minimal elements identify minimal subsets of the inputs in Σ that
can produce any given output under repeated execution of the system with fixed
inputs.
We note that for any V ⊆ V , the set ⋂ΣV can be empty if there is no common
input for which all outputs in V can be produced. Note also that by definition
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ΣV ⊆ ⟨⟨ΣV⟩⟩ due to the singleton subsets of V , since for any v ∈ V , S−1(v) =
⋂S−1(v) ∈ ⟨⟨ΣV⟩⟩. Furthermore, under the powerset lattice of Σ with the usual
subset ordering, which is a complete lattice, the intersection ⋂F of any family
F of subsets of Σ exists uniquely. In particular, for the empty family, we have
⋂∅ = Σ and hence, ⟨⟨∅⟩⟩ = {Σ}. This has intuitive meaning because Σ, which
is the set of all inputs, rules out no possibility and therefore represents lack of
information. Thus, ⟨⟨∅⟩⟩, which represents the information released by a system
which produces no output agrees with the intuition that it cannot cause information
flow.
The ordering of possibilistic information over inputs, ⟨FAM(Σ),⊑,⊔⟩, forms
a complete lattice.
Theorem 3.7.2. The ordered family of sets ⟨FAM(Σ),⊑,⊔⟩ over Σ, representing
the set of possibilistic information, is a complete lattice.
Proof. Since the relation ⊑ over FAM(Σ) is the subset inclusion order on sets, it
is clear that ⟨FAM(Σ),⊑⟩ is a partially ordered set. In order to show that FAM(Σ)
is a complete lattice, it is sufficient to show that arbitrary joins exist [GHK+03].
We first show that ⊔ is the relevant join operation over FAM(Σ) with respect to
the partial order ⊑. Specifically, we want to show that for any ΣJ ,ΣK ∈ FAM(Σ),
ΣJ ⊑ ΣK iff ΣJ ⊔ΣK = ΣK .
• Suppose ΣJ ⊑ ΣK , that is, ΣJ ⊆ ΣK . Hence ΣJ ∪ΣK = ΣK , and since ΣK ∈
FAM(Σ) is already closed under intersections, ΣJ ⊔ΣK = ⟨⟨ΣK⟩⟩ = ΣK .
• Now assume that ΣJ ⊔ ΣK = ΣK . By the definition of the join operation
on FAM(Σ), we have ΣK = ⟨⟨ΣJ ∪ΣK⟩⟩ = ⟨⟨ΣJ ∪ΣK⟩⟩ ∪ ⟨⟨ΣJ⟩⟩. Since
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ΣJ ∈ FAM(Σ) then ΣJ = ⟨⟨ΣJ⟩⟩. Hence ΣJ ⊔ ΣK = ΣK implies ΣK =
⟨⟨ΣJ ∪ΣK⟩⟩ ∪ΣJ Ô⇒ ΣJ ⊆ ΣK . That is, ΣJ ⊑ ΣK .
This shows the necessary relationship between the join operation and the partial
order over FAM(Σ). It now remains to be shown that arbitrary joins exist in
FAM(Σ). Let F = {ΣJ ∣ J ∈ J } ⊆ FAM(Σ) be an arbitrary subset of FAM(Σ),
where for any J ∈ J , ΣJ is a family of subsets of Σ. It is clear from the definition
that ⊔F = ⟨⟨⋃
J∈J
ΣJ ⟩⟩ ∈ FAM(Σ), since ⋃
J∈J
ΣJ is a family of subsets of Σ.
To illustrate how the lattice FAM(Σ) describes the relative information re-
leased by two systems, consider two nondeterministic systems modelled by the
relations S ⊆Σ ×V and S′ ⊆ Σ × V ′, where Σ = {σ1, σ2, σ3} and V = {v1, v2} and
V ′ = {v′1, v
′
2}. Suppose the graphs of the relations S and S′ are respectively given
by graph(S) = {(σ1, v1), (σ2, v1), (σ1, v2), (σ2, v2), (σ3, v2)} and graph(S′) =






2)}. The set of inverse images under S and S′
are respectively given by ΣV = {{σ1, σ2},Σ} and ΣV ′ = {{σ1, σ2},{σ2, σ3}}.
The situation is illustrated in Figure 3.1, where each squiggle contains the set
of inputs which produce a given output and represents the inverse image of that
output. Intuitively, the set ΣV (of the inverse images under S) has more uncer-
tainty (and thus less information) than the set ΣV ′ (of the inverse images under S′)
since for each output v ∈ V of the system modelled by S there is a correspond-
ing output v′ ∈ V ′ of the other system for which S′−1(v′) ⊆ S−1(v). The greater
information released by the system modelled by S′ is confirmed by the fact that
⟨⟨ΣV⟩⟩ = {{σ1, σ2},Σ} ⊑ ⟨⟨ΣV ′⟩⟩ = {{σ1, σ2},{σ2, σ3},{σ2},Σ}, which means
that by fixing the input to the system S′ the attacker can learn (in addition to what
may be learnt under S) when the input to the system modelled by S′ belongs only
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to the set {σ2, σ3} or {σ2}. The knowledge {σ2, σ3} is gained by observing v′2 in
S′ - which eliminates the possibility of σ1 as the input, as opposed to the knowl-
edge Σ on observing v2 in S, which eliminates no possibility. Furthermore, by
fixing the input it is possible to isolate the input σ2 in the input space of S′, which
is the only input that can produce both v′1 and v′2. These additional information












Model of system S′
Figure 3.1: Information flow under two nondeterministic systems
The qualitative representations of information (equivalence relations, PERs,
and families of sets) presented above for the general nondeterministic system an-
swer the question of whether a given input is possible when an output is observed.
This however does not address the question of how likely, in particular, what the
probability is for such an input to have been chosen. For systems which exhibit
probabilistic nondeterminism, it may be possible to derive the probability that a
certain input has been selected based on the observation of a given output. Thus,
by observing the pattern of the outputs, an attacker may reduce his or her un-
certainty about the inputs by deriving the probabilities for selecting inputs to the
system based on the pattern of outputs. This view of information flow result-
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ing from a change in the attacker’s uncertainty about inputs to a system (which
is modelled by probability distributions over the input space) lends itself to an
information-theoretic analysis presented next.
3.8 A Quantitative Representation
Under the qualitative representations of information flow presented earlier, given
the relational model S ⊆ Σ × V of a system, an attacker on observing an output
v ∈ V thinks it possible that the input σ ∈Σ may have been supplied to the system
whenever (σ, v) ∈ S - although it might be extremely unlikely that the input σ
generates the output v. We consider probabilistic systems, which have probability
distributions associated with the occurrence of their inputs and outputs and derive
a quantitative measure, based on Shannon’s information theory, which describes
the level of uncertainty of the attacker induced by the system’s probabilistic input-
output dependency. For the quantitative probabilistic analysis that we consider in
this thesis, we assume that both the set Σ and V are finite.
3.8.1 Probability Measures and Entropy
We start by presenting standard definitions from probability and information the-
ory, and introduce some notations that we shall use in the analysis.
Definition 3.8.1 (σ-Algebra [Hal03]). The set F of subsets of Σ is an algebra
over Σ if it contains Σ and is closed under set union and complementing, so that
if Σ,Σ′ ∈ F then so are Σ ∪ Σ′,Σ = Σ/Σ ∈ F . A σ-algebra is closed under
complementing and countable union, so that if Σ1,Σ2, . . . ∈ F then ⋃iΣi ∈ F .
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A probability space over Σ is a triple ⟨Σ,F , µ⟩, where F is an algebra over
Σ, and µ ∶ F → [0,1] called a probability measure is a map to the closed real
interval [0,1] such that
• µ(Σ) = 1
• µ(Σ ∪Σ′) = µ(Σ) + µ(Σ′) for any disjoint Σ,Σ′ ∈ F .
Any algebra is also closed under intersection since by De Morgan’s duality we
have that Σ ∩Σ′ = Σ ∪Σ′ for any pair Σ,Σ′ ∈ F . A set Σ ∈ F is called an event.
Since the set Σ that we shall consider for the probabilistic information analysis is
assumed to be finite, we have that F is always a σ-algebra. Furthermore, we shall
always take F to be the powerset P(Σ).
Definition 3.8.2 (Probability Measures). For any finite set Σ considered, define
F ≜ P(Σ) to be an algebra over Σ. Furthermore, define the set of all probability
measures over Σ to be M (Σ) ≜ {µ ∣ ⟨Σ,F , µ⟩ is a probability space over Σ}.







This property is referred to as finite additivity. In the following, since the algebra
F = P(Σ) is the powerset of the finite set Σ, it is sufficient to define µ for single-
ton subsets of Σ because we can derive the probability (using the finite additivity





We shall often omit the braces for singleton events and simply write µ(σ), for
brevity, instead of µ({σ}).
Conditional Probability
We shall use the notion of conditional probability to describe how an attacker’s
observation of a system’s outputs affects the attacker’s initial uncertainty about the
inputs to the system. This is because information flow occurs when the attacker is
able to reduce his or her uncertainty about inputs based on the observation of the
system output.
Suppose Σ and V are respectively the sets of inputs and outputs of a system
whose relational model is S ⊆Σ×V . We assume that bothΣ and V are finite. Let
µ ∈ M (Σ×V) be a probability measure describing the probability of event E ∈ F
(where F = P(Σ × V)) occurring. For any singleton event {(σ, v)} ∈ F , we write
µ(σ, v) ≜ µ({(σ, v)}) for the joint probability of input σ and output v occurring
under the system in question.
For any σ ∈ Σ, define Eσ ≜ {(σ, v) ∣ v ∈ V}. Then the marginal probability
of the input value σ occurring is given by µ(Eσ) = ∑
v∈V
µ(σ, v). We shall simply
denote this probability as µ(σ) ≜ µ(Eσ). Similarly, for any v ∈ V , define Ev ≜
{(σ, v) ∣ σ ∈Σ}, the marginal probability of v is given by µ(v) ≜ µ(Ev).
Now suppose E,E′ ∈ F are events, then the conditional probability that E




if µ(E′) > 0. (3.5)
For a given E′ ∈ F , µ(⋅ ∣E′) is also a probability measure [Ros06]. For any input
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σ ∈ Σ and output v ∈ V , we shall write the conditional probability that σ was
selected given that v was observed as
µ(σ ∣ v) ≜ µ(Eσ ∣Ev) =
µ(σ, v)
µ(v)
if µ(v) > 0. (3.6)
This definition follows directly from (3.5). Whenever µ(v) = 0, the conditional
probability µ(σ ∣ v) is undefined. The conditional probability, µ(v ∣ σ), that the
output v is produced given that input σ was selected is similarly defined.
Random Variables
Assume that µ ∈ M (Σ × V) is a probability measure over Σ × V as define above,
we shall designate two random variables XΣ over Σ and XV over V respectively
to represent occurrence of inputs in Σ and outputs in V . For any σ ∈ Σ, XΣ = σ
means that the random variable XΣ takes on the value of σ, and the probability of
this happening (written µ(XΣ = σ)) is µ(Eσ) = µ(σ), which as shown above is
the marginal probability of selecting σ. Similarly, for any v ∈ V , the probability
of XV = v occurring is µ(v). When we consider probability measures µ ∈ M (Σ)
over a setΣ alone, we shall use µ interchangeably for both the probability measure
and the random variable over Σ induced by this measure.
Entropy
The notion of entropy describes, quantitatively, the degree of uncertainty encoded
in a random variable. Suppose µ is a probability measure over Σ, this induces a
random variable that we also denote by µ, which takes on a value σ ∈ Σ with a
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The logarithm in definition (3.7) is traditionally to the base 2 and the measurement
unit is bit. Furthermore, whenever µ(σ) = 0 then µ(σ) log 1
µ(σ)
is conventionally
taken to be 0, which is reasonable since lim
x→0+
x log x = 0.
The value of H(µ) measures the degree of uncertainty over the space Σ as
described by µ. We shall use this measure to describe the information that an at-
tacker gains by computing the difference in the attacker’s uncertainty at two points
in time: before and after the observation of outputs. For example, if by the ob-
servation of outputs the attacker whose uncertainty is encoded by the probability
measure µ becomes less uncertain - represented by another probability measure
µ′, then the information gained can be characterised by the quantityH(µ)−H(µ′).
We note two properties of the entropy measure [Mac03, Sha48]. Suppose µ is
a probability measure over the nonempty finite set Σ which has n elements, we
have
• H(µ) ≥ 0, and H(µ) = 0 when there exists a σ ∈ Σ for which µ(σ) = 1
(uncertainty is minimised when an event becomes certain).
• H(µ) ≤ log(n), and H(µ) = log(n) when µ(σ) = 1
n
for all σ ∈ Σ (uncer-
tainty is maximised when all events are equally likely).
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Conditional Entropy and Mutual Information
Now consider a probability measure µ ∈ M (Σ × V) over Σ × V , and the induced
random variablesXΣ (∀σ ∈Σ, µ(XΣ = σ) = µ(σ)) and XV (∀v ∈ V , µ(XV = v) =















The conditional entropy of the random variable XΣ, given the observation of the
event XV = v for some v ∈ V is defined as
H(XΣ ∣XV = v) ≜ ∑
σ∈Σ




We shall write H(XΣ ∣XV = v) simply as H(XΣ ∣ v), and it represents the un-
certainty which remains about XΣ when XV = v is observed. For any σ ∈ Σ,
H(XV ∣ σ) is similarly defined.
The average, or expected conditional entropy of XΣ given XV is defined as
H(XΣ ∣XV) ≜ ∑
v∈V
µ(v)H(XΣ ∣ v).
The mutual information between the random variables XΣ and XV describes how
much of information about XΣ is encoded in XV and vice versa. The mutual
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information between XΣ and XV is defined as
I(XΣ;XV) ≜ H(XΣ) −H(XΣ ∣XV). (3.8)
Intuitively, I(XΣ;XV) measures the remaining uncertainty about XΣ after XV
is known. This measure is always positive because H(XΣ) ≥ H(XΣ ∣XV), and
equality occurs when XΣ and XV are independent [Sha48]. The mutual informa-
tion measure is used in our analysis to determine the information that flows from
the inputs to the outputs of a system. The use of this measure to characterise infor-
mation flow is not new [CHM07]. We now show that the information contained
in random variables can be arranged on a lattice by using the entropy measure to
describe the relative amount of information that they contain.
3.8.2 Lattice of Probabilistic Information
In this section we show that the set M (Σ) of probability measures over Σ can
be arranged on a lattice based on Shannon’s entropy measure of their relative
quantitative information contents. The entropy measure, by design [Sha48], is
not sensitive to permutations of the probabilities assigned to events under a given
probability measure. For example, since it is immaterial which particular event
becomes certain when we have the least entropy of zero, it is clear that there is
no unique probability measure which maximises information release. This fact
suggests that an order on probability measures based on Shannon’s entropy will
only be a preorder. However, this does not pose a serious technical difficulty as
we can move to a partial order over equivalence classes of probability measures
with the same entropy.
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Definition 3.8.3 (Lattice of probability measures). Let µ,µ′ ∈ M (Σ) be proba-
bility measures over a finite set Σ. Define a preorder ⪯ on M (Σ) as µ ⪯ µ′ iff
H(µ′) ≤ H(µ).
Now define the equivalence relation θ over M (Σ) as µ θ µ′ iff µ ⪯ µ′ and
µ′ ⪯ µ, and define Mθ(Σ) ≜ {[µ]θ ∣ µ ∈ M (Σ)} to be the set of equivalence
classes of the relation θ over M (Σ). Define a partial order ⊑ on Mθ(Σ), which
for any µ,µ′ ∈ M (Σ) is given by [µ]θ ⊑ [µ′]θ iff µ ⪯ µ′. The join operation on
Mθ(Σ) is defined as usual such that [µ]θ ⊔ [µ′]θ = [µ′]θ iff [µ]θ ⊑ [µ′]θ.
The partially ordered set ⟨Mθ(Σ),⊑,⊔⟩, which we call the lattice of Shannon’s
information measures, is a complete lattice as will be shown shortly. From an
information-theoretic point of view, if µ ⪯ µ′ ⪯ µ holds, the amount of infor-
mation that two attackers whose uncertainties are described by the probability
measures µ and µ′ have is the same. However, since the relation ⪯ is not antisym-
metric this does not necessarily mean that µ and µ′ are the same. The reason is
that the computation of entropy does not distinguish between mere permutations
of probabilities of events over which a probability measure is defined [Sha48].
For example, if Σ = {σ,σ′} such that µ(σ) = 1 and µ(σ′) = 0, whereas µ′(σ) = 0
and µ′(σ′) = 1, we have H(µ) = H(µ′) = 0. In fact, for any pair of probability
measures on this set where µ1(σ) = µ2(σ′) and µ1(σ′) = µ2(σ) it is easy to see
that H(µ) = H(µ′). As entropy merely quantifies the degree of uncertainty in ele-
ments of M (Σ), we achieve partial ordering by moving to a set whose canonical
elements are the equivalence classes of the relation θ ≜ ⪯ ∩ ⪰ which relates proba-
bility measures with equal entropy. This technique is standard, and it allows us to
obtain a partially ordered set ⟨Mθ(Σ),⊑⟩. The quantitative information content
of the lattice of Shannon’s information measures, ⟨Mθ(Σ),⊑,⊔⟩, over Σ forms a
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complete lattice.
Theorem 3.8.4. LetΣ be a finite set. The ordered set ⟨Mθ(Σ),⊑,⊔⟩ is a complete
lattice.
Proof. It is clear that ⊑ is a partial order. Now take any pair [µ]θ, [µ′]θ ∈ Mθ(Σ)
for some µ,µ′ ∈ M (Σ). The join, and the meet operation, which is dually de-
fined, exist uniquely and are well defined. Hence Mθ(Σ) is a lattice. From the
properties of entropy and the fact that Σ is finite we know that there is a greatest
element of Mθ(Σ) corresponding to the entropy of 0 and there also exists a least
element corresponding to the entropy H(µ), where µ is the probability mea-
sure which assigns equal probabilities to all σ ∈ Σ. In particular, since entropy
is continuous over probability measures [Sha48], ⟨Mθ(Σ),⊑⟩ is lattice isomor-
phic to the closed real interval I = ⟨[0, log(∣Σ∣)],≥⟩ (which is bounded above and
below respectively by the entropy measures 0 and log(∣Σ∣)) via the isomorphism
ι([µ]θ) ≜ H(µ). Hence, ⟨Mθ(Σ),⊑⟩ is a complete lattice.
3.8.3 Deriving Probabilistic Information Flow
We shall now apply the information-theoretic definitions above to the analysis of
information flow using the relational model of systems. Here, in addition to the
relational model S ⊆ Σ × V , we also make use of a joint probability measure
µ ∈ M (Σ × V) over system’s input-output domain characterising how the system
transfers probabilistic information from its inputs to its outputs.
Definition 3.8.5. Let SP ⊆ Σ × V be the relational model of a system P over its
set Σ of inputs and set V of its outputs, both of which are finite. In addition, let
µˆ ∈ M (Σ × V) be a probability measure over Σ × V such that for all σ ∈ Σ and
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v ∈ V , µˆ(σ, v) is the joint probability of supplying input σ to P and producing the
output v.
Let µ ∈ M (Σ) to be a probability measure over Σ describing an attacker’s
initial uncertainty over the input space such that for any σ ∈ Σ, µ(σ) =∑v∈V µˆ(σ, v).
Similarly, let µ′ ∈ M (V), such that for any v ∈ V , µ′(v) = ∑σ∈Σ µˆ(σ, v) is the
marginal probability of observing output v in P . Furthermore, let the conditional
probability measure µv ∈ M (Σ) be the attacker’s uncertainty about the inputs
after observing output v ∈ V which for any σ ∈Σ is given by µv(σ) ≜ µˆ(σ ∣ v).
The quantitative information flow via P to an attacker whose initial uncer-
tainty about the input is described by µ is given by
I⟨P,µ⟩ ≜ H(µ) −∑
v∈V
µ′(v)H(µv).
The information I⟨P,µ⟩ = I(XΣ;XV) released by P is the mutual information (see
(3.8)) between the random variable XΣ induced by the probability measures µ
over the input space Σ and random variable XV induced by the probability mea-
sure µ′ over the output space V . Let us illustrate Definition 3.8.5 with examples.
Suppose the secret h ∈ {0,1,2,3} is a parameter to the program P and that
P reveals the parity of h by producing an output hmod 2. Now suppose that
h is chosen with uniform probability over its set of possible values. Then the
relational model of P is given by SP ⊆ Σ × {0,1}, where the 2-bit state Σ is rep-
resented by the set Σ = {σ0, σ1, σ2, σ3} where for all i, σi = [h ↦ i] and we have
graph(SP ) = {(σ0,0), (σ1,1), (σ2,0), (σ3,1)}. Since all inputs are equally likely,
we have∀i, µ(σi) = 14 . Furthermore, becauseP is deterministic, for all (σ, v) ∈ SP
the joint probability σ and v is µˆ(σ, v) = 1
4
. Hence we can compute the marginal
78
probabilities µ′(v) of the outputs v ∈ {0,1}, which are µ′(0) = ∑σ∈Σ µˆ(σ,0) = 12 ,
and µ′(1) = 1
2







= µ0(σ2) and µ0(σ1) = µ0(σ3) = 0.
Similarly,
µ1(σ1) = µ1(σ3) =
1
2
and µ1(σ0) = µ1(σ2) = 0.
The information released is I⟨P,µ⟩ = H(µ) − (12H(µ0) +
1
2
H(µ1) = 1. The 1-bit
information that is derived corresponds to the knowledge gained by the attacker,
which now knows whether the parity of h is even or not. Under the same setup,
where h is chosen with uniform probability, if we consider the program P2 which
reveals h directly, we now have the information released to be I⟨P2,µ⟩ = 2 bits.
This is clear, since the attacker completely learns the secret h. However, if we
consider under the same setting, a program P3, which produces a constant output
regardless of the choice of h, the information flow is I⟨P3,µ⟩ = 0 bits. This is also
intuitive because the output of P3 is independent of h. Definition 3.8.5 applies
also to nondeterministic system models, which we illustrate next.
In this example, we introduce a construct 8p for probabilistic nondetermin-
ism. Informally, the semantics of the probabilistic construct c1 8p c2 is to exe-
cute the subprogram c1 with a probability of p and to execute program c2 with
a probability of 1 − p, where 0 < p < 1. The formal semantics of a program-
ming language featuring this construct is presented in Chapter 4. Now, con-
sider the nondeterministic program P4 ≜ P 8.8 P5 which accepts a parameter
h ∈ {0,1,2,3} and which is made up of two deterministic subprograms: P -
introduced above, which reveals the parity of h, and P5 which produces output 2
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when h = 0 and produces output 3 otherwise - hence P5 reveals whether h = 0
or not. Now suppose, as in the previous example, that h is chosen with equal
probability as the input to P4. The set of possible outputs of P4 is V4 = {0,1,2,3}
and thus its relational model is given by SP4 ⊆ Σ × V4, where graph(SP4) =
{(σ0,0), (σ0,2), (σ1,1), (σ1,3), (σ2,0), (σ2,3), (σ3,1), (σ3,3)}. Using the fact
that for all i = 0,1,2,3, the probability of choosing the input σi is µ(σi) = 14 , then
the input-output joint probabilities is computed from P4 as µ(σ0,0) = µ(σ1,1) =




these we obtain the marginal probabilities of the outputs, where µ′(i) is the prob-
ability of producing output i as: µ′(0) = µ′(1) = 2
5
and µ′(2) = 1
20
and µ′(3) = 3
20
.
Additionally, by applying the definitions, the conditional probabilities (µi(σj))
that σj was chosen as the input given the observation of the output i are the fol-
lowing: µ0(σ0) = µ0(σ2) = µ1(σ1) = µ1(σ3) = 12 and µ2(σ0) = 1 and µ3(σ1) =
µ3(σ2) = µ3(σ3) = 13 , and for every other i and j, we have µi(σj) = 0. The quanti-
tative information released by P4 is given by I⟨P4,µ⟩ = H(µ)−∑v∈V4 µ(v)H(µv) ≈
0.9623. Although the result 0.9623 bit is not very intuitive, there is some logic be-
hind the value. Considered independently, the program P5 reveals about 0.8113 bit
of information about h, and we have already shown earlier that P reveals 1 bit of
information about h. However, in P4, P is executed 80% of the time and P5 is ex-
ecuted in the remaining 20%. Thus, the information released about h in P agrees
with the semantics and comes from the fact that 0.8×I⟨P,µ⟩+0.2×I⟨P5,µ⟩ ≈ 0.9623.
This captures a sense of the frequency or the weighted rate of information release
by the two subprograms.
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Summary We have developed a lattice-based policy model for what declassi-
fication policies in this chapter. Useful policy patterns were identified under the
lattice-based policy model. The lattice model of information is shown to cap-
ture natural intuitions about information and information flow. An input-output
relational model was presented as a theoretical primitive for the analysis of infor-
mation flow. Using the relational model, various representations of information
suitable for the analysis of information flow in deterministic and nondeterministic
systems were developed and shown to fit into the lattice model of information.
In Chapter 4 we shall show how to derive the relational model, in language-
based settings, from the operational semantics of programming languages. The
analyses, which are performed parametric to an attacker model, allow us to study
information gained by the chosen attacker. The attackers are assumed to have a
specification (such as the algorithm or protocol that the system implements, or the
program source code) of the system being attacked so that, given any input, the
attacker can work out the possible output(s) that the system can produce. These
assumptions describe, for example, the malicious code scenario where the attacker
is possibly the author of the program that processes sensitive data.
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Chapter 4
Information Flow in Computational
Systems
The goal of this chapter is to demonstrate how to develop the relational model
introduced in the previous chapter from the operational semantics in a language-
based setting, and to show how to derive a system’s information flow property
from this relational model, which is defined parametric to a given attacker’s ob-
servational power.
To provide a concrete language-based setting, a simple While language with
output is introduced as an imperative core language for studying systems with
output interactions. The operational semantics of this core language is presented.
An illustrative semantic attacker model is presented to demonstrate the defini-
tion of attacker models for information flow analyses. The resulting analyses of
information flow with respect to the semantic attacker model demonstrate how
termination-sensitive analyses may be developed under the relational model.
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4.1 Operational Semantics and Observational Power
We consider computational systems, which process confidential data supplied as
part of their inputs and which may produce publicly observable outputs. In or-
der to model what an attacker may learn by observing such a system, we need
to be able to specify what the attacker can observe about the system’s operation.
This is referred to as the attacker model and is defined by the attacker’s obser-
vational power, which describes what the attacker can see about the execution of
the system. We shall formalise the attacker’s observational power with respect to
the operational semantics of the system being analysed to enable us to derive the
system’s information flow property, relative to this attacker model.
A standard way to model the operational semantics of a computational system
is by using a transition systems. We shall use a labelled transition system to model
the operational semantics, where the labels in the transition relation of the tran-
sition system describe what the attacker sees during a transition of the system in
question. Labelled transition systems are powerful tools for describing, at differ-
ent levels of abstractions, the aspects of a system’s operation that are relevant to an
analysis. Well known examples of operational description of systems include the
structural operational semantics (SOS) that is also called the “small-step” seman-
tics [Plo81], and evaluation relations (also called “big-step SOS” or the “natural
semantics” [Kah87]), which are used to formalise the semantics of programs. It is
also common to describe interactions of a system with (or its effects [NNH99] on)
its environment by using labels in the transition system [Mil99, AFV01, PAK02].
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4.1.1 Labelled Transition Systems and Interaction
A transition system is a pair (C ,↠), where C is a set of system configurations
or states, and the binary relation ↠⊆ C × C defines valid transitions between
configurations. The reflexive, transitive closure of ↠, written as ↠∗, is defined
as s0 ↠∗ sn iff there is a sequence of transitions s0 ↠ s1 ↠ ⋯ ↠ sn, for some
s0, s1,⋯, sn ∈ C . The transition system (C ,↠) is said to be deterministic when
the resulting configuration of every transition is uniquely determined by the initial
configuration, that is, for all s, s′, s′′ ∈ C , s↠ s′ and s↠ s′′ means that s′ = s′′,
otherwise the transition system is said to be nondeterministic.
We shall consider systems which have output interactions, which may occur
at any point during the run of the system, and which may be observable by an
attacker. Interactive systems [Mil99] are traditionally modelled as as labelled
transition systems (or automaton [HU79]), where labels capture the interactions
between the system and its environment. A labelled transition system is a triple
(C ,Ð→,A ), which may be viewed as a transition system that is augmented with
a set A of labels (also referred to as actions) to capture the system’s interactions.
The transition relation in a labelled transition system is a ternary relation Ð→⊆
C ×A × C . If for some action a ∈ A and configurations s, s′ ∈ C we have that
(s, a, s′) ∈Ð→, then the system is said to make a transition from configuration s
to s′ with the effect a. This is often written as s aÐ→ s′. A labelled transition
system (C ,Ð→,A ) is deterministic if for all s, s′, s′′ ∈ C and a ∈ A , s aÐ→ s′ and
s
a
Ð→ s′′ means that s′ = s′′, otherwise it is nondeterministic [Mil99].
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4.1.2 Attacker Models
In this section we shall formalise attacker models via a notion of observational
power that describes what an attacker sees during a run of a labelled transi-
tion system. Suppose T = (C ,Ð→,A ) is a labelled transition system which
formalises the semantics of a given computational system. In order to model
what the attacker can see about this system’s operation, we can define a function
O ∶ C ×A ×C →AO on the transition relation, called the observational power,
which models what the attacker sees during each transition of the system T . The
set AO may be chosen arbitrarily, elements of which represent what the attacker
actually sees. Thus, the observational power O can be defined such that for
all (s, a, s′) ∈Ð→, where s, s′ ∈ C and a ∈ A there exists a′ ∈ AO such that
O(s, a, s′) = a′. The intention is that, while the action a in (s, a, s′) captures
the interaction of T in the original sense, O rewrites this as a′ to describe what
the attacker actually sees. In the simplest case, O is just an identity function on
actions, which results in an attacker model that is interacting with the system as
originally prescribed by the operational semantics. However, we may want to
model more powerful attacker’s which can observe internal system actions, such
as an attacker running a program in a debugger, where internal actions can be
observed; or a less powerful attacker which is interacting only with a part of the
system where otherwise externally visible actions in some system parts are invisi-
ble under the attacker model, for example, in a client-server application where the
attacker in question can only observe the system’s interactions that are visible on
the attacker’s client.
The observational power O allows us to specify precisely (by transforming
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system interactions) how an attacker interacts with the system. This gives us a
general tool to model different kinds of attackers which can interact with a system
in non-standard ways. The introduction of O induces a view TO = (C ,Ð→O ,AO)
of the system T = (C ,Ð→,A ), where TO is a labelled transition system, which
describes T as the attacker with the observational power O sees it. Thus, if the
transition relation Ð→O⊆ C × AO × C of the transition system TO is defined as
(s, a′, s′) ∈Ð→O iff (s, a, s′) ∈Ð→ and O(s, a, s′) = a′, then the induced transition
system TO is capable of describing every possible transition in the semantics of
T because O is totally defined over all (s, a, s′) related by Ð→. Observational
powers OA and OB defined over a system’s transition relations can be compared
according to their relative powers, where the attacker modelled by OB is said to
be at least as powerful as the attacker modelled by OA if there exists a function
f such that OA = f ○ OB, that is, the observational power function OA has less
variety than OB.
We may also describe an attacker’s observational power over a system at the
trace level rather than only at the level of the individual transitions in the transition
system as shown above. A trace of the labelled transition system T = (C ,Ð→,A )
is a sequence of transitions, written as s0
a0Ð→ s1
a1Ð→ s2
a2Ð→ ⋯ where for all n,
(sn, an, sn+1) ∈Ð→, and s0 ∈ Ci is a configuration chosen from a distinguished set
of starting configurations Ci of the system modelled by T . Such an observational
power, obs(⋅), is thus a map from the set of traces of T to the set of observed
sequences. Observational powers obsA(⋅) and obsB(⋅) over a system’s traces may
also be arranged according to their relative degrees of power, where obsB(⋅) is
said to be at least as powerful as obsA(⋅) if there exists a function f such that
obsA(⋅) = f ○ obsB(⋅).
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In the next section we shall show how to derive the relational model of a
system, given the relevant transition system and a model of the attacker’s obser-
vational power over the transition system.
4.1.3 Deriving the Relational Model
In Chapter 3 we showed how to derive the information released by a system from
its relational model which associates the system’s input with the output(s) that
the attacker observes. We now show how such a relational model can be de-
rived for the system described by the labelled transition system (C ,Ð→,A ) under
the observational power O of a given attacker model. This leads to a configura-
tion TS = (C ,Ð→,A ,O), which refers to the original labelled transition system
(C ,Ð→,A ) augmented with the attacker model described by O . The induced TS
essentially defines a new transition system that is similar to the definition of TO
from T in the previous section. It is also clear that the original labelled transi-
tion system (C ,Ð→,A ) is a special case of TS , which is obtained when O is an
identity on A .
Definition 4.1.1 (Deriving the Relational Model). Let TS = (C ,Ð→,A ,O) be a
labelled transition system under the observational power O , and let Ci ⊆ C be the
set of all the initial configurations of TS. Define the set of all finite and infinite
traces of TS as seen by O to be
TTS ≜ {s0
a0Ð→ s1
a1Ð→⋯∣s0 ∈ Ci.∀n ≥ 0, (sn, a′n, sn+1) ∈Ð→,O(sn, a
′
n, sn+1) = an}.
Furthermore, for any s0 ∈ Ci let ts0 ⊆ TTS be the set of all traces starting at the
initial configuration s0. Now define the set of observations, given the starting con-
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figuration s0 as obs(ts0) ≜ {a0a1⋯ ∣ s0 a0Ð→ s1 a1Ð→ ⋯ ∈ ts0}, modelling the possible
interactions of TS with the attacker whose observational power is O when TS is
started at the configuration s0. The set of all observations of the system is given
by V = ⋃s∈Ci obs(ts) and the relational model of this system induced by O is now
the relation S ⊆ Ci × V whose graph is
graph(S) = {(s, a) ∣ s ∈ Ci, a ∈ obs(ts)}.
This definition provides us with a general tool for describing information flow in
deterministic and nondeterministic systems. The element a = a0a1⋯ ∈ obs(ts0)
is the sequential juxtaposition of the individual observations a0, a1,⋯ of the trace
s0
a0Ð→ s1
a1Ð→ ⋯ ∈ ts0 . Since the system may be nondeterministic it is clear that
obs(ts) may not be a singleton set and, therefore, S may not be a function from
configurations to sequences of actions. The relation S abstractly describes the
interaction a of the attacker with the system (modelled by TS), given the initial
configuration s of the system, whenever s is related to a by S.
To illustrate the definitions above in a more concrete setting, the next section
presents the While language as a language-based instantiation for the analysis of
information flow in deterministic systems.
4.2 The While Language
We now present the imperative While language, shown in Figure 4.1, upon which
our analysis of information flow in the next chapter shall be based. The operational
semantics of this language is fairly standard [NNH99, Win93], and it has been
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used as the core imperative language in many language-based security settings.
An addition to this language is the write construct for program output, which is
used to model output interaction of a system with its environment. The semantics
of the write statement is the same as that of the output statement of [GBJS06].
Information flow in interactive programs is recently gaining more attention in
language-based security [Bac05, OCC06, GBJS06, AS07, AHSS08]. Since in-
teractive programs are common in practice, the study of the effect of interaction
on information flow is important to give us a more realistic account of information
flow in real systems.
c ∶∶= skip ∣ z ∶= e ∣ write e ∣ c; c ∣
if(b)then c else c ∣ while (b) do c.
Figure 4.1: The While Language with Output
4.2.1 While Expressions and Program States
We consider only boolean and integer expressions in While programs, but the
analysis techniques developed can be extended to other data types in a fairly
straightforward manner. Boolean-valued expressions (ranged over by b) and integer-
valued expressions respectively evaluate to values in the set B ≜ {tt,ff} and Z ≜
{⋯,−2,−1,0,1,2,⋯}. Accordingly, we have standard data types τ ∈ {bool, int}
whose denotations are sets, and are given by JboolK ≜ B and JintK ≜ Z. The set
Exp (ranged over by e and b) of all expressions considered are constructed in the
standard way by using arithmetic and boolean operators. Furthermore, program
variables are taken from the setVar, which is ranged over by x, y, z, h and l, using
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subscripts when necessary. We also refer to the function FV ∶ Exp→ P(Var),
which denotes the set of free variables in a given expression.
Program states σ ∈ Σ are finite maps from variables to values. The evaluation
of expression e ∈ Exp at a state σ ∈Σ is summarised as σ(e), and for any expres-
sion e and state σ considered it is assumed that FV (e) ⊆ dom(σ), where dom(σ)
is the domain of definition of σ. Furthermore, the evaluation of an expression is
assumed to have no side effect on the program state.
4.2.2 While Commands
The set of While commands is denoted by Com. As Figure 4.1 shows, sim-
ple commands include the standard skip statement and assignment statement, as
well as the write statement (used for program output). Other program command
constructors include the conditional if statement construct - for choice, the con-
ditional while statement construct - for iteration or looping, and the composition
constructor (;) for sequential composition of programs. The operational semantics
of While is presented next.
4.2.3 The Operational Semantics of While
In this section we present the operational semantics of the While language. The
analysis that will be performed is based on an attacker model which can observe
output interactions. Thus, in order to formalise this interaction, we introduce two
basic types of actions: ε,out(⋅) ∈ A , where ε stands for internal action that is not
ordinarily observable from the environment and out(v) stands for the output of
the value v to the system’s environment where v can be observed by the attacker.
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The operational semantics of While is specified by transition relations be-
tween command and expression configurations. A command configuration is a
pair ⟨c, σ⟩ ∈ Com ∪ {⋅} ×Σ, which represents a command c to be executed at the
state σ. When there are no more commands to execute, a special terminal com-
mand configuration, ⟨⋅, σ⟩, indicates the termination of the program in the state
σ ∈ Σ. Similarly, an expression configuration is a pair ⟨e, σ⟩ ∈ Exp ×Σ, which
evaluates the expression e at the state σ. Since the evaluation of an expression
does not have side effect on program states and the evaluation operation itself is
taken to be an internal action, the evaluation relation for the expression e at the
state σ is summarised as ⟨e, σ⟩ εÐ→ ⟨σ(e), σ⟩, where σ(e) is the value of e at σ.
Assignments modify program states, and in anticipation of this, we use the
standard definition of state update for some program state σ ∈ Σ and z1, z2 ∈
dom(σ) which updates the variable z1 in state σ with a value v that is taken from
the data type of z1 as follows




v if z1 = z2
σ(z2) otherwise.
(4.1)
The full operational semantics of While is presented in Figure 4.2. This seman-
tics is fairly standard, with the exception of the transition rule for write statements.
This rule says that write does not modify program state, but that the observer can
see the value of the evaluated expression when the statement is executed. The la-
bel a ∈ A represents a program action which an attacker may be able to observe.
Let us illustrate how this can be used to describe how an attacker might reason
about the possible starting state of a deterministic program. Consider the pro-
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Ð→ ⟨tt, σ⟩ ⟨c1, σ⟩
a
Ð→ ⟨c′1, σ′⟩





Ð→ ⟨ff , σ⟩ ⟨c2, σ⟩
a
Ð→ ⟨c′2, σ′⟩





Ð→ ⟨tt, σ⟩ ⟨c, σ⟩
a
Ð→ ⟨c′, σ′⟩
⟨while (b) do c, σ⟩ aÐ→ ⟨c′;while (b) do c, σ′⟩
⟨b, σ⟩
ε
Ð→ ⟨ff , σ⟩
⟨while (b) do c, σ⟩ εÐ→ ⟨⋅, σ⟩
Figure 4.2: Operational semantics of While
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gram in Figure 4.3, where the attacker can see the program outputs via the write
statements, but does not know the value of the secret integer input x.
i f ( x<10) then
w r i t e 1 ;
e l s e
w r i t e 2 ;
i f ( x =15) then
w r i t e 1 ;
e l s e
w r i t e 2 ;
Figure 4.3: Reasoning about program secrets
We denote the sequence of output values of this program as tuples. For ex-
ample, the observation for the trace ⟨P,σ⟩ out(1)Ð→ ⟨P ′, σ⟩ out(2)Ð→ ⟨⋅, σ⟩ is denoted by
⟨1,2⟩. Thus, for any chosen starting state, this program produces an output in the
set V = {⟨1,2⟩, ⟨2,1⟩, ⟨2,2⟩}, which the attacker can use to reason about possible
starting states as follows.
• The output sequence ⟨1,2⟩, correspond to two individual outputs from the
write statements in the then branch of the first if statement and the else
branch of the second if statement. Using the operational semantics, the
attacker can derive the fact that both x < 10 and x ≠ 15 hold. The output
⟨1,2⟩ is produced by all traces through the indicated conditional branches
and these traces have a starting state in the set Σ12 = {σ ∈ Σ ∣ σ(x) <
10} ∩ {σ ∈ Σ ∣ σ(x) ≠ 15} = {σ ∈ Σ ∣ σ(x) < 10}, where the attacker learns
that the starting value of x is less than 10.
• Similarly, the output sequence ⟨2,1⟩ corresponds to the set of traces starting
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at the states in Σ21 = {σ ∈ Σ ∣ σ(x) ≥ 10} ∩ {σ ∈ Σ ∣ σ(x) = 15} = {σ ∈
Σ ∣ σ(x) = 15}. Here, the attacker learns that the value of x is 15.
• Finally, the output sequence ⟨2,2⟩ corresponds to the set of traces starting
at the states in Σ22 = {σ ∈ Σ ∣ σ(x) ≥ 10} ∩ {σ ∈ Σ ∣ σ(x) ≠ 15} = {σ ∈
Σ ∣σ(x) ≠ 15, σ(x) ≥ 10}. Here, the attacker learns that x is greater than or
equal to 10 but is not 15.
This program can be described by the functional model f ∶Σ→ V mapping
the program’s starting state to the produced output. The graph of f is given by
graph(f) = {(σ12, ⟨1,2⟩), (σ21, ⟨2,1⟩), (σ22, ⟨2,2⟩) ∣ σ12 ∈ Σ12, σ21 ∈ Σ21, σ22 ∈
Σ22} ⊆ Σ × V . Using definition (3.1), we obtain the information flow released by
this program as the kernel κf of f , which is given by
∀σ,σ′ ∈Σ, σ κf σ′ iff σ(x), σ′(x) < 10,
or σ(x) = σ′(x) = 15,
or σ(x), σ′(x) ∈ {n ∈ Z ∣ 15 ≠ n and n ≥ 10}.
The equivalence relation κf over Σ describes the information that the attacker
gains by observing the outputs of the program in Figure 4.3. This leads us to
the definition of information flow properties of programs based on the operational
semantics.
4.3 Semantic Information Flow Property
In this section, the information released by a While program P is defined based
on the observational power of a semantic attacker. This information, which is an
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equivalence relation over the program states is used to define the program’s infor-
mation flow property in section 4.3.2. The termination properties of the definition
are discussed in section 4.3.3.
4.3.1 The Semantic Attacker Model
We now define an attacker model that will be used throughout this thesis. We re-
fer to this attacker model as the semantic attacker, because its definition is based
on the standard operational semantics of While, with the exception of its ability
to determine nontermination. The ability of the semantic attacker to determine
nontermination appears to be strong and deserves some explanation. Nontermi-
nation is usually not modelled in language-based security because nontermination
is not observable. However, modelling information flow due to nontermination
is important because in practice, for example, in a hostile code scenario, where
the attacker is probably the author of the program, or otherwise has knowledge
of the program code, the attacker may be able to determine when the program
will not terminate without actually observing it. It has been recently shown that
modelling the ability to “observe” nontermination is important, especially for in-
teractive programs, because it is possible to leak arbitrary amount of information
via nontermination channels [AHSS08].
The observational power of the semantic attacker is given by the function
obs(⋅) from traces to observations, which is defined below. The semantic attacker
cannot observe internal actions ε produced by a program, but can observe all other
actions including whether the program terminates or not. For example, skip and
assignment statements, which only generate the internal action ε cannot be ob-
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served by the semantic attacker.
Let Σ be the set of all states of the While program P . A trace of P starting at
the state σ0 ∈ Σ is said to be terminating or finite if there exists a natural number
n such that ⟨P,σ0⟩
a0Ð→⟨P1, σ1⟩
a1Ð→⋯
an−1Ð→ ⟨⋅, σn⟩, otherwise the trace is said to be
infinite and P diverges at σ0. The notation ⟨P,σ⟩⇓ σ′ denotes the termination of
the program P in the state σ′ ∈Σ when it is executed from the starting state σ ∈Σ.
The notation ⟨P,σ⟩ ⇑ denotes the divergence of P when it is executed from the
starting state σ ∈ Σ. What the semantic attacker sees during a run of the program
P is defined based on the standard operational semantics of While as follows.
Definition 4.3.1 (Semantic Attacker Model). Let P be a While program and letΣ
be the set of all states of P . Furthermore, let εÐ→∗ be the reflexive, transitive clo-











be a canonical representation of P ’s trace starting from the state σ ∈ Σ such that
for all i we have ε ≠ ai ∈ A . What the semantic attacker sees during the trace





⟨a0, a1,⋯, ↑⟩ if P diverges at σ
⟨a0, a1,⋯, ↓⟩ otherwise.
(4.2)
Define the set of all traces of P as
TP ≜ {t⟨P,σ⟩ ∣ σ ∈Σ}. (4.3)
Finally, define the equivalence relation on program states induced by the se-
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mantic attacker’s observation as
∀σ,σ′ ∈Σ, σ ⌊TP ⌋ σ′ ⇐⇒ obs(t⟨P,σ⟩) = obs(t⟨P,σ′⟩). (4.4)
The definition of obs(⋅) formalises the idea that the semantic attacker can-
not observe εÐ→ transitions. For nonterminating traces, the token ↑ is introduced
which, in addition to the sequence of outputs observed on the trace, signals the
divergence of the program. Similarly, the token ↓ signals the termination of the
program. By accommodating possible knowledge of nontermination, the defini-
tion of obs(⋅) allows us to properly account for information flow in the presence
of program divergence as demonstrated in section 4.3.3. When P diverges, the
sequence a0, a1,⋯ of observed output may or may not be finite. However, when
P terminates, this sequence is always finite.
Distinguishability of traces and therefore input states is based on the inequal-
ity of sequences of observable actions. Two sequences a0, a1, . . . and a′0, a′1, . . .
are equal iff for all i we have ai = a′i. Since the attacker distinguishes be-
tween input states by observing differences in program traces, any pair of traces
of P starting at states σ,σ′ ∈ Σ is indistinguishable to the semantic attacker if
obs(t⟨P,σ⟩) = obs(t⟨P,σ′⟩). This definition induces the equivalence relation ⌊TP ⌋
on the set of states that on one hand relates any pair of states that the attacker can-
not distinguish, and thus describes the information released by P . On the other
hand, any pair of states σ,σ′ ∈ Σ that is not related by ⌊TP ⌋ has the property that
obs(t⟨P,σ⟩) ≠ obs(t⟨P,σ′⟩), and hence can be distinguished by the attacker. Thus,
⌊TP ⌋ is the smallest equivalence relation, based on the standard operational se-
mantics, for which any pair of state that it relates cannot be distinguished by the
97
semantic attacker.
4.3.2 Defining the Information Flow Property
We shall define the semantic information flow property of a program P from ⌊TP ⌋.
Firstly, we highlight the link between the definition of ⌊TP ⌋ and the kernel-based
equivalence relation definition of information release presented in Section 3.5.1.
Let V = {obs(t⟨P,σ⟩) ∣ σ ∈ Σ} and let fP ∶Σ→ V be the functional model (since
P is deterministic) of P such that for any σ ∈ Σ, fP (σ) = obs(t⟨P,σ⟩). It is easy
to see that the equivalence relation ⌊TP ⌋ is the kernel of the function fP and thus
describes the information released by P . Now, let I be the lattice PER(Σ), then
the information flow property of the program P can be defined as the singleton set
JP KI = {f ∣ ∀R ∈ PER(Σ), f(R) = R ⊔ ⌊TP ⌋}. (4.5)
This definition describes how the semantic attacker’s knowledge changes by ob-
serving the program P . Furthermore, if F ⊆ F lows is an information flow policy
defined over the lattice of PERs, the program P satisfies the policy F if there ex-
ists f ′ ∈ F which allows the flow f ∈ JP KI caused by P : that is, f ⊑ f ′. However,
the definition of information flow property does not have to be a singleton set as
we shall show next.
Non-singleton Information Flow Properties
We may want to separate the traces of the system described by the program P
based on some considerations. For example, we might want to ensure that in-
formation is not released in certain parts of a program - say in the subprogram
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executed when authentication fails. We can thus partition the set of traces of the
program to those in which the authentication fails and those in which it succeeds,
and compute the information flow properties separately over these traces. More
generally, let us assume that J is an index set of the traces of P such that for any
j ∈ J , T jP ⊆ TP is the set of traces of P identified under j, and where TP = ⋃j∈J T
j
P .
We can define the information flow restricted to the traces indexed by j ∈ J as
∀σ,σ′ ∈Σ, σ ⌊T jP ⌋ σ
′ ⇐⇒ t⟨P,σ⟩, t⟨P,σ′⟩ ∈ T
j
P and obs(t⟨P,σ⟩) = obs(t⟨P,σ′⟩). (4.6)
The PER ⌊T jP ⌋ describes the information released by the parts of the system in-
dexed by j. It is easy to see that ⌊T jP ⌋ is not necessarily an equivalence relation,
but a PER over Σ since it is only defined for traces identified by j. Under this
view we can define the information flow property of P as the set of flows
JP KI = {fj ∣ j ∈ J.∀R ∈ PER(Σ), fj(R) = R ⊔ ⌊T
j
P ⌋}. (4.7)




talks about an aspect of the information ⌊TP ⌋ - the information released by the
whole system. Specifically, for any j ∈ J , we have that ∀σ,σ′ ∈ Σ, σ ⌊TP ⌋ σ′ iff
σ ⌊T jP ⌋ σ
′ or obs(t⟨P,σ⟩) = obs(t⟨P,σ′⟩).
4.3.3 Termination Properties
Let us demonstrate the termination properties of the definition of ⌊TP ⌋ - the in-
formation released by the program P as defined in (4.4). Firstly, let us define a
program loop ≜ while (tt) do skip, which is an infinite loop. For diverging
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programs, such as loop, (4.2) ensures that they are distinguished from terminat-
ing ones by the insertion of a ↑ or ↓ symbol. Consider the following program
PA = if(h = 0)then skip else loop, which either terminates or enters an in-
finite loop. The equivalence relation ⌊TPA⌋ on states relates a pair of states only if
they agree on the value of h to be 0 or if h ≠ 0 in both states. That is, the program
reveals the fact that h = 0 or not. This result is consistent with the information
gained by the attacker which knows the source code of this program and can ob-
serve program termination. To see how we arrive at ⌊TPA⌋, first consider the trace
through the then branch which produces no observation. Hence, for any σ ∈ Σ
such that σ(h) = 0, we have that obs(t⟨PA,σ⟩) is the sequence ⟨↓⟩. On the other
hand, PA diverges on input states where h ≠ 0 and hence for all σ ∈ Σ such that
σ(h) ≠ 0, obs(t⟨PA,σ⟩) = ⟨↑⟩ is the single element sequence. By this we arrive at
the information flow of PA as for all σ,σ′ ∈ Σ, σ ⌊TPA⌋ σ′ iff σ(h) = σ′(h) = 0 or
σ(h) ≠ 0 ≠ σ′(h).
Consider another program PB = P ; loop, where P is an arbitrary While pro-
gram which always terminates. Thus PB always diverges because of the trailing
loop program, which always diverges. Since P always terminates, the termination
properties of PB is independent of the choice of secret input and intuitively PB
should release no more information than P . It is easy to see that the information
flow of P is preserved in ⌊TPB⌋ since all the traces of P are preserved and the
observation of the attacker is only changed by appending ↑ to the end of the ob-
servations made in P . That is for all σ ∈Σ,obs(t⟨PB ,σ⟩) = ⟨obs(t⟨P,σ⟩), ⟨↑⟩⟩. Thus,
because of the isomorphism between what is observed in P and PB when started
from any given state, we have that for all σ,σ′ ∈ Σ,obs(t⟨P,σ⟩) = obs(t⟨P,σ′⟩) iff
obs(t⟨PB ,σ⟩) = obs(t⟨PB ,σ′⟩). Hence, ⌊TP ⌋ = ⌊TPB⌋.
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Again, consider the program PC = loop;P where P is a While program. Al-
though, PC has a trailing program P which might ordinarily reveal some informa-
tion, the leading loop program prevents P from being executed and intuitively PC
should thus not reveal any information. The semantic analysis shows this because




Ð→ ⟨PC , σ⟩
ε
Ð→ ⋯. Hence, for
all σ ∈ Σ,obs(t⟨PC ,σ⟩) = ⟨↑⟩ and therefore ⌊TPC ⌋ = all is the equivalence relation
which relates all states in Σ, demonstrating that the attacker gains no information
by executing PC .
The following lemma shows that for any given While program P , ⌊TP ⌋ dis-
tinguishes states under which P terminates from those under which P diverges.
By this partitioning we know that whenever a pair of states is related by ⌊TP ⌋, P
either terminates under both states or diverges under both states.
Lemma 4.3.2. LetΣ be the set of all states of the While program P and let the set
of starting states under which P terminates be Σ⇓ = {σ ∈ Σ ∣ σ′ ∈ Σ, ⟨P,σ⟩⇓ σ′}
and let the set of starting states under which P diverges be Σ⇑ = Σ/Σ⇓. Then, for
all σ,σ′ ∈ Σ, σ ⌊TP ⌋ σ′ implies σ,σ′ ∈Σ⇓ or σ,σ′ ∈Σ⇑.
Proof. The proof follows easily from the definition of ⌊TP ⌋.
4.3.4 Noninterference
We can state the noninterference property of a program P ’s secret input in terms
of ⌊TP ⌋. Let P be a While program and let Var and Σ be its set of variables and
states respectively. Furthermore, let H ⊆ Var be the set of variables containing
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secret inputs to P . Then P is noninterfering with respect to H variables iff
∀σ ∈ Σ,havocH([σ]⌊TP ⌋) = [σ]⌊TP ⌋. (4.8)
This definition requires every equivalence class of ⌊TP ⌋ to be dense with respect
to H-values (see definition 3.5.8). That is, in any equivalence class of ⌊TP ⌋ every
variation of H values is present for any given state, and thus no H value can be
distinguished from another.
It is useful to see how (4.8) compares with the standard definition of nonin-
terference. Let L = Var/H be the set of public variables, and for any σ ∈ Σ let
σ↓L be the projection of σ to L. The noninterference property of the program P is
defined as (see [SM03a]):
∀σ,σ′ ∈Σ.σ↓L = σ′↓L Ô⇒ obs(t⟨P,σ⟩) = obs(t⟨P,σ′⟩). (4.9)
That is, the attacker’s observation (low-view) is invariant whenever the L-inputs
are fixed (the requirement for fixed L-inputs is to factor out output variations due
to the low inputs). This property is captured in (4.8) because ∀σ,σ′ ∈Σ
havocH([σ]⌊TP ⌋) = [σ]⌊TP ⌋ ⇐⇒ σ↓L = σ′↓L Ô⇒ σ′ ∈ [σ]⌊TP ⌋
(by the definition of havocH(⋅))
⇐⇒ σ↓L = σ′↓L Ô⇒ obs(t⟨P,σ⟩) = obs(t⟨P,σ′⟩)
(by definition of σ ⌊TP ⌋ σ′) .
Thus, (4.8) is a statement of noninterference of H-inputs to P , with respect to the
semantic attacker model.
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4.4 Other Semantic Definitions of Information Flow
In this section we shall compare our definition of information flow in the deter-
ministic case with the definition of [SS01] that uses PERs to describe information
flow, and the event-based definition of [AS07] that has a similar definition to our
trace-based observational semantics. We also compare our attacker model with
the abstract interpretation-based model of the attacker in [GM04].
4.4.1 The PER Security Model
In [SS01, Sab01] the security property of a program is presented as a transforma-
tion of PERs by a function, which represents the (Scott-style) denotation of that
program. The approach does not have an explicit notion of interaction, but pro-
gram output is achieved by assignment to special low parts of the memory, which
may be observed on program termination. The same effect can be achieved under
our framework by inserting write statements at the end of the program to print out
the values in the low portions of the memory, modelling the fact that the (low)
attacker can observe these values on program termination. Alternatively, we can
obtain the attacker model by defining an observational power function, which can
observe the low part of memory at the end of program execution. We shall take
the first approach.
Let the function f ∶ A→ B be the denotation of the program P where A and
B are sets. Furthermore, let R ∈ PER(A) and Q ∈ PER(B) be PERs over A
and B respectively. The security property of this program is described as a PER
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transformer, written as LfM ∶ R _ Q, which holds iff
∀a, a′ ∈ A,a R a′ Ô⇒ f(a)Q f(a′). (4.10)
Intuitively, this definition says that subject to the constraint R on the input space,
the output of the program is indistinguishable under Q. Now let A = A1 × . . .×An
be a set product, so that for all i ∈ [1, n] we have ai, a′i ∈ Ai and Ri ∈ PER(Ai).
The definition easily extends to tuples of relations (Ri)i∈[1,n], which we write as
the relation R1 ● . . . ●Rn and defined as
(a1, . . . , an)R1 ● . . . ●Rn (a′1, . . . , a
′




Now suppose that the program states is partitioned into a high-security half (H)
and a low-security half (L) so that the set of states is the product Σ = H × L and
all ∈ PER(H) and id ∈ PER(L). A program whose denotation is f ∶ Σ→Σ is said
to be secure iff
LfM ∶ (all ● id) _ (all ● id) (4.12)
The statement of (4.12) requires that information does not leak from the high part
of program state to the low part since from (4.10) this means that
∀h,h′ ∈H, l ∈ L. f(h, l) all ● id f(h′, l).
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Thus, if the low part of the input state is fixed, regardless of the initial value of the
high part of state the low part of the output state remains fixed, making the value
of the low output invariant under any pair of high inputs. This definition also
extends to nonterminating programs, but with the additional requirement that the
termination property of the program is not influenced by H inputs. Thus (4.12) is
a statement of the noninterference for the program P whose denotation is f . By
fixing the L inputs of P , we effectively say that the attacker can observe the initial
low values, thereby factoring out variations in the final low values that might be
caused by a variation of L inputs.
We can achieve this effect under our setting by inserting write statements. Let
the set of low variables of the program P be {l1, . . . , ln} and define a program
PL ≜ write l1;⋯;write ln, which leaks the L-projection of states. Then we
derive another program P ′ = PL;P ;PL, which reveals the value of the L-portion
of the memory to the attacker before the execution of P and on termination. Using
(4.4) the information released is given by ⌊TP ′⌋ defined as
∀σ,σ′ ∈Σ, σ ⌊TP ′⌋ σ′ ⇐⇒ obs(t⟨P ′,σ⟩) = obs(t⟨P ′,σ′⟩)
Thus, any pair of states that is related by ⌊TP ′⌋ has the property that they agree
on their L-projections, and P ′ must either terminate in both states to the same
L-values or P ′ (that is, P ) must diverge under both states.
By its definition, ⌊TP ′⌋ computes the information flow of the program P about
H since it is the least equivalence relation over secrets for which the observation
of the attacker is invariant whenever the input states are related by it. In par-
ticular, if f is the denotation of the program P , then for any PER R ● id such
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that LfM ∶ R ● id _ all ● id holds, we have also that ⌊TP ′⌋ ⊑ R ● id. Hence, ⌊TP ′⌋
captures the security property of P .
Partial Information Release
For some PERs R,Q ∈ PER(Σ) over the states Σ of the program P whose de-
notation is f , the specification LfM ∶ R _ Q may be considered as a statement of
the security property of the program P , that is, a policy, which P satisfies. Thus,
we say that P satisfies the policy L⋅M ∶ R _ Q, whenever LfM ∶ R _ Q. For any
R,R′ ∈ PER(Σ) such that R ⊑ R′, it follows by definition that LfM ∶ R _ Q Ô⇒
LfM ∶ R′ _ Q since R ⊑ R′ means that ∀σ,σ′ ∈ Σ, σ R′ σ′ Ô⇒ σ R σ′. In other
words, if P satisfies a stronger policy (L⋅M ∶ R _ Q) then it also satisfies a weaker
one L⋅M ∶ R′ _ Q. Given the set of states Σ = H × L, the general policy schema
of [SS01] is L⋅M ∶ R ● id _ all ● id, which declassifies information R about the se-
cret space H . The id part on both sides of _ means that the attacker can observe
the L portion of states (before and after program execution), and the all on the
right-hand-side means “don’t care” since the attacker cannot view the H part of
state on termination.
Any deterministic programP trivially satisfies the policy L⋅M ∶ id ● id _ all ● id,
the proof of which relies only on the fact that the denotation of P is a function.
Thus, policy refinement involves finding more coarse Rs, that is, those R ⊑ id,
such that the condition LfM ∶ R ● id _ all ● id is satisfied. Policy refinement is an
important problem in language-based security [SM03a, Zda04a, SS07]. By find-
ing the information released about P ′ = PL;P ;PL as defined above, which corre-
sponds to the observational capability of the attacker model in the noninterference
definition of [SS01], our semantic definition ⌊TP ′⌋ derives the most refined policy
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that P satisfies. Thus, ⌊TP ′⌋ is the smallest equivalence relation over the set of
states, which relates every pair of initial states of P with the same L-input, such
that whenever P is executed under this pair, the same L-output is produced on ter-
mination. That is, LfM ∶ ⌊TP ′⌋ _ all ● id holds for all starting states under which
P terminates. Furthermore, for any PER R ● id such that R ● id ⊏ ⌊TP ′⌋, P does
not satisfy L⋅M ∶ R ● id _ all ● id. This is easy to see because R ● id ⊏ ⌊TP ′⌋ means
that there exists a pair of states σ,σ′ ∈ Σ which is related by R ● id but that is
not related by ⌊TP ′⌋. Since the states σ and σ′ are not related by ⌊TP ′⌋, this either
means that P terminates in both states to different values of the L-projection of
state, or that P diverges in exactly one of the states. Under these two scenarios
the attacker observes a difference and can thus distinguish σ from σ′.
4.4.2 Gradual Release
In [AS07] the notion of gradual release is introduced as a policy framework for
declassification, encryption and key release. The language setting is the standard
core imperative While language with an explicit declassification construct for ex-
pressing declassification policies for secrets. The language is interactive because
assignment to low variables can be observed as well as the assignment of declas-
sified expressions. As a result, the operational semantics is event-based and is
similar to our labelled-transition system approach. Gradual release is enforced by
a standard type system similar to [VSI96] with the additional requirement that de-
classification may not be performed within conditional statements or loops with a
high guard. We highlight how the knowledge representation and the computation
of knowledge compares with our approach.
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The attacker’s knowledge (or rather, uncertainty) is represented as a set of
states, which represents the possible values of the initial program memory. This
is similar to our representation of information with PERs over the initial program
states. However, since PERs generalise sets [Hun91a], the information under the
gradual release approach can be modelled as a PER. Specifically, for any set
Σ ⊆ Σ, which represents the attacker’s knowledge, there is a PER RX ∈ PER(Σ),
which models this knowledge, defined such that for all σ,σ′ ∈ Σ, σ RX σ′ iff
σ,σ′ ∈ X . This makes it possible to encode each instantiation of gradual-release
knowledge as a PER. Furthermore, the monotonicity of knowledge and the grad-
ual nature of information release agrees with the notion of information flow being
monotone and extensive. In particular, gradual release requires that the attacker’s
knowledge may only be refined with time by shrinking the set of states, which
represents the knowledge - this is an extensivity property on the PER lattice.
The memory is assumed to be partitioned into two: a high (H) part and a low
(L) part forming a security lattice L ⊏ H . The operational semantics identifies
two types of events α ∈ {ǫ, ℓ}, where ǫ is an empty label, which the attacker
cannot observe, and ℓ is a low event that the attacker can observe. Whenever it is
generated, the event ℓ is either the L-projection of state or a special termination
event ↓ signalling program termination. Vectors (ℓ⃗) represent sequences of low
events and ⟨P,σ⟩ ℓ⃗Ð→ ∗⟨P ′, σ′⟩ means that ⟨P ′, σ′⟩ is reachable via the execution
of P at state σ, generating the sequence ℓ⃗ of low events. Similarly, ⟨P,σ⟩ ℓ⃗Ð→
∗⟨⋅, σ′⟩ means that the execution of P at state σ terminates in the state σ′ and
generates the sequence ℓ⃗.
Let L(P,σ0↓L) ≜ {ℓ⃗ ∣ σ,σ′ ∈ Σ, σ0↓L = σ↓L.⟨P,σ⟩
ℓ⃗
Ð→ ∗⟨⋅, σ′⟩} and let Lˆ(P,σ0↓L)
be the prefix closure of L(P,σ0↓L). The termination-sensitive knowledge gained
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by an attacker of the program P under the observation of ℓ⃗ ∈ Lˆ(P,σ0↓L) when the
low projection of the starting states is σ0L is defined as
k(P,σ0↓L, ℓ⃗) ≜ {σ ∣ σ,σ
′ ∈ Σ, σ0↓L = σ↓L, ⟨P,σ⟩
ℓ⃗




We can therefore compute the gradual release knowledge k(P,σ0↓L, ℓ⃗) under our
approach by defining an observational power function over traces which maps
each partial trace to the sequence ℓ⃗ generated under the definition of [AS07],
so that a resulting PER is defined which relates any pair of states σ,σ′ ∈ Σ iff
σ,σ′ ∈ k(P,σ0↓L, ℓ⃗). However, since the termination-sensitive knowledge can only
be computed for a terminating trace, or its prefix, (that is, for ℓ⃗ ∈ Lˆ(P,σ0↓L))
one cannot represent the knowledge gained under nonterminating traces. This ex-
cludes a large class of programs, for example, P ; loop, where P is an arbitrary
program. As the analyses in the preceding sections show, program divergence
does not pose additional difficulty to our information release definition.
4.4.3 Abstract Noninterference Attacker Model
The abstract noninterference definition of [GM04] introduces attacker models as
abstract interpretations, which can observe only properties of data in the concrete
domain. The idea is that by weakening the observational power of the attacker
on the values of public inputs and outputs of a program, so that the attacker can
observe only their properties, less restrictive policies, which accept programs that
might otherwise be rejected by the standard noninterference definitions can be
specified. The concrete domain is partitioned into two sets H and L, which rep-
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resent the domain of secret and public values respectively, and state is modelled
as tuples in Σ = H × L. The attacker is modelled as a pair of abstractions ⟨η,ρ⟩,
where η,ρ ∈ uco(P(L)) are upper closure operators on the powerset lattice of
public values ordered by subset inclusion. The closure operators η and ρ model
what the attacker can observe about the program’s public inputs and outputs re-
spectively. The concrete semantics of the program P is formalised using angelic
denotational semantics, which associates an input-output function, JP K ∶ Σ→Σ,
with P and ignores nontermination. Furthermore, the observation of (public) val-
ues occur at the beginning of program execution and on program termination. To
slightly simplify the notations, we shall denote the concrete semantics of P as a
map JP K ∶ H ×L → L, throwing away the H-projection of state on termination,
since it is not used.
Our observational model is more general since we place no restriction on
the nature of the observational power function, as opposed to the requirement
in [GM04], where they must be closure operators. Furthermore, our observational
model is not restricted to the observation of values at the beginning and end of
program execution. The attacker ⟨η,ρ⟩ can be obtained under our model by defin-
ing an observational power function on traces, such that for any σ, σˆ ∈ Σ, and





obs⟨η,ρ⟩(t⟨P,σ⟩) ≜ ⟨η({σ↓L}),ρ({σˆ↓L})⟩. (4.14)
This definition says that the attacker only observes the η-property of theL-projection
of the initial state and the ρ-property of the L-projection of the terminating state
of P . Consequently, the information released under this observational model is
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the PER ⌊TP⟨η,ρ⟩⌋ over Σ defined such that for any σ,σ′ ∈Σ
σ ⌊TP⟨η,ρ⟩⌋ σ
′ ⇐⇒ obs⟨η,ρ⟩(t⟨P,σ⟩) = obs⟨η,ρ⟩(t⟨P,σ′⟩). (4.15)









Ð→ ⟨⋅, σˆ′⟩ we have
σ ⌊TP⟨η,ρ⟩⌋ σ
′ ⇐⇒ η({σ↓L}) = η({σ′↓L}) ∧ ρ({σˆ↓L}) = ρ({σˆ
′
↓L})
Ô⇒ η({σ↓L}) = η({σ′↓L}) Ô⇒ ρ({σˆ↓L}) = ρ({σˆ
′
↓L}).
By this we immediately obtain the narrow abstract noninterference (NANI) defi-
nition:
[η]P [ρ] ⇐⇒ ∀σ,σ′ ∈ Σ,η({σ↓L}) = η({σ′↓L}) Ô⇒ ρ(JP K(σ)) = ρ(JP K(σ
′)).
Thus, ⌊TP⟨η,ρ⟩⌋ is the least PER over states for which any pair of states that it relates
satisfies NANI in P .
The NANI definition causes what is referred to as “deceptive flows”, whereby
η-undistinguished public input values cause a variation, which makes P to violate
NANI. In order to deal with this problem, abstractions of L values are passed as
program parameters and another abstraction φ ∈ uco(P(H)) is introduced on the
input secret values. This results in the abstract noninterference (ANI) property,
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[η]P (φ↝ 8ρ), of [GM04], which is defined to hold iff for all σ,σ′ ∈Σ,














Let σ ∈ Σ be a state, and define the set Ση,φσ of L-projections of the terminating
states of P due to the execution of P from any starting state, which agrees with σ




















Hence, from (4.16), [η]P (φ↝ 8ρ) holds iff for all σ,σ′ ∈Σ
η({σ↓L}) = η({σ′↓L}) Ô⇒ ρ(Σ
η,φ
σ ) = ρ(Σ
η,φ
σ′ ). (4.18)
We can obtain this observational model under our framework by defining an ob-
servational power function on traces, such that for any σ ∈ Σ, and terminating
trace t⟨P,σ⟩
obs⟨η,φ,ρ⟩(t⟨P,σ⟩) ≜ ⟨η({σ↓L}),ρ(Ση,φσ )⟩ (4.19)
This definition requires that no public output can be distinguished by ρ for any ini-
tial state, which is L-indistinguishable from to σ under η and H-indistinguishable
from σ under φ. Thus, as usual, the information released under our relational
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model is the PER ⌊TP⟨η,φ,ρ⟩⌋ over Σ defined such that for any σ,σ′ ∈ Σ
σ ⌊TP⟨η,φ,ρ⟩⌋ σ
′ ⇐⇒ obs⟨η,φ,ρ⟩(t⟨P,σ⟩) = obs⟨η,φ,ρ⟩(t⟨P,σ′⟩). (4.20)
Hence, for all σ,σ′ ∈Σ, we have that
σ ⌊TP⟨η,φ,ρ⟩⌋ σ
′ ⇐⇒ η({σ↓L}) = η({σ′↓L}) ∧ ρ(Σ
η,φ
σ ) = ρ(Σ
η,φ
σ′ )
Ô⇒ η({σ↓L}) = η({σ′↓L}) Ô⇒ ρ(Σ
η,φ
σ ) = ρ(Σ
η,φ
σ′ ).
By this we obtain ANI property [η]P (φ ↝ 8ρ) and ⌊TP⟨η,φ,ρ⟩⌋ is the least PER
over Σ, for which any pair of states that it relates satisfies ANI in P .
4.5 Information Flow in Nondeterministic Systems
In the remainder of this chapter, we shall turn our attention to the application
of the operational-semantics based relational model definition of section 4.1 in a
nondeterministic language setting. The objective is to demonstrate that, similarly
to its use in a deterministic language setting, we can also apply the technique to
the analysis of information flow in a nondeterministic language. For this reason
we shall add, separately, two simple extensions to the While language, which are
constructs for possibilistic nondeterminism (to obtain While-ND) and probabilis-
tic nondeterminism (to obtain While-PND). The resulting two languages provide
us with concrete language-based settings to demonstrate the use of the relational
model for the definition of information flow property of a nondeterministic sys-
tem. We shall use the same semantic attacker’s observational model that was
introduced earlier for the deterministic While language. Later on, in Chapter 5
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and Chapter 6, static analyses for the While language will be presented, however,
the full static analyses of the While-ND and While-PND are beyond the scope of
this thesis.
4.5.1 Possibilistic Nondeterminism
We start by introducing the language While-ND (for While with NonDeterminism)
as a language for (possibilistic) nondeterministic systems. While-ND extends the
While language presented in section 4.2 by adding a nondeterministic construct,
c1 8 c2, which makes an invisible but arbitrary choice in the execution of either
the command c1 or the command c2. Consequently, the operational semantics of
While-ND extends that of While as shown in Figure 4.4.
⟨c1 8 c2, σ⟩
ε
Ð→ ⟨c1, σ⟩ ⟨c1 8 c2, σ⟩
ε
Ð→ ⟨c2, σ⟩
Figure 4.4: Extending While with Possibilistic Nondeterminism
As the semantics shows, nondeterministic choice is an internal action, which
is not externally observable to the semantic attacker. In other to address nondeter-
minism, we extend the definition (4.2) of obs(⋅) to obs∗(⋅), which now produces
the set of all observations that can result from the execution of a While-ND pro-
gram from a given starting state. Let P be a While-ND program and let Σ be the
set of all states of P . Furthermore, let t⟨P,σ⟩ = {⟨P,σ⟩
ai




1Ð→ ⋯ ∣ i ∈ Iσ}
be the set of all finite and infinite traces of P resulting from the execution of P at
the state σ ∈ Σ, where Iσ is an index set which identifies all the possible traces of
P starting from σ. For any i ∈ Iσ, let ti⟨P,σ⟩ ∈ t⟨P,σ⟩ be the ith possible trace of P
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starting from σ so that t⟨P,σ⟩ = {ti⟨P,σ⟩ ∣ i ∈ Iσ}. Now define obs
∗(⋅), which extends
obs(⋅) (see (4.2)) to set of traces as:
obs∗(t⟨P,σ⟩) ≜ {obs(ti⟨P,σ⟩) ∣ i ∈ Iσ}. (4.21)
The set of all possible observations arising from the execution of P is given by
VP ≜ {a ∈ obs∗(t⟨P,σ⟩) ∣σ ∈Σ} and the relational model SP ⊆ Σ×VP of P is given
by ∀σ ∈ Σ, σ SP a ⇐⇒ a ∈ obs∗(t⟨P,σ⟩). We can now define the possibilistic
information released by the program P as follows.
Let SP ⊆ Σ × VP be the relational model of the nondeterministic While-ND
program P such that ΣVP ≜ {S−1P (a) ∣ a ∈ VP}. The information released by P
under the possibilistic model is given by
⌊P ⌋ ≜ ⟨⟨ΣVP ⟩⟩. (4.22)
This definition is based on the possibilistic information flow definition of sec-
tion 3.7. It is straightforward to see that definition (4.22) is a natural extension of
the deterministic definition (4.4). In particular, if P is a deterministic While pro-
gram then ⌊P ⌋ is a partitioning of states, such that for any σ ∈ Σ, [σ]⌊TP ⌋ ∈ ⌊P ⌋ .
Similarly to the definition (4.5) of semantic information flow in the deterministic
setting, but now taking the lattice I to be FAM(Σ), we can define the semantic
information flow property of a While-ND program P as
JP KI ≜ {f ∣ ∀⟨⟨ΣJ⟩⟩ ∈ FAM(Σ), f(⟨⟨ΣJ ⟩⟩) = ⟨⟨ΣJ⟩⟩ ⊔ ⌊P ⌋}. (4.23)
This definition describes how the attacker’s knowledge on the lattice FAM(Σ) is
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transformed by the program P . Let us further illustrate how ⌊P ⌋ captures the
information released by the nondeterministic While-ND program P .
Suppose the integer (secret) h is a parameter to the nondeterministic program
P = if(h = 0)then skip 8 loop else skip. This program may either termi-
nate or loop indefinitely when the secret value h is chosen to be zero. Thus, it is
easy to see that the attacker may learn the value of h to be zero when the program
fails to terminate. The set of possible observation of P is given by VP = {⟨↓⟩, ⟨↑⟩}
where ⟨↓⟩ corresponds to the observation during the terminating traces and ⟨↑⟩
corresponds to the observation of the diverging trace. If we represent the set of
program states asΣ = {(n)∣n ∈ Z}, then the relational model of P , is SP ⊆Σ×VP
whose graph is given by {((0), ⟨↑⟩), ((n), ⟨↓⟩) ∣n ∈ Z}. Thus, we have the follow-
ing inverse images: S−1P (⟨↑⟩) = {(0)} and S−1P (⟨↓⟩) = Σ, and ⌊P ⌋ = {{(0)},Σ}
reflecting the fact that the attacker can learn when the secret value is zero.
Consider another program PA = if(h = 0)then skip 8 loop else loop.
In this case the observation of termination reveals to the attacker that the value
of the integer secret h is zero. The analysis is similar to that of P , but now we
have graph(SPA) = {((0), ⟨↓⟩), ((n), ⟨↑⟩) ∣ n ∈ Z} and S−1PA(⟨↓⟩) = {(0)} and
S−1PA(↑) = Σ. Thus, ⌊PA⌋ = {{(0)},Σ}, and it is intuitive that PA should release
the same information as P .
Consider the program PB = if(h = 0)thenskip 8 loopelseskip 8 loop
which may or may not terminate regardless of the chosen value of h. Intuitively,
this program should not reveal any information to the attacker as its behaviour
is independent of the choice of h. This is confirmed as follows: graph(SPB) =
{((n), ⟨↓⟩), ((n), ⟨↑⟩) ∣ n ∈ Z}. Thus, S−1PB(⟨↓⟩) = S
−1
PB
(⟨↑⟩) = Σ. This means that
⌊PB⌋ = {Σ}, confirming the fact that the attacker learns nothing by observing the
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execution of PB.
Now suppose that PC is a While-ND program that always terminates. Sim-
ilarly to the analysis under deterministic programs, the information flow of PC
is preserved in the program P ′ = PC ; loop. This is easy to see because there is
an isomorphism between VPC and VP ′ , which appends ↑ to all a ∈ VPC such that
∀σ ∈Σ, σ SPC ⟨a⟩ ⇐⇒ σ SP ′ ⟨a, ↑⟩, where SPC ⊆Σ×VPC and SP ′ ⊆ Σ×VP ′ are
respectively the relational models of PC and P ′. Hence, we have ⌊PC⌋ = ⌊P ′⌋ .
Finally, let PD be a While-ND program such that P ′ = loop;PD. Like the deter-
ministic analysis, this program reveals no information since for all σ ∈Σ, σSP ′⟨↑⟩
holds and hence ⌊P ′⌋ = {Σ}.
Possibilistic Noninterference
We can also state a noninterference property under the possibilistic setting to cap-
ture when an attacker cannot learn anything about secret inputs by observing the
public output. The basic idea is that the choice of secret values should not affect
the information that can be deduced by the attacker.
Let H ⊆ Var be the set of secret-containing variables, a nondeterministic
While-ND program P has no possibilistic information flow iff
∀Σ ∈ ⌊P ⌋ , havocH(Σ) = Σ. (4.24)
The link between the nondeterministic definition (4.24) and the deterministic one
(4.8) is clear since if P is a deterministic program each Σ ∈ ⌊P ⌋ corresponds to an
equivalence class of ⌊TP ⌋. The intuition of (4.24) is also straightforward: if L =
Var/H is the set of public variables, then for any σ ∈ Σ ∈ ⌊P ⌋ the observations
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that led to the knowledge that the secret lies within the set Σ could have been
produced by any σ′ ∈ Σ such that σ↓L = σ′↓L, since havocH(Σ) = Σ. In other
words, that observation is independent of the choice of H-values. Let us illustrate
this definition with two more examples.
Consider the program P = write h − h 8 write l, where h and l are re-
spectively the secret and public inputs to P . Intuitively, the attacker cannot learn
anything about h since the output of this program is never dependent on the value
of h regardless of how the nondeterminism is resolved. This is demonstrated by
the analysis of its possibilistic information flow. Suppose h, l ∈ {0,1} are bi-
nary numbers. Now let σ1 ∈ Σ be the state where σ1(h) = 0, σ1(l) = 1 and let
σ3 ∈ Σ be the state where σ3(h) = 1, σ3(l) = 1. The graph of the relational
model of P is given by graph(SP ) = {(σ, ⟨0, ↓⟩), (σ1, ⟨1, ↓⟩), (σ3, ⟨1, ↓⟩) ∣ σ ∈ Σ}
where as usual (σ, ⟨n, ↓⟩) ∈ SP means that the output sequence ⟨n, ↓⟩ can be ob-
served when P is executed at state σ ∈ Σ. The inverse images induced by these
outputs are S−1P (⟨0, ↓⟩) = Σ and S−1P (⟨1, ↓⟩) = {σ1, σ3} = Σ. Thus, we have
⌊P ⌋ = {Σ,Σ}. This program is noninterfering with respect to h-inputs since if
we defined H = {h}, havocH(Σ) = Σ and havocH(Σ) = Σ.
Now consider the program P ′ = write h − h 8 write l XOR h which can
nondeterministically compute the exclusive OR of l and h, or print 0 = h − h.
It is easy to see that the h input interferes with the output of this program. In
particular, if the attacker observes an output of 1, then the attacker can derive the
value of h from the value of l since in that case h ≠ l. The fact that information
flows to the attacker is revealed by the analysis because P ′ does not satisfy (4.24).
Now let σ1 ∈ Σ be the state where σ1(h) = 0, σ1(l) = 1 and let σ2 ∈ Σ be the
state where σ2(h) = 1, σ2(l) = 0. We have the graph of the relational model
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of P ′ to be graph(SP ′) = {(σ, ⟨0, ↓⟩), (σ1, ⟨1, ↓⟩), (σ2, ⟨1, ↓⟩) ∣ σ ∈ Σ}. Thus,
S−1P ′ (⟨0, ↓⟩) = Σ and S−1P ′ (⟨1, ↓⟩) = {σ1, σ2} = Σ′ and ⌊P ′⌋ = {Σ,Σ′}. However,
havocH(Σ′) =Σ ≠ Σ′ shows that information is revealed about h.
4.5.2 Probabilistic Nondeterminism
We now introduce the language While-PND (for While with Probabilistic Non-
Determinism) as a language-based instantiation of probabilistic nondeterminis-
tic systems. While-PND extends the While language presented in section 4.2 by
adding a probabilistic construct, c1 8p c2, which executes c1 with a probability of p
and c2 with a probability of 1 − p. In the constructor 8p, we assume that 0 < p < 1.
In order to model how probabilistic choices affect the execution of programs,
we extend command configurations with probabilities such that ⟨p, c, σ⟩ means
that the command configuration ⟨c, σ⟩ is to be executed with a probability of p.
We shall call ⟨p, c, σ⟩ a probabilistic command configuration. Similarly to termi-
nal command configurations, ⟨p, ⋅, σ⟩ represent a terminal probabilistic command
configuration where there are no more commands to execute. The operational
semantics of While-PND is shown in Figure 4.5. It shows that the probabilis-
tic choice itself is not observable, although we assume that the attacker knows
the program code and therefore knows the probability of making any of the two
choices.
Let P be a While-PND program and let Σ be the set of states of P . Further-
more, for any σ ∈ Σ we denote by Iσ an index set identifying the set of all finite
and infinite traces of P starting at state σ. Since P will be executed for any given
starting state, we take the starting probability of P to be 1. The set of all traces of
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⟨p,skip, σ⟩ εÐ→ ⟨p, ⋅, σ⟩ ⟨p, z ∶= e, σ⟩ εÐ→ ⟨p, ⋅, σ[z ↦ σ(e)]⟩
⟨p,write e, σ⟩
out(σ(e))
Ð→ ⟨p, ⋅, σ⟩
⟨p, c1, σ⟩
α
Ð→ ⟨p′, c′1, σ′⟩
⟨p, c1; c2, σ⟩
α
Ð→ ⟨p′, c′1; c2, σ′⟩
⟨p, c1, σ⟩
α
Ð→ ⟨p′, ⋅, σ′⟩
⟨p, c1; c2, σ⟩
α
Ð→ ⟨p′, c2, σ′⟩
⟨b, σ⟩
ε
Ð→ ⟨tt, σ⟩ ⟨p, c1, σ⟩
α
Ð→ ⟨p′, c′1, σ′⟩
⟨p,if (b) then c1 else c2, σ⟩
α
Ð→ ⟨p′, c′1, σ′⟩
⟨b, σ⟩
ε
Ð→ ⟨ff , σ⟩ ⟨p, c2, σ⟩
α
Ð→ ⟨p′, c′2, σ′⟩
⟨p,if (b) then c1 else c2, σ⟩
α
Ð→ ⟨p′, c′2, σ′⟩
⟨b, σ⟩
ε
Ð→ ⟨tt, σ⟩ ⟨p, c, σ⟩
α
Ð→ ⟨p′, c′, σ′⟩
⟨p,while (b) do c, σ⟩ αÐ→ ⟨p′, c′;while (b) do c, σ′⟩
⟨b, σ⟩
ε
Ð→ ⟨ff , σ⟩
⟨p,while (b) do c, σ⟩ εÐ→ ⟨p, ⋅, σ⟩
0 < p′ < 1
⟨p, c1 8p′ c2, σ⟩
ε
Ð→ ⟨p × p′, c1, σ⟩
0 < p′ < 1
⟨p, c1 8p′ c2, σ⟩
ε
Ð→ ⟨p × (1 − p′), c2, σ⟩
Figure 4.5: The Operational Semantics of While-PND
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P starting at σ is given by








1Ð→ ⋯ ∣ i ∈ Iσ}. (4.25)
Similarly to the While-ND case, the index set Iσ identifies the probabilistic choices
that are made during the execution of the While-PND program P when executed
from the state σ. We shall write ti
⟨P,σ⟩
∈ t⟨P,σ⟩ to represent the ith possible trace of
P starting at the state σ for some i ∈ Iσ. The set of all traces of the While-PND




In the probabilistic case, we require that the input spaceΣ and the output space V
both be finite. Furthermore, we shall consider only programs where the set TP of
all traces of P is finite. We do not consider in this thesis the full generality of an
infinite set of probabilistic traces. This, for example, rules out programs, which
are infinitely branching on 8p.
As usual, using the semantic attacker’s observational model (see (4.2)), and
similarly to the definition in the While-ND case (see 4.21), the extension of obs(⋅)
to set of probabilistic traces is obs∗(t⟨P,σ⟩) = {obs(t) ∣ t ∈ t⟨P,σ⟩}. Define VP =
{obs(t) ∣ t ∈ TP} to be the set of all observations that the attacker can make about
the While-PND program P . The relational model SP ⊆ Σ × VP of P is, as usual,
thus defined as ∀σ ∈Σ, σ SP v ⇐⇒ v ∈ obs∗(t⟨P,σ⟩).
Furthermore, for any σ ∈ Σ and i ∈ Iσ, define the limiting probabilityω(ti⟨P,σ⟩) =
pik of the trace ti⟨P,σ⟩ of P , to be the smallest probability, due to some probabilistic
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j⟩ in ti⟨P,σ⟩, where j > k, if it exists, we have pij = pik. The limiting
probability ω(ti
⟨P,σ⟩
) is the probability of executing ti
⟨P,σ⟩
∈ t⟨P,σ⟩ whenever σ is
chosen. From the operational semantics, the limiting probability exists uniquely












In (4.27), the notation ⟨pij, P ij , σij⟩ ∈ ti⟨P,σ⟩ denotes the existence of the probabilistic
command configuration ⟨pij , P ij , σij⟩ in the trace ti⟨P,σ⟩.
In order to compute the quantitative information release to an attacker of a
While-PND program P we need a probability measure µ ∈ M (Σ), which assigns
probabilities to the selection of input states σ ∈ Σ of P . We assume that the
attacker knows the measure µ so that it represents the attacker’s uncertainty about
the choice of inputs. From µ we can compute the joint probability, µˆ ∈ M (Σ ×
VP ), which represents the probability of joint occurrence of input-output pairs in
the relational model of P . As usual, following the standard convention, for any
σ ∈ Σ and v ∈ VP , µˆ(σ ∣ v) and µˆ(v ∣ σ) are conditional probabilities, and we shall
denote the marginal probability for the occurrence of v by µ′(v). These measures
are computed using the operational semantics of P and the given probabilities µ
over the input space as follows.
Let T ⟨σ,v⟩ = {t ∈ t⟨P,σ⟩ ∣ obs(t) = v} be the set of traces of P starting from σ,
which produce the output observation v. The conditional probability of producing
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the output v when the input state σ is chosen is given by
µˆ(v ∣ σ) ≜ ∑
t∈T ⟨σ,v⟩
ω(t). (4.28)
The probability µˆ(v ∣ σ) is the sum of the probabilities of traces that produce the
output v when P is executed at state σ. Thus, the marginal probability of pro-
ducing the output v by P is µ′(v) = ∑σ∈Σ µ(σ) × µˆ(v ∣ σ). Using these, we can
compute the attacker’s uncertainty about the input state σ ∈ Σ given the observa-
tion of output v ∈ VP as the conditional probability
µˆ(σ ∣ v) =
µˆ(v ∣ σ) × µ(σ)
µ′(v)
Using Definition 3.8.5 we can now compute the quantitative information released
by P . Let us illustrate with some example analyses.
Sample Analyses
Consider the program P = if(h = 7)then skip 8.5 loop else skip and sup-
pose h is an integer secret chosen uniformly from the set {0,1, . . . ,15} of integers.
Hence we can model the set of states as Σ = {(n) ∣ 0 ≤ n ≤ 15}, where for any
input states σ ∈ Σ of P , µ(σ) = 1
16
. Let σn ∈ Σ be the state of P where h = n. We
have two possible traces of P for σ7, both of which are chosen by the probabilistic
constructor 8.5 with equal probability of 0.5. One of these traces terminates, but
the other does not. Let us label the traces as t1
⟨P,σ7⟩
for the terminating trace and
t2
⟨P,σ7⟩
for the nonterminating trace. Then we have t1
⟨P,σ7⟩
= ⟨1, P, σ7⟩
ε
Ð→ ⟨.5, ⋅, σ7⟩
and t2
⟨P,σ7⟩










) = ⟨↓⟩, whereas obs(t2
⟨P,σ7⟩
) = ⟨↑⟩ - being an infinite trace with no out-
put. Furthermore, ω(t1
⟨P,σ7⟩
) = .5 and ω(t2
⟨P,σ7⟩
) = .5. However, for any n ≠ 7
there is only one possible trace for σn, which is, t1⟨P,σn⟩ = ⟨1, P, σn⟩
ε
Ð→ ⟨1, ⋅, σn⟩
and we have obs(t1
⟨P,σn⟩
) = ⟨↓⟩ and ω(t1
⟨P,σn⟩
) = 1. Hence µˆ(⟨↓⟩ ∣ σ7) = 12 (the
probability of observing ⟨↓⟩ given that σ7 was chosen as the input to P ) and
µˆ(⟨↑⟩ ∣ σ7) = 12 , whereas for any other n ≠ 7 we have that µˆ(⟨↓⟩ ∣ σn) = 1 and















. Thus, for σ7, we have
the conditional probabilities
µˆ(σ7 ∣ ⟨↓⟩) =





, and, µˆ(σ7 ∣ ⟨↑⟩) = 1.
Similarly, for any σn ∈ Σ/{σ7} we have µˆ(σn ∣ ⟨↓⟩) = 231 and µˆ(σn ∣ ⟨↑⟩) = 0.
Using Definition 3.8.5, the information released by P is given by
I⟨P,µ⟩ =H(µ) − ∑
v∈VP
µ′(v)H(µv)
where for any σ ∈ Σ, µv(σ) = µˆ(σ ∣ v) is the probability that σ was selected as
the input to P given the observation of v, and H(µ) and H(µv) are respectively
the entropies of the random variables induced by the probability measures µ and
µv over Σ, which respectively describe the attacker’s uncertainty about the input
state before and after observing P ’s execution. Therefore, the information (in bits)
about h released by P is
I⟨P,µ⟩ = log(16) − (3132 (
1
31









This measure is the average uncertainty lost about the input space, that is, the
information gained by the attacker. The measure H(µ) = log(16) is the initial
uncertainty that the attacker has about the input space, but after observing di-
vergence in one out of 32 runs, whereby the attacker can identify the input on
that run, the average uncertainty that remains about the input space is the measure
∑v∈VP µ
′(v)H(µv), and its difference fromH(µ) models the information released
to the attacker about the inputs to P .
Now consider the program PA = if(h = 7)then skip 8.5 loop else loop,
which is similar to P but now swaps skip and loop. The similarity is that, instead
of revealing the input on divergence, termination now signals that the input h to
PA is 7. Intuitively, we should get the same result for PA that we got for P ,
because PA is simply a swapping of probabilities (which the entropy measure is
not sensitive to) so that PA terminates once every 32 times, as opposed to P , which
symmetrically diverges once every 32 times. Making the same assumptions and
using the similar notations as in the last example, the analysis of PA is similar
to the analysis of P . We now have the following probabilities: µˆ(⟨↓⟩ ∣ σ7) =
µˆ(⟨↑⟩ ∣ σ7) = 12 and for all σ ∈ Σ/{σ7}, µˆ(⟨↑⟩ ∣ σ) = 1 and µˆ(⟨↓⟩ ∣ σ) = 0. Also,
µ′(⟨↑⟩) = 31
32
and µ′(⟨↓⟩) = 1
32
, and for any σ ∈ Σ, µˆ(σ ∣ ⟨↓⟩) = 1 if σ = σ7 and
µˆ(σ ∣ ⟨↓⟩) = 0 otherwise. Finally, for any σ ∈ Σ, µˆ(σ ∣ ⟨↑⟩) = 1
31
if σ = σ7 and
µˆ(σ ∣ ⟨↓⟩) = 2
31
otherwise. Thus, by applying Definition 3.8.5, the information
released by PA is given by I⟨PA,µ⟩ = I⟨P,µ⟩. The identical result is not surprising
because the analysis of PA is merely a permutation of probabilities due to the
observation of ⟨↑⟩ and ⟨↓⟩ in the analysis of P .
The quantitative information flow obtained when loop is appended or prepended
to While-PND programs is similar in nature to the information flow obtained un-
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der the deterministic While and the possibilistic nondeterministic While-ND un-
der the relational model. Specifically, for any While-PND program P that always
terminates, the quantitative information flow of P is preserved in the program
PB = P ; loop since PB only appends ↑ to the observations of P without changing
the probabilities. Similarly, for any While-PND program P , it is easy to see that
the probabilistic information flow of PC = loop;P is 0 bits, since the P subpro-
gram is never executed and the output observation ⟨↑⟩ of PC is independent of the
choice of the input values to PC .
Summary In this chapter we have studied semantic definitions of information
flow in various language-based settings. These definitions demonstrate the use of
the input-output relational model and information representations introduced in
Chapter 3. The definitions of information flow were given relative to an attacker’s
observational model, the semantic attacker, to illustrate the definition of attacker
models, and to demonstrate the development of information flow analyses that are
parametrised by a chosen attacker’s observational power. The semantic analyses
developed demonstrate that the relational model copes well with issues of nonter-
mination. In the next chapter, we shall develop a static information flow analysis




Information Flow Analysis of While
Programs
In this chapter we present a static analysis of information flow for While pro-
grams, using PERs on the set of program states to represent information. The
semantics-based static analysis, which is flow-sensitive and termination-sensitive,
is shown to be correct with respect to the semantic attacker model introduced in
the previous chapter. This attacker is not only able to observe program outputs as
prescribed by the operational semantics, but can also determine whether the pro-
gram terminates or not. We shall start by presenting examples to motivate some
aspects of information flow analysis captured by the static analysis.
5.1 Motivating Examples
In the following examples the variable h (for high) is named to suggest that it
might contain sensitive input, and variable l (for low) is named to suggest that
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it initially contains public input. The variable z is generally used for temporary
storage of intermediate computation, and is not a parameter to the program. We
shall sometimes present two or more programs within the same figure (usually to
compare the programs), separated by a vertical line. When there are two programs,
we refer to the leftmost program as the left-hand-side (LHS) program and the other
as the right-hand-side (RHS) program.
Example 5.1.1 (Explicit Information Flow) The two programs shown in Fig-
ure 5.1.1 below both reveal exactly the same information, namely, the value of
the secret input h. The RHS program first assigns the secret value of h to another
intermediate variable z before printing it to the output. Although the two program
implementations are different, the information flow analysis of these programs
should produce the same result since they both reveal the same information. In
the security literature, information flow from h to z through the assignment state-
ment is called explicit information flow [Den76].
w r i t e h; z ∶= h;
w r i t e z;
Figure 5.1: Explicit Information Flow
Example 5.1.2 (Implicit Information Flow) This example demonstrates the idea
of implicit or indirect information flow [Den76]. Assume that both h and z in
the programs of Figure 5.2 are boolean-typed variables. The LHS program is a
classic example of how information can be propagated implicitly. Although h is
not directly assigned to z, the value of h can be learnt indirectly via z because the
value assigned to z is determined by the value of h. This information flow from h
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to z due to branching is called control dependence [Muc97] in compiler analysis.
The RHS program has exactly the same information flow, but it is propagated ex-
plicitly by the assignment. However, the distinction between implicit and explicit
information flow is immaterial in these programs because the binary value of the
secret h is revealed in both cases.
i f (h) then
z ∶= tt;
e l s e
z ∶= ff ;
w r i t e z ;
z ∶= h;
w r i t e z;
Figure 5.2: Implicit Flow and a binary-valued Explicit Flow
Example 5.1.3 (Implicit Flow Capacity) Although implicit information flow chan-
nels are usually low-capacity transmission channels, but when well-used, implicit
information flow can be as potent as the explicit copying of data. Assuming that
h is a natural number, the program of Figure 5.3 (inefficiently, through a linear
search) copies the secret input to z purely by implicit means.
z : = 0 ;
whi l e (h ≠ z) do
z ∶= z + 1;
w r i t e z;
Figure 5.3: Implicit Flows could be as dangerous as Explicit Copying
Example 5.1.4 (Implicit Flow - due to assignment or lack of it) This example
demonstrates why not all implicit flows can be detected by only considering one
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program trace (or control-flow path) at a time. In Figure 5.4, both programs re-
lease the same information about the secret h. More specifically, an output of 0 in
both programs indicates that the value of h is 1, whereas an output of 1 indicates
that the value of h is not 1. It is clear that the particular output value is not impor-
tant, what matters is the fact that the attacker can determine which branch of the
conditional statement has been executed by observing the output values.
i f ( h =1) then
z : = 0 ;
e l s e
z : = 1 ;
w r i t e z ;
z : = 0 ;
i f ( h =1) then
skip;
e l s e
z : = 1 ;
w r i t e z ;
Figure 5.4: Assignments on all program paths must be considered
Now suppose that we have a trace-based monitor which determines at runtime
whether information may flow implicitly to a variable by checking whether or not
that variable is assigned within the branch of a conditional statement whose guard
is predicated on an expression involving secret values. In the LHS program, this
monitor will be able to detect the implicit information flow to z from the secret
variable h because z is assigned within both branches of the if statement. In the
RHS program however, this monitor will fail to detect that information flows from
h to z on the trace through the then branch, because as far as the runtime monitor
can tell on this trace, z is not assigned within a conditional statement. Information,
however, flows to z because it is assigned in at least one branch of the conditional
statement. This is a well known problem concerning the use of runtime moni-
tors for the enforcement of information flow security [Vol99b, McL94, SM03a].
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The runtime monitor fails to detect the flow because secure information flow is
a property of all control-flow paths. A runtime-based enforcement monitor for
information flow introduced in [GBJS06] uses the result of a static analysis in
the enforcement monitor in order to deal with this problem. This highlights the
importance of static analysis as a useful technique for information flow protection.
Example 5.1.5 (Information Flow - due to program interaction or lack of it) Many
useful programs are interactive in nature, receiving inputs from the user and gen-
erating output as they execute. The While language studied in this thesis produces
outputs through the write construct, which raises the possibility of implicit infor-
mation flow when output takes place in conditional statements, and also explicit
information flow when the attacker observes the result of the evaluation of an ex-
pression whose value depends on secrets. The example of Figure 5.5 demonstrates
implicit information flow via output interactions.
i f (h = 1) then
w r i t e 1 ;
e l s e
w r i t e 2 ;
i f (h = 1) then
w r i t e 1 ;
e l s e
skip;
Figure 5.5: Program Output, or the lack of it, on all control-flow paths must be considered
In the LHS program of Figure 5.5, an output of 1 indicates that the value of
h is 1, whereas an output of 2 reveals that h is not 1. The RHS program only
produces output when the then branch is executed, however this single output or
the lack of it is sufficient to reveal the same information as in the LHS program to
the attacker: an output of 1 in the RHS program reveals h to be 1, and no output
reveals that h is not 1. This implicit information flow due to lack of output is
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similar to the problem of lack of assignment in the RHS program of Figure 5.4.
Example 5.1.6 (Flow-Sensitivity and Semantics) This example, adapted from
[JL00], demonstrates flow-sensitivity and semantics-related aspects of informa-
tion flow analyses. Flow-sensitive and semantics-based analyses are usually more
precise than flow-insensitive static approximations of information flow, which
are commonly used in security type-systems for noninterference such as [VSI96,
VS97]. In flow-insensitive security type systems, which are common in language-
based security, a variable must be typed as secret whenever it is assigned a value
that may be dependent on a secret at any point within the program. While this
is the case in the three programs of Figure 5.6, the attacker cannot learn any-
thing about (the secret) h by observing the program output. Flow-sensitive and
semantics-based analyses detect this. In the first program, the secret value in z
is over-written before it can be used in the output: flow-sensitivity. Similarly, in
the second program, the secret value in h is lost before it is assigned to z - which
in turn is written to the output. In the third program, although the value of z is
computed as a function of h, it is however clear that the final value of z before
it is released is the constant 0, which means that the value of the program output
is independent of the secret h. Modern type-based analyses such as [HS06], and
dependency analyses such as [AB04], which are flow-sensitive will detect the se-
curity of the first two programs. The analysis that we shall present in this chapter
is flow-sensitive and, being semantics-based, will detect that all the three program
are safe. In particular, the analysis of the third program demonstrates the semantic
properties of our analysis.




w r i t e z;
h ∶= 6;
z ∶= h;
w r i t e z;
z ∶= h;
z ∶= z − h;
w r i t e z;
Figure 5.6: Accuracy: Semantic Analysis against Static Typing
based analyses, which makes them more accurate than the traditional static-typing
systems for information flow. In the LHS program of Figure 5.7, the secret h is
assigned to z in the then branch, which suggests that the output value might be
dependent on the secret input. However, since this branch will never be executed,
the output of this program is the constant 0, and hence no information is revealed
about h. In the RHS program, the preceding nonterminating loop prevents the ex-
ecution of the write statement, which makes the program safe because the danger-
ous part will never be executed. The correct information flow in these examples,
and similar dead code situations, are detected by our analysis.
i f (ff) then
z ∶= h;
e l s e
z ∶= 0;
w r i t e z;
whi l e ( tt) do
skip;
w r i t e h;
Figure 5.7: Dead Code and Information Flow
Example 5.1.8 (Termination-Sensitivity) The modelling of information flow due
to nontermination (termination channels) or in the presence of nontermination
is important because nontermination, especially when combined with program
outputs, can be used to reveal arbitrary information about secrets [AHSS08].
On one hand, although the LHS program of Figure 5.8 does not produce any
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i f (h = 10) then
whi l e ( tt) do
skip;
e l s e
skip;
w r i t e h;
whi l e ( tt) do
skip;
Figure 5.8: Information Flow in the Presence of Nontermination
output by a write statement, it however has a termination channel via which infor-
mation about the secret h is transmitted. The termination of this program reveals
that h ≠ 10, whereas nontermination reveals that h is 10. The RHS program, on
the other hand, reveals the secret h before diverging. Termination-insensitive anal-
yses, which support program outputs like [GBJS06, AS07], do not model infor-
mation flow under diverging programs such as the one on the RHS of Figure 5.8.
Our analysis can deal with these and similar cases.
Example 5.1.9 (Disjunctive Information Flow Analysis) Since a program trace
traverses a given control-flow path at a time during the program’s execution, it
is reasonable to analyse information flow in a way that models this property of
program execution. This observation leads to a more accurate analysis of certain
disjunctive information flow. For example, we might require that at most one of
two secrets h1 or h2 may be learnt, that is, never both at the same time, during
the program run. This pattern is akin to the disjunctive information flow property
mentioned in [SS05]. We have shown how one may represent disjunctive infor-
mation with PERs in section 3.5.5. This example demonstrates the usefulness of
such a notion.
Consider the programs of Figure 5.9, and assume that l is a public boolean
value (possibly chosen by an attacker). It is clear that the first program on the LHS
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w r i t e h1;
w r i t e h2;
i f ( l) then
w r i t e h1;
e l s e
w r i t e h2;
i f (tt) then
w r i t e h1;
e l s e
w r i t e h2;
Figure 5.9: Disjunctive Information Flow
violates the required disjunctive policy about the release of h1 and h2, whereas the
other two programs do not. In the second program in the middle, the attacker can
learn at most one of either h1 or h2 during a run regardless of how l is chosen in
this program. One may think of l as the release key to choose between the release
of either h1 or h2. The third, rightmost, program satisfies the desired policy by
definition because it never reveals h2. Our analysis, by the definition of disjunctive
information in PERs, detects the disjunctive properties of information flow about
h1 and h2 in these three programs.
5.2 Information Flow Analysis with PERs
We have presented, in Chapter 3, the lattice of PERs over a set as a representation
of information and we have shown, in Chapter 4, how the semantic information
flow property of a While program may be defined by using PERs over its set of
states. In the remainder of this chapter, we shall develop a static analysis calculus
for deriving the program information flow, which uses the lattice of PERs over
program states as the representation of information.
In the following, the sets Σ and Var are taken to be the set of all states and
the set of all variables respectively of a given program P , which will hopefully
be clear from the context. We also assume that the set Var of the program vari-
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ables is partitioned into two; namely, the set IVar of variables used for program
inputs, that is, the program’s formal parameters, and the set TVar ≜ Var/IVar
of variables, which are not formal parameters but are used for temporary inter-
mediate storage during the program’s computations. The semantic status of the
IVar-TVar partitioning of variables is established by requiring a property, which
preserves the determinism of While with respect to the program inputs, namely,
that the behaviour of a While program must be invariant under fixed IVar-values.
Definition 5.2.1. Let P be a While program. We say that P is properly-initialised
iff
1. for any σ,σ′ ∈ Σ such that σ↓IVar = σ′↓IVar, where ⟨P,σ⟩ = ⟨P,σ⟩
a0Ð→
⟨P1, σ1⟩
a1Ð→ ⋯ and ⟨P,σ′⟩ = ⟨P,σ′⟩
a′




1Ð→ ⋯ then for all i,
ai = a′i and
2. there is no assignment to IVar variables in P .
We shall consider only properly-initialised programs in the static analysis de-
veloped in this chapter. The Definition 5.2.1 of a properly-initialised program P
requires that the observable operational behaviour of this program must be fixed
from one run to another under fixed input (IVar) values. A way to ensure this
property is to initialise properly all TVar variables before use. A variable is
said to be properly-initialised if it is defined as a function of the initial values of
IVar variables. This is not an unusual requirement because the initialisation of
a variable before use is standard programming practice. The property is required
during the static analysis of programs because determinism of the program with
respect to its formal parameters is assumed. At the beginning of program execu-
tion, the IVar variables are properly-initialised by definition. But we also require,
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to simplify the analysis, that IVar variables are not used on the left-hand-side of
assignment statements. This is not a serious restriction because assignments to
IVar variables can be handled by a systematic variable-renaming scheme. The
no-assignment-to-IVar requirement has the additional benefit that we can simply
name a secret input after the IVar variable in which it was initially stored.
5.2.1 The Attacker Model
In the static analysis of this chapter, we have assumed the semantic attacker model
of Chapter 4, which can only observe program outputs through write statements as
prescribed by the standard operational semantics, and can additionally determine
whether the program terminates or not.
5.3 Inducing PERs by Expression Evaluation
Consider the program in Figure 5.10, which reveals the parity of the secret input
h. This information is derived by the equivalence relation over states induced by
the possible evaluations of the expression hmod 2. This equivalence relation is
the “parity of h” relation Parh, such that ∀σ,σ′ ∈ Σ, σ Parh σ′ iff σ(h) mod 2 =
σ′(h)mod 2. Thus, on account of the information revealed by this program alone,
any pair of input states, which agree on the parity of h, cannot be distinguished by
observing the program’s output. Alternatively, we can say that the observer can
distinguish two input states of this program, by observing the output, only if those
states map h to values with different parities.
Let us now introduce a notation to construct PERs over program states by
considering expression evaluations.
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w r i t e ( h mod 2 ) ;
Figure 5.10: A program revealing the parity of its input.
Definition 5.3.1 (Inducing PERs by evaluations). Let τ ∈ {int,bool} be the pro-
gram data type of an expression e and let φ ∈ PER(JτK) be a PER over τ values.
Define the PER e ∶φ ∈ PER(Σ) over states that is induced by the observation of e
under the constraint φ as
∀σ,σ′ ∈Σ. σ (e ∶φ) σ′ ⇐⇒ σ(e) φ σ′(e).
Furthermore, define the PERs T,F ∈ PER(B) over booleans such that for any
∀v, v′ ∈ B, v T v′ ⇐⇒ v = v′ = tt and v F v′ ⇐⇒ v = v′ = ff . In the special
case when φ = id is the identity relation over values, we have for any expression
e, ∀σ,σ′ ∈Σ, σ (e ∶ id) σ′ ⇐⇒ σ(e) = σ′(e).
The PER φ in e ∶ φ specifies what values of the expression e an attacker can and
cannot distinguish, where v φ v′ means that the attacker cannot distinguish the
pair of values v and v′. More generally, for any v ∈ dom(φ), the attacker cannot
distinguish any pair of values in [v]φ. Thus, the attacker cannot distinguish a pair
of states σ and σ′ by observing their e-values if σ(e), σ′(e) ∈ [v]φ. Additionally,
the PER φ allows us to specify that certain values are not possible whenever those
values are not in the domain of definition of φ. This partiality property is used
to specify the knowledge of which conditional branch has been taken during the
analysis of conditional statements. For example, on entering the then branch of the
conditional statement if(b)thenc1elsec2, we know statically that b evaluates
to the value tt and hence we can identify the information released about b as
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the PER b ∶ T over states. Since ff ∉ dom(T), the PER T specifies that the
boolean guard could not have evaluated to the valueff on entering the then branch.
Consequently, the domain of definition of the PER b ∶ T identifies exactly only
the set of states under which the then branch of this conditional statement can be
executed and it sets the context of implicit information flow for the analysis of c1.
5.3.1 Conditional Information Flow
Information flow in a program may be conditional. For example, when a com-
mand lies within a conditional statement, the information released by this com-
mand becomes conditional on how the boolean guard of the conditional statement
evaluates. As a concrete example, consider the program listings of Figure 5.11.
It is clear that the information flow caused by the command write h in the LHS
program is different from that in the program on the RHS. In the LHS program,
all possible values of the secret input may be learnt, whereas in the RHS program,
write h only reveals the value of h whenever that value is 10 (in fact, the RHS
program as a whole only reveals whether the value of h is 10 or not). These two
write statements cause different information flows because of the program context
where they occur. In particular, the execution of write h in the RHS program is
predicated on the condition that h = 10 holds.
w r i t e h ; i f ( h =10) then w r i t e h ;
e l s e s k i p ;
Figure 5.11: Conditional Information Flow
Considered independently of the execution context, the PER on states induced by
command write h is h ∶ id, which distinguishes any pair of states with different
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values of h.
Now, in the RHS program, the write statement is executed only if the boolean
conditional guard evaluates to the value tt. This predicate on state is captured
by the PER (h = 10) ∶ T which requires that the value of h must be 10. Thus,
the domain of the PER (h = 10) ∶ T encodes the set of states under which the
execution of the then branch of the RHS program takes place, capturing the con-
ditionality of execution of the write statement. Thus, the PER that is effectively
induced by the write h statement in this conditional context may be computed
as ((h = 10) ∶ T) ⊔ (h ∶ id) = (h = 10) ∶ T, which means that h is revealed (by
the write statement) only if its value is 10. This is as opposed to the LHS program
that always reveals the value of h (that is, h ∶ id).
For the else branch of the RHS program, the information released is modelled
by the PER (h = 10) ∶ F, which relates all states where h ≠ 10 and therefore repre-
sents the knowledge that h is not equal to 10. Note that this information is gained
by the observer of the RHS program if the program produces no output when ex-
ecuted. We can thus represent the information released by the RHS program by
the PER obtained by taking the disjoint union (h = 10) ∶ T ∪ (h = 10) ∶ F. This
information reveals whether h = 10 or not.
5.4 Static Analysis of Information Flow with PERs
In this section we present some PER operations that will be used in the information
flow analysis. The analysis itself is based on triples that we refer to as information
configurations, which provide dynamic semantic contexts for the analysis of pro-
grams. Information configurations encode information flows at different points
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along a program’s control-flow path.
5.4.1 Information Configurations
We are interested in keeping track of three aspects of information flow during
analysis. These information are encoded in triples referred to as information
configurations of the form (E, I,O), where E (for Explicit) represents explicit
information flows toTVar variables during assignments, and I (for Implicit) rep-
resents implicit information flows due to program branching and O (for Output or
Observed) represents the information released due to program outputs and obser-
vation.
Definition 5.4.1 (Information configurations). Let I= PER(Σ) be the lattice of
PERs over the set Σ of states of a program P and let Var be the set of variables
of P . Define the set of all information configurations with respect to this program
as Φ ≜ E × I ×O, where E = [Var→ I] and I =O = I .
We shall use (E, I,O), ϕ,ψ ∈ Φ for information configurations, and symbols
Φ,Ψ ⊆ Φ for sets of information configurations - adding superscripts and/or sub-
scripts when necessary. We shall refer to the first, second, and third projection of
an information configuration triple as its E-, I-, and O-component respectively.
5.4.2 Context-based PERs
In order to track the flow of information through a program we shall be construct-
ing PERs, which encode the information released. We shall however be tracking
the information released about the formal parameters (elements of the set IVar)
141
of a program only, throwing away (or forgetting) information about other vari-
ables (elements of the set TVar). Let us define some operations on PERs and
information configurations that we shall use in the static analysis.
Definition 5.4.2 (Forgetting information about variables). Let R ∈ PER(Σ) be a
PER over Σ, and let Z ⊆ Var be a set of variables. Define ↑ZR such that for
any σ,σ′ ∈ Σ, σ ↑ZR σ′ iff there exist states σ1, . . . , σn ∈ Σ and σ′′1 , . . . , σ′′n−1 ∈
dom(R) and σ = σ1, σ′ = σn such that for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1 implies σi, σi+1 ∈
havocZ([σ′′i ]R).
Intuitively, ↑ZR “forgets” the information that R has about the variables in Z since
each equivalence class of ↑ZR is dense with respect to the values of variables in
Z. That is, for all σ ∈ dom(↑ZR) we have [σ]↑ZR = havocZ([σ]↑ZR). Let us show
that ↑ZR is a PER.
Lemma 5.4.3. Let Z ⊆Var be a set of variables in the domain of states inΣ and
let R ∈ PER(Σ) be a PER over Σ. The relation ↑ZR is a PER over Σ.
Proof. The symmetry of ↑ZR is clear. For transitivity, suppose σ ↑ZR σ′ and
σ′ ↑ZR σ′′ hold. Then there exist two sequences of states σ1, . . . , σn ∈ Σ and
σ′1, . . . , σ
′
m ∈ Σ such that for all i = 1, . . . , n − 1 and j = 1, . . . ,m − 1 there exist
σAi , σ
B
j ∈ dom(R) such that σi, σi+1 ∈ havocZ([σAi ]R) and σ′j , σ′j+1 ∈ havocZ([σBj ]R)
and σ = σ1 and σ′ = σn = σ′1 and σ′′ = σ′m. Thus, transitivity of ↑ZR is clear by
concatenating the two sequences of states.
Definition 5.4.4 (Domain-preserving joins). Let R,R′ ∈ PER(Σ) be PERs over
Σ. Define the PER CΣ(R), which extends the domain of R up to Σ ⊆ Σ while
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preserving the equivalence classes of R as
∀σ,σ′ ∈Σ, σ CΣ(R) σ′ iff σ R σ′ or σ,σ′ ∈ Σ/dom(R).
Furthermore, let Σ = dom(R) ∪ dom(R′), define a join operation on PERs R and
R′, which preserves their domains as
R FR′ ≜ CΣ(R) ⊔ CΣ(R′).





The join operation F has an associated partial order, ⊑+, defined as
R⊑+R′ ⇐⇒ R FR′ = R′.
Let (E, I,O), (E′, I ′,O′) ∈ Φ be information configurations, F is extended to
information configurations as
(E, I,O) F (E′, I ′,O′) ≜ (E FE′, I F I ′,O FO′)
where, as usual, E F E′ is the pointwise join of functions. The extension F of F
to sets of information configurations is done in the usual way. Finally, define an
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order relation on information configurations as
(E, I,O)⊑+(E′, I ′,O′) ⇐⇒ ∀x ∈Var.E(x)⊑+E′(x), I⊑+I ′,O⊑+O′.
The operation F preserves domains of PERs. It also preserves the partitioning,
that is, the information content of PERs.
Proposition 5.4.5. Let R,R′,R′′ ∈ PER(Σ) be PERs, then
1. dom(R) ⊆ dom(R FR′),
2. for all σ,σ′ ∈ dom(R), σ (R FR′) σ′ Ô⇒ σ R σ′,
3. for any σ ∈ dom(R) and σ′ ∈ Σ such that σ′ ∉ dom(R), we have that
(σ,σ′) ∉ (R FR′),
4. dom(R) ⊆ dom(R′) and R′⊑+R′′ implies that R ⊔R′ ⊑ R ⊔R′′.
Proof.
1. It is clear from the definition that dom(R FR′) = dom(R) ∪ dom(R′) and
hence that dom(R) ⊆ dom(R FR′).
2. LetΣ = dom(R)∪dom(R′) and defineR andR′ such that∀σ,σ′ ∈Σ, σRσ′ ⇐⇒
σ,σ′ ∈ Σ/dom(R) and σ R′ σ′ ⇐⇒ σ,σ′ ∈ Σ/dom(R′). Then we have
R F R′ = (R ∪ R) ⊔ (R′ ∪ R′) = (R ⊔ R′) ∪ (R ⊔ R′) ∪ (R′ ⊔ R), since
R ⊔R′ = ∅. Furthermore, since by definition σ,σ′ ∈ dom(R) Ô⇒ σ,σ′ ∉
dom(R), then for any σ,σ′ ∈ dom(R), σ R FR′ σ′ Ô⇒ σ (R ⊔R′) σ′ or
σ (R ⊔R′) σ′ Ô⇒ σ R σ′.
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3. From the definition σ1 (R F R′) σ2 Ô⇒ σ1 CΣ(R) σ2 Ô⇒ σ1 R σ2 or
σ1, σ2 ∈ Σ/dom(R), where Σ = dom(R) ∪ dom(R′). Since neither σ R σ′
nor σ,σ′ ∈ Σ/dom(R) holds, then (σ,σ′) ∉ R FR′.
4. Since R′⊑+R′′ then R′′ = R′ F R′′ and hence Σ′′ = dom(R′′) = dom(R′′) ∪
dom(R′). Define R′ such that ∀σ,σ′ ∈ Σ, σR′σ′ ⇐⇒ σ,σ′ ∈ Σ′′/dom(R′).
Since Σ′′ = dom(R′′) then CΣ′′(R′′) = R′′. Thus, R′′ = R′ FR′′ = CΣ′′(R′)⊔
R′′ = (R′⊔R′′)∪(R′′⊔R′). Hence, R′′⊔R = R⊔R′⊔R′′ because R′⊔R = ∅
since dom(R) ⊆ dom(R′), and, R′ and R′ are disjoint by definition. Since
R′′ ⊔R = R ⊔R′ ⊔R′′, then R ⊔R′ ⊑ R ⊔R′′.
It is clear that ⊑+ is a partial order on PERs because F is idempotent, commuta-
tive, and associative. The resulting lattice is also complete. The induced order on
Φ in turn makes the set of information configurations a complete lattice.
Theorem 5.4.6. The set PER(Σ) of PERs over Σ is partially ordered by ⊑+, and
⟨PER(Σ),⊑+,F⟩ forms a complete lattice
Proof. The partial order proof is straightforward. We shall now show that for
any R ⊆ PER(Σ) and R′ ∈ PER(Σ) such that for all R ∈ R,R⊑+R′, we have that
FR⊑+R′. Let Σ = dom(R′), then we know by (1) of proposition 5.4.5 that for
all R ∈ R,dom(R) ⊆ Σ, since R⊑+R′, and hence that dom(FR) ⊆ Σ. Now, by
definition, ∀σ,σ′ ∈Σ, σ(FRFR′)σ′ ⇐⇒ σ(⊔∀R∈R CΣ(R)⊔R′)σ′ ⇐⇒ σR′σ′
since for all R ∈ R, σ R′ σ′ Ô⇒ σ CΣ(R) σ′ by the fact that R⊑+R′, which
means that CΣ(R) ⊔R′ = R′. Therefore FR FR′ = R′, which shows the desired
property.
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Theorem 5.4.7. The partially ordered set ⟨Φ,⊑+,F⟩ of information configurations
is a complete lattice.
Proof. For this proof it is sufficient to show that for any arbitrary Φ ⊆ Φ the
join FΦ exists in Φ [GHK+03]. As usual, FΦ = (E′, I ′,O′) is the information
configuration defined as ∀x ∈ Var,E′(x) = F{E(x) ∣ (E, I,O) ∈ Φ} and I ′ =
F{I ∣ (E, I,O) ∈ Φ} and O′ = F{O ∣ (E, I,O) ∈ Φ}. The proof is immediate since
from Theorem 5.4.6 ⟨PER(Σ),⊑+,F⟩ is a complete lattice.
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Lemma 5.4.8. Let Σ be the set of all states, which are maps from Var to values.
Suppose Σ,Σ′ ⊆ Σ and that Z ⊆ Var and let R,R′ ∈ PER(Σ). Then we have the
following properties:
1. Let X,Y ⊆ Var such that X ∪ Y = Z, then havocZ(Σ) ∪ havocZ(Σ′) =
havocZ(Σ ∪Σ′), and havocX(havocY (Σ)) = havocZ(Σ) .
2. The operator havocZ(⋅) is an upper closure operator on the powerset lattice
⟨P(Σ),⊆⟩ with respect to the subset inclusion order.
3. The following identities hold
(a) havocZ(Σ) ∪ havocZ(Σ′) = havocZ(havocZ(Σ) ∪ havocZ(Σ′)).
(b) havocZ(Σ) ∩ havocZ(Σ′) = havocZ(havocZ(Σ) ∩ havocZ(Σ′)).
(c) havocZ(Σ)/havocZ(Σ′) = havocZ(havocZ(Σ)/havocZ(Σ′)).
4. For all σ ∈ dom(↑ZR) we have [σ]↑ZR = havocZ([σ]↑ZR) .
5. For any X,Y ⊆Var we have ↑X↑YR = ↑Y↑XR = ↑X∪YR.
6. ↑ZR ⊔ ↑ZR′ = ↑Z(↑ZR ⊔ ↑ZR′).
7. ↑ZR F ↑ZR′ = ↑Z(↑ZR F ↑ZR′).
8. R ⊑ R′ Ô⇒ ↑ZR ⊑ ↑ZR′.
Proof. See Appendix A.
We shall now define some operations on information configurations.
Definition 5.4.9 (Semantic Sets and PERs). Let (E, I,O) ∈ Φ be an information
configuration, define the semantic set of (E, I,O), which represents the set of
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program states modelled by the configuration (E, I,O) to be
dom((E, I,O)) ≜ ⋂
z∈Var
dom(E(z)) ∩ dom(I) ∩ dom(O).
Define the PER PER((E, I,O)), which encodes this set such that
∀σ,σ′ ∈Σ, σ PER((E, I,O)) σ′ ⇐⇒ σ,σ′ ∈ dom((E, I,O)).
Information configurations provide contexts under which the information re-
leased by program commands and expression evaluations may be constructed.
The information released by a subprogram of a given program is constrained by
the possible set of states, as prescribed by the semantic set of an information
configuration, that reaches that subprogram. The information released by the ob-
servation of the evaluation of an expression in a given program context is defined
as follows.
Definition 5.4.10 (Information released in a context). LetΣ be the set of all states,
which are maps from Var to values, and let IVar ⊆ Var such that TVar =
Var/IVar. Furthermore, let (E, I,O) ∈ Φ be an information configuration, and
let e be an expression of type τ such that FV (e) ⊆ Var, and let φ ∈ PER(JτK) be
a PER over τ .
Define the PER flow(e ∶ φ, (E, I,O)) over Σ to be
flow(e ∶ φ, (E, I,O)) ≜ ↑TVar(e ∶φ ⊔RE ⊔ I)
where RE is defined such that ∀σ,σ′ ∈Σ, σRE σ′ iff σ,σ′ ∈ dom (⊔z∈FV (e)E(z)).
148
When IVar is the set of input variables to a While program P , this definition con-
structs a PER flow(e ∶ φ, (E, I,O)), which represents the information released
about the formal parameters of P by the observation of the evaluation e subject
to the constraint φ over its evaluation. The PERs RE and I provide a context,
specifying what states are possible as prescribed by the information configuration
(E, I,O) (see Definition 5.4.9), for the evaluation of e. The PER RE places a
constraint on the possible values of the free variables of e, and the PER I is a con-
straint on the possible values of the program parameters that cause the control-
flow to reach the evaluation of e due to program branching. The definition of
flow(⋅, ⋅) only computes the information released about the program’s formal pa-
rameters by throwing away (via the operation ↑TVar(⋅)) the information encoded
about variables the variables of TVar, which are not formal parameters of P .
With these definitions in hand, we can now present the static analysis rules for the
analysis of information flow in While programs.
5.5 The Information Flow Rules
The algorithmic information flow rules for the static analysis of information flow
in a given While program is presented in Figure 5.12. The analysis rules are de-
fined parametric to a given program P , where the sets Var, IVar,TVar,Σ, and
Φ are defined with respect to this program. For some (E, I,O) ∈ Φ and sub-
program c of P , the analysis of c is specified as a transformation of information
configurations: (E, I,O) c (E′, I ′,O′). The information configuration (E, I,O)
is referred to as the pre-configuration or precondition for the analysis of c and
(E′, I ′,O′) is referred to as the post-configuration or postcondition of the analy-
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sis. The pre-configuration (E, I,O) provides a semantic and information context
for the analysis, where the semantic set dom((E, I,O)) represents the starting set
of states for the analysis of c, and O is the attacker’s knowledge before the exe-
cution of c. Similarly, dom((E′, I ′,O′)) contains the set of states under which c
terminates and O′ represents the attacker’s knowledge after observing the execu-
tion of c. In particular, E and E′ respectively keep track of the values of program
variables and their dependencies on input parameters before and after the execu-
tion of c. Program branching information, specifically, the values of the program
input parameters under which a given program point is reached are encoded in
the I-part of the information configuration, setting the context for the analysis of
subprograms of conditional statements.
We shall explain each of the analysis rules in the remainder of this section. The
first two rules are straightforward. The [SKIP] rule shows that the skip command
does not modify information configurations and therefore causes no information
flow, and the sequential composition rule ([SEQNC]) shows that the analysis is com-
positional. Let us now look at the definition of the remaining rules.
5.5.1 Analysis of write Statements
The write statements in a program cause information to flow directly to the pro-
gram observer. The semantic attacker model shows that the attacker can observe
the output value of a write statement as prescribed by the operational semantics,
and hence the information released to the attacker is modelled by the identity ob-
servational constraint (e ∶ id) on the program output. The information flow to
the attacker is however subject to the semantic constraints placed on the possi-
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ϕ c1 ϕ′ ϕ′ c2 ϕ′′
ϕ c1; c2 ϕ′′
[WRITE]
O′ = O F flow(e ∶ id, ϕ)
ϕ write e (E, I,O′)
[ASSGN]
E′ = E[z ↦ aflow(z ∶= e,ϕ)]
ϕ z ∶= e (E′, I,O)
[IF]
I ′ = flow(b ∶ T, ϕ) I ′′ = flow(b ∶ F, ϕ)
(E, I ′,O) c1 ψ′ (E, I ′′,O) c2 ψ′′
ϕ if (b) then c1 else c2 ψ′ ⊎ϕ ψ′′
[WHL]
ϕ0 = ϕ (En, In,On) = ϕn ϕn if(b)then c else skipϕn+1 I ′n = flow(b ∶ F, ϕn)
∀x ∈Var. X¯ = TVar/{x}. σ E′(x) σ′ ⇐⇒ ∃i ∈ N, σ ↑X¯(Ei(x) ⊔ I ′i ⊔ b ∶ F) σ′
(E′′, I ′′,O′′) = Fi≥0ϕi I ′ = flow(b ∶ F, (E′, I ′′,O′′)) O′ = Fi≥0 flow(b ∶ id, ϕi) FO′′
ϕ while (b) do c (E′, I ′,O′)
Figure 5.12: Calculus of Information Flow
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ble values of the free variables of the expression (based on previous assignments)
and the possible values of the program parameters that cause the control-flow to
reach the write statement. These semantic constraints are specified by the pre-
configuration (E, I,O). Thus, the attacker’s knowledge after observing the result
of the statement write e in the context provided by (E, I,O) is captured by tak-
ing a join of the prior knowledge O of the attacker with the released information
flow(e ∶ id, (E, I,O)) in that context.
To illustrate how the [WRITE] rule captures the information flow to an attacker,
consider the example shown in Figure 5.13. Here the attacker wishes to gain
access to the values of two secret input parameters h1 and h2 by solving equations
involving these inputs.
w r i t e h1 + h2;
w r i t e h1 − h2;
Figure 5.13: PER joins capture information flow via equation solving
This example illustrates how PER joins capture reasoning with equations as fol-
lows. The PERs induced by the expressions h1 + h2 and h1 − h2 respectively are
the equivalence relations R1 = (h1 + h2) ∶ id and R2 = (h1 − h2) ∶ id, where
• ∀σ,σ′ ∈Σ, σ R1 σ′ ⇐⇒ σ(h1 + h2) = σ′(h1 + h2), and
• ∀σ,σ′ ∈Σ, σ R2 σ′ ⇐⇒ σ(h1 − h2) = σ′(h1 − h2).
In the flow rules, the fact that the attacker learns the precise values of both
secrets after observing the output of the two write statements is captured by the
join R = R1 F R2 = R1 ⊔ R2 (since both R1 and R2 are equivalence relations)
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which is given by:
∀σ,σ′ ∈ Σ, σ R σ′ ⇐⇒ σ(h1 + h2) = σ′(h1 + h2) and σ(h1 − h2) = σ′(h1 − h2)
⇐⇒ σ(h1) = σ′(h1) and σ(h2) = σ′(h2).
This means that two states are indistinguishable to the attacker (via the knowledge
modelled by the PER R) if and only if they both agree on the values of both h1
and h2. In other words, the attacker learns the values of h1 and h2.
5.5.2 Analysis of if statements
We know statically what the conditional guard evaluates to when the control flow
is passed to one of the branches of an if statement. This information is captured
in the [IF] rule by constructing a PER representing the set of states that evalu-
ate the boolean guard to the appropriate value on entering that branch. The in-
formation thus released (also known as implicit information flow) constitute the
implicit information contexts under which the branches of the if statement are
analysed. These implicit contexts are computed from the boolean expression b as
flow(b ∶ T, ϕ) and flow(b ∶ F, ϕ) for the then and else branches respectively, which
identify the states in which the boolean guard evaluates to tt and ff respectively.
As demonstrated by Example 5.1.4 and Example 5.1.5, in computing the im-
plicit information flows in the branches of a conditional if statement, simply look-
ing for assignment or write statements in each branch of the if statement indepen-
dently of the other branch can cause certain implicit flows to go undetected. This
information flow is due to a well-known problem that information flow is not a
property of individual execution paths [Vol99b, McL94, SM03a, Sch00]. Such
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flows can occur when an attacker observes that certain actions did not take place,
such as outputs or assignments on a given execution path. Thus, runtime execu-
tion monitors [Sch00] cannot detect such flows when execution passes through
the control-flow path where the relevant action is missing. However, this is not a
problem for static analysis since information about all program paths are available
to the analyser - making static analysis more suitable for the analysis of secure in-
formation flow. An execution monitor [GBJS06], which is able to deal with this
problem uses the result of a static analysis to prevent this problem in the execution
monitor. The operation ⊎ in the if rule, which is given in the following definition,
identifies this information flow.
Definition 5.5.1. Let (E, I,O) ∈ Φ be an information configuration and let b
be a boolean expression an let c1 and c2 be While commands, such that I ′ =
flow(b ∶ T, (E, I,O)) and I ′′ = flow(b ∶ F, (E, I,O)) and (E, I ′,O)c1(E1, I1,O1)
and (E, I ′′,O) c2 (E2, I2,O2).














E2(z) ⊔ I ′′ if E1(z) ≠ E(z)
E2(z) otherwise
and,
∀σ,σ′ ∈Σ, σ I3 σ′ ⇐⇒ σ,σ′ ∈ dom(I1) ∪ dom(I2)
The post-configuration of the conditional statement if (b) then c1 else c2,
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with respect to the pre-configuration (E, I,O), is given by
(E1, I1,O1) ⊎(E,I,O) (E2, I2,O2) ≜ (E′1, I3,O1) F (E
′
2, I3,O2).
The implicit context in the post-configuration of the conditional if statement
is a PER representing the union of the domains of the post-configurations of the
branches. This makes the information in the implicit context local to the relevant
branches, otherwise this can result in the so-called label creep [SM03a] - a condi-
tion where the security type of the “program counter” monotonically increases due
to conditional statements. The implicit context also keeps track of the dependency
of reaching a particular program point on the value of inputs, and, as will be seen
in the analysis of while statements, input states leading to program divergence are
removed from the implicit context of the while statement post-configuration.
5.5.3 Analysis of Assignment Statements
When an assignment takes place in a program context, information is encoded
directly in the assigned variable (by virtue of the assigned expression) and/or in-
directly (by virtue of the implicit context under which the assignment takes place).
However, since assignment also changes program state, we define a transposition
operation on PERs over states that models the semantic effect of assignments on
states.
Definition 5.5.2 (PER transposition and assignment). Let R be a PER overΣ and




R such that for any σ,σ′ ∈Σ, σ
z∶=e
↝
R σ′ iff there exist states σ1, . . . , σn ∈Σ
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and σ′′1 , . . . σ′′n−1 ∈ dom(R) and σ = σ1, σ′ = σn such that for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1
implies σi, σi+1 ∈ {σˆ[z ↦ σˆ(e)] ∣ σˆ ∈ [σ′′i ]R}.
Now let (E, I,O) ∈Φ be an information configuration and let e be an expres-
sion and let z ∈ TVar. Furthermore, let R = e ∶ id ⊔ RE ⊔ I , where RE is the









Z¯ = TVar/{z}. Define the information released to z by the assignment z ∶= e
under the pre-configuration (E, I,O) to be




The intention behind PER transposition is to transfer the relational structure (in-
formation content) of R to another PER
z∶=e
↝
R , which updates state in lockstep with
the semantic effect of the assignment z ∶= e. The information flow to z due to the
assignment z ∶= e is then computed as the information released by the evaluation
of e in the context (E, I,O), and the state change is reflected by the PER transpo-
sition. In the definition of aflow(z ∶= e, (E, I,O)), only the value of z is retained
out of all the TVar variables and the values of other TVar variables are “for-
gotten” (that is, ↑Z¯
z∶=e
↝
R , where Z¯ = TVar/{z}). Thus, in the resulting information
configuration of the assignment rule, where E′ = E[z ↦ aflow(z ∶= e, (E, I,O))],
E′(z) keeps track only of the value of z and its dependency on the program’s for-
mal parameters IVar. Let us show that the transposition of a PER is also a PER.
Lemma 5.5.3. Let R ∈ PER(Σ) be a PER, then the transposition
z∶=e
↝
R of R is also
a PER.
Proof. The symmetry of
z∶=e
↝
R is clear. For transitivity, suppose σ
z∶=e
↝





hold, then there exist two sequences of states σ1, . . . , σn ∈ Σ and σ′1, . . . , σ′m ∈ Σ
such that for all i = 1, . . . , n − 1 and j = 1, . . . ,m − 1 there exist σAi , σBj ∈ dom(R)
and σi, σi+1 ∈ {σ′′[z ↦ σ′′(e)] ∣ σ′′ ∈ [σAi ]R} and σ′j , σ′j+1 ∈ {σ′′[z ↦ σ′′(e)] ∣ σ′′ ∈




by concatenating the two sequences of states.
A Notation. To aid presentation, we shall often represent a PER
by its set of equivalence classes. For example, R ≡ [Σ]R means that
[Σ]R is the set of equivalence classes of R. Recall from section 3.5.3
that this partitioning is defined as [Σ]R = {[σ]R ∣ σ ∈ dom(R)}
for any R ∈ PER(Σ). This notation is reasonable because a PER
is completely determined by its set of equivalence classes. For
example, suppose σ2 ≠ σ1 ≠ σ3 ≠ σ2, the PER R defined as
∀σ,σ′ ∈ Σ, σ R σ′ ⇐⇒ σ = σ′ = σ1 or σ,σ′ ∈ {σ2, σ3} is written as
R ≡ {{σ1},{σ2, σ3}}. The states themselves will be represented by
tuples of values.
Sample Analysis
To illustrate the information flow rules presented so far, consider the analysis of
the program shown in Figure 5.14. Suppose IVar = {h1, h2} and TVar = {l},
such that Jτh1K = Jτh2K = {0,1} and JτlK = {0,1,2} (where τx is the data type of
variable x). For brevity, the states are represented by tuples from Jτh1K×Jτh2K×JτlK
so that (1,0,1) represents the state σ ∈ Σ where σ(h1) = σ(l) = 1 and σ(h2) = 0.
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Assume that h1 and h2 contain secret values and that l is public, but we want to
find out what information is gained about the secret inputs.
We choose a starting configuration, which contains no prior information, and
which makes no assumption about the starting state to be (E, I,O), such that ∀x ∈
{h1, h2, l}, E(x) = I = O = all ≡ {{(i, j, k) ∣ i, j ∈ {0,1}, k ∈ {0,1,2}}}. Thus, the
attacker (O) has no initial knowledge about the inputs h1 and h2 since O relates
all states. Applying the assignment rule at line 1, we arrive at the configuration
(E1, I,O), whereE1 = E[l ↦ R1] andR1 ≡ {{(0,0,0)},{(0,1,1), (1,0,1)},{(1,1,2)}}.
The partitioning of R1 reflects the fact that, after this assignment, observing the
value of l as 0 reveals that h1 = h2 = 0, a value 1 reveals that either h1 = 0, h2 = 1
or h1 = 1, h2 = 0, and a value 2 reveals that h1 = h2 = 1.
1 l ∶= h1 + h2;
2 i f ( l = 1) then
3 l ∶= l + h1;
4 w r i t e l;
5 e l s e
6 s k i p ;
Figure 5.14: Illustrating assignment, conditional, and write analysis.
In the then branch of the if statement, the implicit context is given by I1 =
flow((l = 1)∶T, (E1, I,O)) = ↑{l}R2 ≡ {{(0,1, k), (1,0, k) ∣ k ∈ JτlK}}. The PER
R2 = ((l = 1) ∶T) ⊔ I ⊔ R′2 ≡ {{(0,1,1), (1,0,1)}}, where σ R′2 σ′ iff σ,σ′ ∈
dom(E1(l)), relates only the set of states where l = 1. Consequently, the pre-
configuration for the then branch is (E1, I1,O). Applying the assignment rule
again on line 3 under the information configuration (E1, I1,O), we obtain (E2, I1,O),
where the PER encoded against l is now given byE2(l) ≡ {{(0,1,1)},{(1,0,2)}}.
This means that by observing the value of l at this point we can determine the value
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of both h1 and h2, where l = 1 Ô⇒ h1 = 0, h2 = 1 and l = 2 Ô⇒ h1 = 1, h2 = 0.
This information is released by the following write statement because by starting
with the pre-configuration (E2, I1,O) and applying the write rule on line 4 we ob-
tain the post-configuration (E2, I1,O1), where O1 = OFflow(l ∶ id, (E2, I1,O)) ≡
{{(0,1, k)∣k ∈ JτlK}, {(1,0, k)∣k ∈ JτlK}, {(0,0, k), (1,1, k)∣k ∈ JτlK}}. The equiv-
alence classes {(0,1, k)∣k ∈ JτlK} and {(1,0, k)∣k ∈ JτlK} ofO1 retain the informa-
tion encoded in l about h1 and h2, namely that states with different input values of
h1 and h2 can be distinguished. The equivalence class {(0,0, k), (1,1, k)∣k ∈ JτlK}
of O1 comes from O due to the domain-preserving property of F and it reflects the
information released about secrets (that h1 = h2) in the else branch of the condi-
tional if statement if no output is produced in that branch (which is the case in this
example).
Since the else branch is a skip statement, the post-configuration of this branch
remains unchanged, but the assignment to l in the then branch means that the
l part of the E-component of the postcondition of the else branch must be up-
dated (due to the fact that E1(l) ≠ E2(l)). This yields E3 = E1[l ↦ E1(l) ⊔ I2],
where I2 = flow((l = 1) ∶ F, (E1, I,O)) ≡ {{(0,0, k), (1,1, k) ∣ k ∈ JτlK}} and
hence E3(l) ≡ {{(0,0,0)},{(1,1,2)}}. Thus, the post-configuration of the con-
ditional if statement is (E2, I,O1) F (E3, I,O) = (E4, I,O1), where E4(l) ≡
{{(0,0,0)},{(0,1,1)},{(1,0,2)},{(1,1,2)}} represents the various possible val-
ues that l might take based on the choice of the inputs h1 and h2, and hence its
dependency on the inputs.
Note that, on one hand, the semantic set of the pre-configuration (E, I,O)
of the analysis of this program defines the set of possible starting states of the
program dom((E, I,O)) = Σ, which is the set of all states. On the other hand,
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the semantic set of the post-configuration is the set of terminating states of the
program, namely, dom((E4, I,O1)) = {(0,0,0), (0,1,1), (1,0,2), (1,1,2)}. We
shall prove a semantic correctness property of the analysis in Theorem 5.7.10,
which states that the semantic set of the post-configuration contains the set of
states under which the program terminates when the program is executed from a
starting state chosen from the semantic set of the pre-configuration. Formally, this
means that for a given program P and the relevant information configurations ϕ
and ϕ′ used in its analysis, ϕP ϕ′ Ô⇒ {σ′ ∣σ ∈ dom(ϕ), ⟨P,σ⟩⇓ σ′} ⊆ dom(ϕ′).
5.5.4 Analysis of while Statements
The while rule computes the limit of the monotonically increasing chain Fn≥0ϕi
over the lattice ⟨Φ,⊑+,F⟩, induced by the iterative application of the command
if(b)then c else skip. This computes the information released during each
iteration of the while statement while (b) do c, which begins from the pre-
configuration ϕ = ϕ0 of the while statement. Being a monotonically increasing
chain on a complete lattice, the fixpoint Fn≥0ϕi exists [Tar55].
The definition of the post-configuration (E′, I ′,O′) of the while analysis en-
sures that only the set of states under which the while loop terminates can be used
in the analysis of the subsequent statements after the loop. Thus, E′ and I ′ are
defined to select only the states where the boolean guard evaluates to ff . Since
the attacker model can determine whether the program terminates or not, the def-
inition of O′ partitions states, through b ∶ id, to those in which the while loop
terminates or diverges.
To illustrate the while analysis rule, consider the program listing in Figure 5.15,
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where the attacker performs a linear search on the value of the secret h. In this
example, IVar = {h} and TVar = {l}. Let us assume that h and l are of integer
type τh and τl respectively, where JτhK = JτlK = V = {i ∈ Z ∣ − n ≤ i < n} is the set
of integers between −n (inclusive) and n (exclusive), and where n ∈ N is a natural
number. If h is chosen to be a natural number in V, the while loop will terminate
with the value of l equal to the secret value of h (and will be printed to the output).
However, nontermination reveals that h is a negative integer in V. Let us see how
this is derived by the analysis.
The Figure 5.16 annotates the program of Figure 5.15 with information config-
urations at selected milestones to illustrate the analysis. The pre-configurations of
the analysis is assumed to be (E, I,O), where E(h) = E(l) = I = O = all, and all
is the PER which relates all program states. The state σ ∈ Σ is represented in Ta-
ble 5.1 as a pair (σ(h), σ(l)) ∈ JτhK×JτlK. In the table, V+ ≜ {i ∈ Z ∣0 ≤ i < n} ⊆ V
is the natural subset of V, and V− ≜ V/V+ is the set of negative values that the
secret can take. The information configuration (E0, I0,O0) = (E[l ↦ R], I,O)
after the assignment l ∶= 0 is the starting configuration for the analysis of the while
statement and R ≡ {{(j,0) ∣ j ∈ V}}. The ith iteration of the while analysis starts
at the pre-configuration ϕi = (Ei, Ii,Oi), and ϕi+1 = (Ei+1, Ii+1,Oi+1) is com-
puted as ϕi (if(h ≠ l)then l ∶= (l + 1) mod n else skip) ϕi+1. Since there is
no write statement in the while body, we have Oi = O for all i. Similarly, since
the while body (l ∶= (l + 1) mod n) itself terminates, we have Ii = I for all i. The
post-configuration of the while statement is ϕ′, and it is the pre-configuration of
the write statement.
As Table 5.1 shows, at the nth iteration (and afterwards), the set of initial
values for which the program terminates is identified. This set is modelled by
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l ∶= 0;
whi l e (h ≠ l) do
l ∶= (l + 1) mod n;
w r i t e l;
Figure 5.15: Linear search using a while loop
l ∶= 0;
ϕ0 = (E0, I0,O0)
ϕi = (Ei, Ii,Oi)
whi l e (h ≠ l) do
l ∶= (l + 1) mod n;
ϕi+1
ϕ′
w r i t e l;
Figure 5.16: Analysis of the while loop
Analysis
iteration (i) Ei(l)
0 {{(j,0) ∣ j ∈ V}}
1 {{(0,0)}, {(j,1) ∣ j ∈ V/{0}}}
2 {{(k, k)}, {(j,2) ∣ j ∈ V/{0,1}} ∣ k ∈ {0,1}}
⋮ ⋮
m {{(k, k)}, {(j,m) ∣ j ∈ V/{0,1, . . . ,m − 1}} ∣ k ∈ {0,1, . . . ,m − 1}}
⋮ ⋮
n {{(k, k)}, {(j,0) ∣ j ∈ V−} ∣ k ∈ V+}
n + 1 {{(k, k)}, {(j,1) ∣ j ∈ V−} ∣ k ∈ V+}
⋮ ⋮
Table 5.1: Analysis of a while statement
the {{(k, k)} ∣ k ∈ V+} equivalence classes of En(l). Further iterations after this
point is benign because no new state can be produced that has not been previously
encountered during the iterative analysis. Thus, dom(En(l)) = dom(En+m(l)) for
any m ∈ N.
The post-configuration of the while analysis is given by ϕ′ = (E′′, I ′′,O′′),
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where E′′(l) ≡ {{(k, k)} ∣ k ∈ V+} and E′′(h) ≡ {{(k,m) ∣m ∈ V} ∣ k ∈ V+}
and I ′′ ≡ {{(k,m) ∣ k ∈ V+,m ∈ V}}′ and O′′ ≡ {{(k,m) ∣m ∈ V},{(j,m) ∣ j ∈
V−,m ∈ V}∣k ∈ V+}. The meaning of I ′′ is that it encodes the set of starting states
for which the while statement terminates and it sets the context for the analysis
of the subsequent commands. The O′′ can distinguish between terminating and
nonterminating starting states of the program, and can additionally distinguish
different terminating traces due to the computation of flow((h ≠ l) ∶ id, ϕi) at each
stage. Notice also that dom(ϕ′) = {(k, k) ∣k ∈ V+}, which is the set of terminating
states of the while loop.
Finally, by applying the write rule to the write l statement, using the pre-
configuration ϕ′, we obtain the post-configuration (E′′, I ′′,O′) where O′ = O′′ F
flow(l ∶ id, ϕ′) ≡ {{(k,m) ∣m ∈ V},{(j,m) ∣ j ∈ V−,m ∈ V} ∣ k ∈ V+}. Thus, O′
reveals the knowledge of hwhenever it is positive and also distinguishes states un-
der which the program terminates from those under which it diverges. However,
the attacker cannot distinguish between two states that leads to program diver-
gence. More precisely, O′ is the PER ∀σ,σ′ ∈ Σ, σ O′ σ′ iff σ(h) = σ′(h) ∈ V+
or σ(h), σ′(h) ∈ V−. This agrees with the intuition about the information released
by this program.
Note that after the while statement, the attacker has already gained the in-
formation O′ due to the computation of flow((h ≠ l) ∶ id, ϕi) at each stage. An
alternative definition of the while rule, which does not suffer from this overap-
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proximation, but which only works when the set of states is finite is given by
ϕ0 = ϕ (En, In,On) = ϕn ϕn if(b)then c else skip ϕn+1
F (ϕ0) ≜ ϕ0 F ϕ1 F (ϕn+1) ≜ F (ϕn) F ϕn+2 F (ϕk) = lfp(F ) I ′ = flow(b ∶ F, ϕk)
∀x ∈Var,E′k = Ek[x ↦ Ek(x) ⊔ I
′] I ′k = Ik ⊔ I
′ O′k = Ok F flow(b ∶ id, ϕk)
ϕ while (b) do c (E′k, I ′k,O′k)
This definition requires the existence of a k ∈ N, after which further iteration of the
while statement cannot produce any new state. This point is reached at the fixpoint
lfp(F ) = Fi≥0ϕi = F (ϕk). The post-configuration of the while statement is then
computed at this point, where the set of states is partitioned by b ∶ id at the kth
step only. When applied to the example above, this produces a better result for the
while analysis, where O′′ ≡ {{(k,m) ∣ k ∈ V+,m ∈ V},{(k,m) ∣ k ∈ V−,m ∈ V}}.
This means that after the while loop, the attacker can only distinguish initial states
that lead to termination from those under which the loop diverges, but cannot
distinguish one state which leads to termination from another one under which
the loop also terminates. Using this definition, the attacker’s knowledge after the
write statement is the same as O′ derived above.
It should be noted that when while statements are used in a program, whose
set of states is infinite, the static analysis of Figure 5.12 is not computable in the
general case. While the definition of information flow analysis of Figure 5.12
sheds insight into how the analysis of the while rule might be performed in this
case, abstract interpretation techniques are necessary. The application of abstract
interpretation to make information flow analysis more tractable is presented in
Chapter 6.
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5.6 Static Information Flow Property
We introduced the notion of the semantic information flow property of a While
program in section 4.3 of Chapter 4 as a semantic definition, which describes how
an attacker’s knowledge is transformed by observing program executions. We now
relate this semantic definition to the static analysis of information flow presented
in this chapter, showing that the static analysis is sound.
The semantic information flow property of a While program P is derived from
the equivalence relation ⌊TP ⌋, which relates only pairs of input states under which
the semantic attacker makes exactly the same observation when P is executed.
This information flow property on the lattice I = PER(Σ) of PERs over the states
of P is given by JP KI = {f ∣∀R ∈ PER(Σ), f(R)⊔ ⌊TP ⌋}, where f describes how
the attacker’s knowledge is transformed by observing the program P . We now
show that the static analysis of information flow presented in this chapter derives
at least the information ⌊TP ⌋. Specifically, when the information configuration
(E, I,O) (see Definition 5.6.1) is chosen as the pre-configuration of P , and
(E, I,O)P (E, I,O) holds, then we have also that ⌊TP ⌋ ⊑ O. The definition of
the static information flow property, JP KIstatic, of P as derived by the static analysis
is the following.
Definition 5.6.1 (Static Information Flow Property). Let P be a While program
and let Σ and Var be the set of all states and the set of all variables of P re-
spectively. Define the information configuration (E, I,O) ∈Φ such that for all
x ∈ Var,E(x) = I = O = all ∈ PER(Σ). The static information flow property
of P is defined as JP KIstatic ≜ {f ∣ (E, I,O) P (E, I,O),∀R ∈ PER(Σ), f(R) =
R ⊔O}.
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The information configuration (E, I,O) enjoys a special status because it
makes no assumption about the starting state of P since dom((E, I,O)) = Σ.
Furthermore, the attacker has no prior knowledge about any input to P (O = all)
and the initial implicit context I = all places no constraint on input. Similarly, no
constraint is placed on the initial value of variables: ∀x ∈Var,E(x) = all.
The O-component of the post-configuration of the static analysis specifies the
information that the attacker might gain from the execution of P . The correct-
ness requirement is therefore that ⌊TP ⌋ ⊑ O, which means that the information
derived by the analysis is at least as much as that gained by the semantic attacker
introduced in Chapter 4. The correctness of the static analysis is shown next.
5.7 Correctness of Static Analysis
This section shows the correctness of the static analysis. For the information flow,
it shows that the static information flow property derived by the analysis is at
least as much information as the semantic information flow property gained by
the semantic attacker. Furthermore, with respect to the program semantics, it also
shows that the analysis models the transformation of states by the program. We
define first, a set of initial configurations Φinit ⊆ Φ, elements of which may serve
as the pre-configuration of any subprogram during analysis.
Definition 5.7.1. Define the set Φinit ⊆ Φ to be the set of all starting config-
urations, where Φinit ≜ {(E, I,O) ∈ Φ ∣ ∀z ∈ TVar, Z¯ = TVar/{z}.∀y ∈
IVar.E(z) = ↑Z¯E(z),E(y) = ↑TVarE(y), I = ↑TVarI,O = ↑TVarO}.
It is clear from this definition that (E, I,O) ∈ Φinit. A consequence of
Definition 5.2.1, where all variables are properly-initialised before use, is that
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it confers a property on the PERs constructed during the analysis such that the
partitioning of inputs by the PERs, and thus their information content about inputs,
is preserved by the operation ↑Z(⋅), where Z ⊆ TVar (see (2) of lemma 5.7.3). We
identify the properties of such PERs (Rinit) in Definition 5.7.2 and lemma 5.7.3
highlights some of the consequences.
Definition 5.7.2. Define Rinit ≜ {R ∈ PER(Σ) ∣X ⊆ TVar.Y = TVar/X,∀σ,σ′ ∈
dom(R),havocY ([σ]R) = [σ]R, σ↓IVar = σ′↓IVar Ô⇒ σ↓X = σ′↓X}.
Lemma 5.7.3. Let Z ⊆ TVar, and let e be an expression such that FV (e) ⊆Var,
and let R,R′ ∈Rinit ⊆ PER(Σ).
1. For all σ ∈ dom(R), havocZ([σ]R) = [σ]↑ZR.
2. For all σ,σ′ ∈ dom(R), σ ↑ZR σ′ Ô⇒ σ R σ′.
3. R ⊔R′ ∈Rinit.
4. Let X ⊆ TVar and Y = TVar/X such that ∀σ,σ′ ∈ dom(R), σ↓IVar =
σ′↓IVar Ô⇒ σ↓X = σ
′
↓X and havocY ([σ]R) = [σ]R. Furthermore, suppose
FV (e)∩TVar ⊆ X . Then for any PER φ over the values of e, we have that
e ∶ φ ⊔R ∈Rinit.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Lemma 5.7.4. Let (E, I,O) ∈ Φinit, and suppose the program while (b) do c
does not assign to IVar variables, where all variables are properly-initialised be-
fore use. Then there exists a unique (E′, I ′,O′), so that (E, I,O) while (b) do c (E′, I ′,O′)
holds and (E′, I ′,O′) ∈Φinit.
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Proof. The derivations in the flow rules are syntax-directed. However, it is not
immediately clear that we have the desired property for the while rule. In particu-
lar, we first note that the limit Fi≥0ϕi exists, since ⟨Φ,⊑+,F⟩ is a complete lattice.
It now remains to show that the E-component of the while post-configuration is a
map from variables to PERs, which have the desired properties.
Firstly, suppose (Ej , Ij ,Oj)if(b)then c else skip(Ej+1, Ij+1,Oj+1) holds,
for some (Ej , Ij ,Oj) = ϕj ∈ Φinit during the iterative analysis of the statement
while (b) do c. Now take any x ∈ Var. We want to show that the property
(Ej+1(x) ⊔ I ′′j+1 ⊔ b ∶ F) ⊑ (Ej(x) ⊔ I
′′
j ⊔ b ∶ F) holds, where I ′′j = flow(b ∶ F, ϕj)
and I ′′j+1 = flow(b ∶ F, (Ej+1, Ij+1,Oj+1)). Furthermore, let I ′j = flow(b ∶ T, ϕj) so
that the analysis of c is given by (Ej , I ′j ,Oj) c (E′j+1, I ′j+1,O′j+1) according to the
if rule. The post-configuration of the else branch is therefore (Ej , I ′′j ,Oj), being
a skip statement.
We first observe, from Definition 5.5.1, that σ1 Ij+1 σ2 iff σ1, σ2 ∈ dom(I ′′j ) ∪
dom(I ′j+1), and hence we have that Ij+1 ⊑ I ′′j . Now, since variables are properly-
initialised before use, and the IVar projection of states are not modified then I ′j
and I ′′j are disjoint PERs. To see why, let Y = FV (b) and define REj such that
σ REj σ
′ iff σ,σ′ ∈ dom(⊔y∈Y Ej(y)). Since variables are properly-initialised
before use, and the IVar projection of states is not modified, we have that for
any y ∈ Y and i, and for all σ,σ′ ∈ dom(Ei(y)), σ↓IVar = σ′↓IVar Ô⇒ σ(y) =
σ′(y) (this is shown in Lemma 5.7.5). Hence, for all σ,σ′ ∈ dom(REj), σ↓IVar =
σ′↓IVar Ô⇒ σ↓Y = σ
′
↓Y Ô⇒ σ(b) = σ
′(b). Hence, by the contrapositive, σ(b) ≠
σ′(b) Ô⇒ σ↓IVar ≠ σ′↓IVar. This means that the PERs, RA = b ∶ T ⊔ Ij ⊔ REj
and RB = b ∶ F ⊔ Ij ⊔ REj are disjoint since RA restricts the domain of REj to
those where b is true, whereas RB restricts the domain of REj to those where
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b is false. Hence I ′j = ↑TVarRA and I ′′j = ↑TVarRB are disjoint PERs, since the
operation ↑TVar(⋅) does not modify the IVar projection of states. Now according
to Definition 5.5.1, for the merging of the post-configuration of the conditional if
statement, we have that for any z ∈ Var, Ej+1(z) = Ej(z) F Ej(z) = Ej(z) if




j+1(z) if Ej(z) ≠ E′j+1(z). In the
latter case, we further note that since E′j+1(z) has been modified within the branch
c, which is predicated on the implicit context I ′j , then dom(E′j+1(z)) ⊆ dom(I ′j)
and hence (Ej(z) ⊔ I ′′j ) and E′j+1(z) are disjoint PERs, since I ′j ⊔ I ′′j = ∅. Hence,
in this case, Ej+1(z) is simply the disjoint union of PERs: namely that, Ej+1(z) =
(Ej(z) ⊔ I ′′j ) ∪E
′
j+1(z) by the definition of F. Thus, in both cases, we have that
Ej+1(z) ⊑ Ej(z) ⊔ I ′′j .
Now for the proof of (Ej+1(x) ⊔ I ′′j+1 ⊔ b ∶ F) ⊑ (Ej(x) ⊔ I ′′j ⊔ b ∶ F), there are
two cases to consider according to Definition 5.5.1, which depends on whether
E′j+1(x) is different from Ej(x) or not.
• Case 1: Suppose Ej(x) = E′j+1(x). In this case we have, according to
Definition 5.5.1 thatEj+1(x) = Ej(x)FEj(x) = Ej(x). It thus remains only
to show that I ′′j+1 ⊑ I ′′j in the case. Now define REj+1 such that σ REj+1 σ′
iff σ,σ′ ∈ dom(⊔y∈FV (b)Ej+1(y)) and let RC = b ∶ F ⊔ Ij+1 ⊔REj+1 . Hence,
I ′′j = ↑TVarRC . Since for all z ∈ Var, Ej+1(z) ⊑ Ej(z) ⊔ I ′′j , then it follows
that REj+1 ⊑ REj ⊔I ′′j . Now, since I ′′j = ↑TVarRB , then I ′′j ⊑ RB by definition,
which means also that Ij+1 ⊑ RB since Ij+1 ⊑ I ′′j . Therefore, REj+1 ⊔ b ∶ F ⊑
REj ⊔ I
′′
j ⊔ b ∶ F ⊑ REj ⊔RB ⊔ b ∶ F = RB , and hence REj+1 ⊔ Ij+1 ⊔ b ∶ F =
RC ⊑ RB . Since RC ⊑ RB , then by applying (8) of lemma 5.4.8, we have
↑TVarRC ⊑ ↑TVarRB , that is, I ′′j+1 ⊑ I ′′j . This shows the first case.
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• Case 2: Suppose Ej(x) ≠ E′j+1(x). Then, as shown above, Ej+1(x) is
the disjoint union Ej+1(x) = (Ej(x) ⊔ I ′′j ) ∪ E′j+1(x), hence Ej+1(x) ⊑
Ej(x) ⊔ I ′′j . Therefore, Ej+1 ⊔ I ′′j+1 ⊔ b ∶ F ⊑ (Ej(x) ⊔ I ′′j ) ⊔ I ′′j+1 ⊔ b ∶ F =
Ej(x) ⊔ I ′′j ⊔ b ∶ F, since I ′′j+1 ⊑ I ′′j . This shows the desired property.
Now define X¯ = TVar/{x}. Since we have that (Ej+1(x) ⊔ I ′′j+1 ⊔ b ∶ F) ⊑
(Ej(x) ⊔ I ′′j ⊔ b ∶ F), then by applying (8) of lemma 5.4.8 we obtain the fact that
↑X¯(Ej+1(x) ⊔ I ′′j+1 ⊔ b ∶ F) ⊑ ↑X¯(Ej(x) ⊔ I
′′
j ⊔ b ∶ F). Hence, for the while rule,
we have that for any j, k ∈ N such that j ≤ k, then ↑X¯(Ek(x) ⊔ I ′′k ⊔ b ∶ F) ⊑
↑X¯(Ej(x) ⊔ I ′′j ⊔ b ∶ F) by the transitivity of ⊑. Thus, for any x ∈ Var, such that
σ E′(x) σ′ and σ′ E′(x) σ′′ hold, we know that there exist j, k ∈ N, such that
σ ↑X¯(Ej(x) ⊔ I ′′j ⊔ b ∶ F) σ′ and σ′ ↑X¯(Ek(x) ⊔ I ′′k ⊔ b ∶ F) σ′′. If j ≤ k, then we
know from above that σ↑X¯(Ej(x) ⊔ I ′′j ⊔ b ∶ F)σ′ Ô⇒ σ↑X¯(Ek(x) ⊔ I ′′k ⊔ b ∶ F)σ′,
and therefore σ ↑X¯(Ek(x) ⊔ I ′′k ⊔ b ∶ F) σ′′ holds also. That is, σ E′(x) σ′′ holds.
Since ↑X¯(Ek(x) ⊔ I ′′k ⊔ b ∶ F) is a PER, then so also is E′(x). Furthermore, since
X¯ = IVar/{x}, it is easy to see that the post-configuration (E′, I ′,O′) ∈ Φinit.
Because of the property that all variables in a program P are properly-initialised
before use in P , and the fact that the IVar projection of states are not modified
by P , on termination, the value of a variable that is properly-initialised during the
execution of P is determined only by the value of the inputs to P .
Lemma 5.7.5. Suppose (E1, I1,O1) ∈ Φinit is an information configuration of
the While program P , which does not use IVar variables on the left-hand-side
of assignment and where all variables are properly-initialised before use. If
(E1, I1,O1) P (E2, I2,O2) holds, then for any variable x ∈ Var, which has
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been properly-initialised in P we have that E2(x) ∈ Rinit, and for all σ,σ′ ∈
dom(E2(x)), σ↓IVar = σ′↓IVar Ô⇒ σ(x) = σ′(x).
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the derivation tree of (E1, I1,O1)P (E2, I2,O2)
according to the information flow rules. The E-component of information config-
urations are modified only during assignments, and in the analysis of conditional
if and while statements.
We shall first show that the desired property holds after assignment statements.
Let (E, I,O)x ∶= e (E′, I ′,O′) be the analysis of the assignment x ∶= e in P . Fur-
thermore, letX = {x} and letX = TVar/X . ThenE′ = E[x↦ aflow(x ∶= e, (E, I,O))],
where aflow(x ∶= e, (E, I,O)) = ↑X
x∶=e
↝
R , and R = e ∶ id ⊔ I ⊔ RE , and ∀σ,σ′ ∈
Σ, σREσ′ ⇐⇒ σ,σ′ ∈ dom(⊔z∈FV (e)E(z)). Now let Z = FV (e)∩TVar. Since
TVar variables are properly-initialised before use, then we have by the induction
hypothesis that for any z ∈ Z,E(z) ∈Rinit and for all σ,σ′ ∈ dom(E(z)), σ↓IVar =
σ′↓IVar Ô⇒ σ(z) = σ
′(z). Thus, for all σ,σ′ ∈ dom(RE), σ↓IVar = σ′↓IVar Ô⇒
σ↓Z = σ′↓Z , and therefore for any σ,σ′ ∈ dom(R), σ↓IVar = σ′↓IVar Ô⇒ σ↓Z = σ′↓Z
since dom(R) ⊆ dom(RE).
Now by definition dom(
x∶=e
↝




R ), σ↓IVar = σ′↓IVar Ô⇒ σ(x) = σ
′(x) because all states in the
domain of R, which agree on the IVar projection also agree on the Z projection,









Since x ∉ X and IVar ∩ X = ∅, then havocX(dom(
x∶=e
↝




not modify the IVar or x projections of states in dom(
x∶=e
↝




R ∈ Rinit. Hence, E′(x) = ↑X
x∶=e
↝
R ∈Rinit and for all σ,σ′ ∈ dom(E′(x)), σ↓IVar =
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σ′↓IVar Ô⇒ σ(x) = σ
′(x).
During the analysis of if (b) then c1 else c2, starting from the pre-configuration
(E, I,O), the post-configuration of c1 is derived as (E, I ′,O) c1 (Ec1 , Ic1 ,Oc1),
where I ′ = flow(b ∶ T, (E, I,O)). Similarly, the post-configuration of c2 is ob-
tained as (E, I ′′,O) c2 (Ec2 , Ic2 ,Oc2), where I ′′ = flow(b ∶ F, (E, I,O)). For any
variable x, both Ec1(x) and Ec2(x) have the desired property by applying the in-
duction hypothesis to c1 and c2 respectively. Let (E′, I ′,O′) = (Ec1 , Ic1,Oc1)⊎(E,I,O)
(Ec2 , Ic2 ,Oc2) be the post-configuration of the if statement. Now suppose that x
is assigned in c1, then dom(Ec1(x)) ⊆ dom(I ′) since x is assigned in c1, which is
in the scope of an implicit context, whose domain is smaller than the domain of
I ′. Similarly, if x is assigned within c2, then dom(Ec2(x)) ⊆ dom(I ′′). Now since
variables are properly-initialised before use, then for all y ∈ FV (b),E(y) ∈ Rinit,
and for all σ,σ′ ∈ dom(E(y)), σ↓IVar = σ′↓IVar Ô⇒ σ(y) = σ′(y) since IVar
variables are not assigned to and the value of variables in TVar ∩ FV (b), being
properly-initialised, are functions of IVar projection of states. If we now define
RE such that σRE σ′ iff σ,σ′ ∈ dom(⊔y∈FV (b)E(y)), where Y = FV (b)∩TVar,
then for all σ,σ′ ∈ dom(RE), σ↓IVar = σ′↓IVar Ô⇒ σ↓Y = σ′↓Y Ô⇒ σ(b) = σ′(b),
which by the contrapositive means that σ(b) ≠ σ′(b) Ô⇒ σ↓IVar ≠ σ′↓IVar.
Hence, I ′ = flow(b ∶ T, (E, I,O)) and I ′′ = flow(b ∶ F, (E, I,O)) are disjoint
PERs, since σ ∈ dom(b ∶ T ⊔ I ⊔ RE) and σ′ ∈ dom(b ∶ F ⊔ I ⊔ RE) im-
plies σ(b) ≠ σ′(b), which in turn means that σ↓IVar ≠ σ′↓IVar. Since dom(I ′) =
havocIVar(dom(b ∶ T ⊔ I ⊔RE)) and dom(I ′′) = havocIVar(dom(b ∶ F ⊔ I ⊔RE)),
both of which do not modify IVar variables, I ′ ⊔ I ′′ = ∅. Hence, Ec1(x) and
Ec2(x) are disjoint PERs, and therefore E′(x) = Ec1(x) FEc2(x) has the desired
property.
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Now suppose that x is assigned in only one branch, say c1 (the other case for
c2 is symmetrical). Then, again, dom(Ec1(x)) ⊆ dom(I ′). There are two cases
to consider according to Definition 5.5.1. Either Ec1(x) = E(x), in which case
E′(x) = E(x) = Ec1(x), and therefore E′(x) has the desired property by the
induction hypothesis on c1. In the second case, Ec1(x) ≠ E(x), in which case
E′(x) = Ec1(x) F (E(x) ⊔ I ′′) and since x must be properly-initialised, it must
be initialised before control is passed to the else branch, and hence E(x) has the
desired property, which means that E′(x) has the desired property since Ec1(x)
and E(x) ⊔ I ′′ are disjoint PERs.
In the iterative analysis of the command while (b)do c, the E-component of
the post-configuration is computed from a sequence (E′0, I ′0,O′0), (E′1, I ′1,O′1),⋯,
where for all i ≥ 0, (E′i, I ′i ,O′i) if(b)then c else skip (E′i+1, I ′i+1,O′i+1),
and hence by induction on if(b)then c else skip, E′i(x) has the desired
property for all i. The E-component of the post-configuration of the while state-
ment is computed such that X¯ = TVar/{x},∀σ,σ′ ∈ Σ, σ E′(x) σ′ ⇐⇒ ∃j ∈
N, σ↑X¯(E′j(x) ⊔ I
′′
j ⊔ b ∶ F)σ′, where for any k ∈ N, I ′′k = flow(b ∶ F, (E′k , I ′k,O′k)).
However, for any j ∈ N,E′j(x) ∈Rinit and∀σ,σ′ ∈ dom(E′j(x)), σ↓IVar = σ′↓IVar Ô⇒
σ(x) = σ′(x) by the induction hypothesis, it is thus clear that this property is
preserved in ↑X¯(E′j(x) ⊔ I ′′j ⊔ b ∶ F) since ↑X¯(⋅) does not modify the IVar ∪ {x}
projection of states. Furthermore, ↑X¯(E′j(x) ⊔ I ′′j ⊔ b ∶ F) ∈ Rinit by definition.
We have already shown in lemma 5.7.4 that for all j, k ∈ N, such that j ≤ k, then
↑X¯(E′k(x) ⊔ I
′′




j ⊔ b ∶ F). Thus, for any σ,σ′ ∈ dom(E′(x)),
there exist j, k ∈ N, such that k ≥ j and σ ∈ dom(↑X¯(E′j(x) ⊔ I ′′j ⊔ b ∶ F)) and σ′ ∈
↑X¯(E′k(x) ⊔ I
′′
k ⊔ b ∶ F). Since dom(↑X¯(E′j(x) ⊔ I ′′j ⊔ b ∶ F)) ⊆ ↑X¯(E′k(x) ⊔ I ′′k ⊔ b ∶ F)
and ↑X¯(E′k(x) ⊔ I ′′k ⊔ b ∶ F)) has the desired property, then we are done.
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We now show that composing the analysis of sequential programs correctly
approximates the information released by the sequenced program.
Proposition 5.7.6. Let P = P1;P2 be a While program. Define the PER ⌊TP1●P2⌋
to be ∀σ,σ′ ∈ Σ, σ ⌊TP1●P2⌋ σ′ iff σ ⌊TP1⌋σ′ and if ⟨P1, σ⟩⇓ σ1 and ⟨P1, σ′⟩⇓ σ′1
then σ1⌊TP2⌋σ′1. Then we have ⌊TP ⌋ ⊑ ⌊TP1●P2⌋.
Proof. Take any σ,σ′ ∈ Σ such that σ ⌊TP1●P2⌋σ′ holds. Then, σ ⌊TP1⌋σ′ holds,
which by lemma 4.3.2 means that either P1 terminates under both states σ and σ′
or that it diverges under both states, and that the attacker makes the same obser-
vation on the traces of the two states, that is, obs(t⟨P1,σ⟩) = obs(t⟨P1,σ′⟩).
In the first case, suppose that P1 diverges under both σ and σ′, then we have
obs(t⟨P1,σ⟩) = obs(t⟨P1,σ′⟩) = obs(t⟨P,σ⟩) = obs(t⟨P,σ′⟩) since the trailing subpro-
gram P2 of P cannot be executed due to the divergence of P1, and hence σ ⌊TP ⌋σ′
holds.
Now suppose P1 terminates under both σ and σ′, then σ⌊TP1●P2⌋σ′ implies that
σ ⌊TP1⌋σ′ holds, and there exist σ1, σ′1 ∈ Σ such that ⟨P1, σ⟩⇓ σ1 and ⟨P1, σ′⟩⇓ σ′1
and σ1⌊TP2⌋σ′1 holds. Thus, obs(t⟨P1,σ⟩) = obs(t⟨P1,σ′⟩) and obs(t⟨P2,σ1⟩) = obs(t⟨P2,σ′1⟩),
and therefore, obs(t⟨P,σ⟩) = obs(t⟨P,σ′⟩), which means that σ ⌊TP ⌋σ′ holds. Thus,
⌊TP ⌋ ⊑ ⌊TP1●P2⌋.
Lemma 5.7.7. Let P = P1;P2 be a While program, which does not modify the
IVar-projection of states. Define the PER ⌊TP1●P2⌋ to be ∀σ,σ′ ∈ Σ, σ ⌊TP1●P2⌋σ′
iff σ ⌊TP1⌋σ′ and if ⟨P1, σ⟩⇓ σ1 and ⟨P1, σ′⟩⇓ σ′1 then σ1⌊TP2⌋σ′1. Furthermore, let
Σ,Σ1 ⊆ Σ such that {σ′ ∣ σ ∈ Σ, ⟨P1, σ⟩⇓ σ′} ⊆ Σ1. Define RΣ and RΣ1 as the
PERs ∀σ,σ′ ∈ Σ, σ RΣ σ′ ⇐⇒ σ,σ′ ∈ Σ and σ RΣ1 σ′ ⇐⇒ σ,σ′ ∈ Σ1. Suppose
O1,O2 ∈ PER(Σ) are PERs such that Σ ⊆ dom(O1) and O1⊑+O2 and ↑TVarO2 = O2,
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and RΣ ⊔ ⌊TP1⌋ ⊑ RΣ ⊔O1 and RΣ1 ⊔ ⌊TP2⌋ ⊑ RΣ1 ⊔O2. Then
1. RΣ ⊔ ⌊TP1●P2⌋ ⊑ RΣ ⊔O2,
2. RΣ ⊔ ⌊TP ⌋ ⊑ RΣ ⊔O2.
Proof.
1. Define the set of all states under which the subprogram P1 terminates to be
Σ⇓ = {σ ∈ Σ ∣ ⟨P1, σ⟩⇓ σ′} and define f ∶Σ⇓ →Σ to model this transfor-
mation of states by P1 such that for all σ ∈ Σ⇓, f(σ) = σ′ if ⟨P1, σ⟩⇓ σ′
- which maps a starting state under which P1 terminates to the terminating
state. Now define the equivalence relation R ∈ PER(Σ) such that ∀σ1, σ2 ∈
Σ, σ1 R σ2 iff σ1, σ2 ∈ Σ/Σ⇓ and σ1, σ2 ∈ Σ⇓ Ô⇒ f(σ1) ⌊TP2⌋ f(σ2).
Hence, we have ⌊TP1●P2⌋ = ⌊TP1⌋ ⊔R.
Hence we wish to show that RΣ⊔ ⌊TP1⌋⊔R ⊑ RΣ⊔O2, that is, for all σ,σ′ ∈
Σ, σ O2 σ′ Ô⇒ σ (⌊TP1⌋⊔R)σ′. Now suppose σ,σ′ ∈ Σ, such that σ O2 σ′
holds. It then follows that σ ⌊TP1⌋ σ′ holds because RΣ ⊔ ⌊TP1⌋ ⊑ RΣ ⊔O1
and by (4) of proposition 5.4.5 RΣ ⊔O1 ⊑ RΣ ⊔O2, since Σ = dom(RΣ) ⊆
dom(O1) and O1⊑+O2. It now remains to show that σ R σ′ also holds. But
σ ⌊TP1⌋σ′ implies σ,σ′ ∈Σ⇓ or σ,σ′ ∈Σ/Σ⇓ by lemma 4.3.2. We now show
that σ R σ′ holds under these two possibilities.
• Suppose σ,σ′ ∈ Σ/Σ⇓, then σ R σ′ holds by definition.
• Now suppose σ,σ′ ∈Σ⇓. Since P does not modify the IVar-projection
of states, then for any σˆ ∈ Σ⇓, f(σˆ) ∈ havocTVar({σˆ}). Hence,
since ↑TVarO2 = O2, then by (4) of lemma 5.4.8, σˆ ∈ dom(O2) Ô⇒
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havocTVar([σˆ]O2) = [σˆ]O2 . Therefore, σO2σ′ Ô⇒ f(σ)O2 f(σ′).
Now σ,σ′ ∈ Σ∩Σ⇓ implies f(σ), f(σ′) ∈ Σ1 and hence f(σ)RΣ1f(σ′).
Furthermore, since f(σ)O2f(σ′) holds then we know that f(σ)⌊TP2⌋f(σ′)
holds because RΣ1 ⊔ ⌊TP2⌋ ⊑ RΣ1 ⊔O2. Therefore, σ R σ′ holds.
This shows the required property: RΣ ⊔ ⌊TP1●P2⌋ ⊑ RΣ ⊔O2.
2. The proof is immediate since by proposition 5.7.6 ⌊TP ⌋ ⊑ ⌊TP1●P2⌋, hence
we have that RΣ ⊔ ⌊TP ⌋ ⊑ RΣ ⊔ ⌊TP1●P2⌋ ⊑ RΣ ⊔O2.
Lemma 5.7.8. Let W ≜ while (b) do c be a while statement, and let C ≜
if(b)then c else skip. Define the set of starting states under which only
the outer while loop diverges (excluding those under which c diverges) as ΣW⇑ ≜
{σ0 ∈Σ ∣ ∀i ∈ N, ⟨C,σi⟩⇓ σi+1, σi+1(b) = tt}.
Now define the PER W ∈ PER(Σ) such that for all σ0, σ′0 ∈ Σ, σ0 W σ′0 iff
(σ0, σ′0 ∈Σ/ΣW⇑ or σ0, σ′0 ∈ΣW⇑ ) and σ0⌊TC⌋σ′0 and ∀i, ⟨C,σi⟩⇓ σi+1, ⟨C,σ′i⟩⇓ σ′i+1 Ô⇒
σi+1 ⌊TC⌋ σ′i+1. Then we have ⌊TW ⌋ ⊑W .
Proof. The proof shows that W contains at least as much information as released
by the while statement W . The PER W requires that an indistinguishable pair of
states must be stepwise indistinguishable for each possible iteration step of W ,
and that the pair must both either belong to the set Σ/ΣW⇑ or ΣW⇑ - distinguishing
states in which the outer while loop terminates from those in which it diverges.
The proof is similar to that of proposition 5.7.6 by considering the sequence of
the program C as an unwinding of W into its iteration steps. In the following σi
(resp. σ′i) is derived by i-step application of C to σ0 ∈ Σ (resp. σ′0 ∈ Σ).
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From lemma 4.3.2 we know that for any σ,σ′ ∈ Σ, such that σ ⌊TC⌋ σ′ holds
then C diverges under both of σ and σ′, or terminates under both states. Now
take any σ0, σ′0 ∈ Σ/ΣW⇑ such that σ0Wσ′0 holds. Then by lemma 4.3.2, there are
two cases to consider, namely, when W terminates under both states and when it
diverges in both. Suppose that W terminates under σ0 and σ′0, then for all i ≥ 0,
⟨C,σi⟩⇓ σi+1 and ⟨C,σ′i⟩⇓ σ′i+1 and σi ⌊TC⌋ σ′i and σi+1 ⌊TC⌋ σ′i+1 hold. Thus, the
attacker’s observation under the traces of W starting at σ0 and σ′0 is the same,
that is, obs(t⟨W,σ0⟩) = obs(t⟨W,σ′0⟩). Now suppose that W diverges under both
σ0 and σ′0, then by definition of W and by lemma 4.3.2 the pair of traces must
diverge on the same iteration of W and the traces must be indistinguishable at
each iteration step. That is, there exist i, j ∈ N such that for all i ≤ j, σi ⌊TC⌋ σ′i,
but c diverges under both σj and σ′j. Thus, obs(t⟨W,σ0⟩) = obs(t⟨W,σ′0⟩). Hence, for
all σ,σ′ ∈Σ/ΣW⇑ , σ W σ′ Ô⇒ σ ⌊TW ⌋σ′.
Now take any σ0, σ′0 ∈ΣW⇑ such that σ0Wσ′ holds. Then, for all i ∈ N, we have
that σi ⌊TC⌋ σ′i by the definition of W , and since W diverges under both traces we
have obs(t⟨W,σ0⟩) = obs(t⟨W,σ′0⟩). Thus, for all σ,σ′ ∈Σ
W
⇑ , σW σ
′ Ô⇒ σ ⌊TW ⌋σ′.
Therefore, for all σ,σ′ ∈Σ, σ W σ′ Ô⇒ σ ⌊TW ⌋ σ′, and hence ⌊TW ⌋ ⊑W .
Lemma 5.7.9. Let (E, I,O) ∈ Φinit such that (E, I,O) P (E′, I ′,O′). Then
dom(I ′) ⊆ dom(I).
Proof. We note that for any (E, I,O) ∈ Φinit and any expression e and PER φ
over values of e, we have dom(flow(e ∶ φ, (E, I,O))) ⊆ dom(I). This is because
flow(e ∶ φ, (E, I,O)) = ↑TVar(e ∶ φ ⊔ I ⊔RE) (see the details in Definition 5.4.10).
Hence, dom(flow(e ∶ φ, (E, I,O))) = havocTVar(dom(e ∶ φ ⊔RE ⊔ I)). That is,
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dom(flow(e ∶ φ, (E, I,O))) ⊆ havocTVar(dom(e ∶ φ ⊔RE))∩havocTVar(dom(I)) =
havocTVar(dom(e ∶ φ ⊔RE)) ∩ dom(I) since I = ↑TVarI . Hence, we have that
dom(flow(e ∶ φ, (E, I,O))) ⊆ dom(I).
The proof proceeds by induction on the derivation tree of each command in
the information flow rules. The rules for skip, assignment and write statements
do not change the I-component of their pre-configurations, thus it only remains
to show that this property holds for if and while statements. This follows imme-
diately because for any subprogram command c of P the pre-configuration and
post-configuration are both elements of Φinit (see Theorem 5.7.10). In the infor-
mation flow rules, the resulting post configuration (En+1, In+1,On+1) is computed
from (En, In,On) as a join of In+1 = flow(e ∶ φ, (En, In,On)) (conditional branch-
ing of if statements and termination analysis of while statements) - which means
dom(In+1) ⊆ dom(In), or by constructing a PER which represents the union of
the domains of the I-component of the post-configuration of the branches of a
conditional if statement, which by induction on the branches are both subsets of
the domain of the I-component of their respective pre-configuration.
We now prove properties of the static analysis which establish its information
flow and semantic soundness. It is assumed that all variables of P are properly-
initialised before use.
Theorem 5.7.10 (Semantic and Information Flow Correctness). Let Σ and Var
respectively be the set of states and variables of a While program P , which does
not modify the IVar projection of states. Furthermore, let (E, I,O) ∈ Φinit be an
information configuration and let (E, I,O)P (E′, I ′,O′) be the static analysis of
P . Then
178
(A) PER((E, I,O)) ⊔ ⌊TP ⌋ ⊑ PER((E, I,O)) ⊔O′ and
(B) {σ′ ∣ σ ∈ dom((E, I,O)), ⟨P,σ⟩⇓ σ′} ⊆ dom((E′, I ′,O′)) and
(C) (E′, I ′,O′) ∈ Φinit.
Proof. The proof proceeds by structural induction on the derivation tree of (E, I,O)P (E′, I ′,O′).
Suppose P = P ′0;P ′1; . . . ;P ′m, such that for all i, P ′i is a skip, assignment, write,
or a conditional if or while statement. Furthermore, for any n ≤ m, define
Pn ≜ P ′0; . . . ;P ′n such that for all n, (E, I,O) Pn (En, In,On). We will show
that if the induction hypothesis holds for Pn then it holds also for Pn+1 ≜ Pn;P ′n+1.
• The proof when P ′n+1 is a skip statement is straightforward.




whereR = e ∶ id⊔In⊔RE and∀σ,σ′ ∈ Σ, σRE σ′ iff σ,σ′ ∈ dom(⊔x∈FV (e)En(x))
and X = TVar/{z}.
(A) Since ⌊TPn⌋ = ⌊TPn+1⌋ and On+1 = On then by the induction hypothesis
we have also that PER((E, I,O)) ⊔ ⌊TPn+1⌋ ⊑ On+1 ⊔ PER((E, I,O)).
(B) Now let Σ = {σ′ ∣σ ∈ dom((E, I,O)), ⟨Pn, σ⟩⇓ σ′} and let Σ′ = {σ′ ∣σ ∈
dom((E, I,O)), ⟨Pn+1, σ⟩⇓ σ′}, thenΣ′ = {σ[z ↦ σ(e)]∣σ ∈ Σ}. By the in-
duction hypothesis Σ ⊆ dom((En, In,On)), thus Σ ⊆ dom(R) since e ∶ id is
an equivalence relation overΣ. From the definition of
z∶=e
↝
R , we know that for
any σ ∈ dom(R), σ[z ↦ σ(e)] ∈ dom(
z∶=e
↝
R ). Hence, Σ′ ⊆ dom(
z∶=e
↝




R ) ⊆ dom(↑X
z∶=e
↝
R ) then Σ′ ⊆ dom(↑X
z∶=e
↝
R ). Now let Z = {z}, since
Σ ⊆ dom((En, In,On)), then Σ′ ⊆ havocZ(dom((En, In,On))) because Σ′
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is obtained from Σ by modifying the value of the variable z alone. Further-




since (En, In,On) ∈ Φinit by the induction hypothesis. Hence, Σ′ ⊆ dom((En+1, In+1,On+1)),




(C) By the induction hypothesis (En, In,On) ∈ Φinit, it is thus clear that
(En+1, In+1,On+1) ∈Φinit.
• Let P ′n+1 be write e. Then we have the post-configuration (En+1, In+1,On+1)
= (En, In,On F flow(e ∶ id, (En, In,On))). Let ϕ0 = (En, In,On).
(A) Now ⌊TPn+1⌋ is derived from ⌊TPn⌋ as follows: for all σ,σ′ ∈Σ, σ⌊TPn+1⌋σ′
iff σ ⌊TPn⌋σ′ and if ⟨Pn, σ⟩⇓ σn and ⟨Pn, σ′⟩⇓ σ′n then σn(e) = σ′n(e).
But by the induction hypothesis PER((E, I,O))⊔⌊TPn⌋ ⊑ PER((E, I,O))⊔
On and also {σ′ ∣σ ∈ dom((E, I,O)), ⟨Pn, σ⟩⇓ σ′} ⊆ dom(ϕ0). Hence,
by applying lemma 5.7.7 and since On⊑+On+1, it only remains to show
that PER(ϕ0) ⊔ ⌊TP ′n⌋ = PER(ϕ0) ⊔ e ∶ id ⊑ PER(ϕ0) ⊔On+1 in order to
show that PER((E, I,O)) ⊔ ⌊TPn+1⌋ ⊑ PER((E, I,O)) ⊔On+1.
Let flow(e ∶ id, ϕ0) = ↑TVarR, where R = e ∶ id ⊔ In ⊔ RE and where
∀σ,σ′ ∈ Σ, σ RE σ′ iff σ,σ′ ∈ dom(⊔x∈FV (e)En(x)). Furthermore,
let Σ′ = dom(On) ∪ dom(↑TVarR) such that ∀σ,σ′ ∈ Σ, σ R σ′ ⇐⇒
σ,σ′ ∈ Σ′/dom(↑TVarR) and σ On σ′ ⇐⇒ σ,σ′ ∈ Σ′/dom(On).
Hence, we have On+1 = On F ↑TVarR = (On ∪ On) ⊔ (↑TVarR ∪ R).
Thus, On+1 ⊔ PER(ϕ0) = On ⊔ ↑TVarR ⊔ PER(ϕ0) since dom(ϕ0) ⊆
dom(On) and dom(ϕ0) ⊆ dom(↑TVarR) and hence PER(ϕ0) is disjoint
with On and R, and On ⊔R = ∅ by definition. Therefore, to show that
PER(ϕ0)⊔e ∶ id ⊑ PER(ϕ0)⊔On+1 we need to show that for any σ,σ′ ∈
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dom(ϕ0), σ (On ⊔ ↑TVarR) σ′ Ô⇒ σ(e) = σ′(e). Since ↑TVarIn = In,
then In ∈ Rinit by observing that for all σ ∈ dom(In),havocTVar([σ]In) =
[σ]In . Furthermore, since TVar variables are properly-initialised be-
fore use, then the FV (e) ∩ TVar projection of state is a function
of the IVar projection, which means that by applying (3) and (4) of
lemma 5.7.3, RE ∈ Rinit and hence R ∈ Rinit. Hence, since dom(ϕ0) ⊆
dom(R), then by (2) of lemma 5.7.3, for all σ,σ′ ∈ dom(ϕ0), σ↑TVarRσ′ Ô⇒
σ R σ′ Ô⇒ σ(e) = σ′(e). Thus, PER(ϕ0) ⊔ e ∶ id ⊑ PER(ϕ0) ⊔On+1.
(B) It is clear that Σ = {σ′ ∣ σ ∈ dom((E, I,O)), ⟨Pn, σ⟩⇓ σ′} = {σ′ ∣ σ ∈
dom((E, I,O)), ⟨Pn+1, σ⟩⇓ σ′} is the set of terminating states of Pn+1
starting from dom((E, I,O)). By the induction hypothesisΣ ⊆ dom((En, In,On)).
Furthermore, by the domain-preserving property of F, dom(On) ⊆
dom(On+1). Hence,Σ ⊆ dom((En, In,On)) ⊆ dom((En+1, In+1,On+1)).
(C) Since by the induction hypothesis (En, In,On) ∈ Φinit, it is thus clear
by applying (7) of Lemma 5.4.8 that (En+1, In+1,On+1) ∈ Φinit.
• Let P ′n+1 be if (b) then c1 else c2. Let ϕ0 = (En, In,On) so that I ′n =
flow(b ∶ T, ϕ0) and I ′′n = flow(b ∶ F, ϕ0) and (En, I ′n,On)c1(E′n+1, I ′n+1,O′n+1)
and (En, I ′′n ,On) c2 (E′′n+1, I ′′n+1,O′′n+1). By applying the induction hypoth-
esis to Pn, ϕ0 ∈ Φinit and hence (En, I ′n,On), (En, I ′′n ,On) ∈ Φinit because
I ′n = ↑TVarI ′n and I ′′n = ↑TVarI ′′n by definition. By further applying the in-
duction hypothesis to c1 we obtain PER((En, I ′n,On)) ⊔ ⌊Tc1⌋ ⊑ O′n+1 ⊔
PER((En, I ′n,On)), and also that {σ′ ∣σ ∈ dom((En, I ′n,On)), ⟨c1, σ⟩⇓ σ′} ⊆
dom((E′n+1, I ′n+1,O′n+1)), and also that (E′n+1, I ′n+1,O′n+1) ∈ Φinit. Simi-
larly, for the else branch we have that PER((En, I ′′n ,On)) ⊔ ⌊Tc2⌋ ⊑ O′′n+1 ⊔
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PER((En, I ′′n ,On)) and that {σ′ ∣ σ ∈ dom((En, I ′′n ,On)), ⟨c2, σ⟩⇓ σ′} ⊆
dom((E′′n+1, I ′′n+1,O′′n+1)), and that (E′′n+1, I ′′n+1,O′′n+1) ∈ Φinit. Now define
In+1 such that ∀σ,σ′ ∈ Σ, σ In+1σ′ ⇐⇒ σ,σ′ ∈ dom(I ′n+1) ∪ dom(I ′′n+1)
and for all x ∈ TVar, let E′n+1(x) = E′n+1(x) ⊔ I ′n if E′′n+1(x) ≠ En(x) and
E′n+1(x) = E
′
n+1(x) otherwise. Similarly, for all x ∈ TVar, let E′′n+1(x) =
E′′n+1(x) ⊔ I ′′n if E′n+1(x) ≠ En(x) and E′′n+1(x) = E′′n+1(x) otherwise. Then




(A) Let Σ′ = dom(O′n+1) ∪ dom(O′′n+1) so that ∀σ,σ′ ∈ Σ, σ O′n+1 σ′ ⇐⇒
σ,σ′ ∈ Σ′/dom(O′n+1) and σ O′′n+1 σ′ ⇐⇒ σ,σ′ ∈ Σ′/dom(O′′n+1).
Since On+1 = O′n+1 F O′′n+1, and O′n+1 ⊔ O′′n+1 = ∅ by definition, then











more, by the domain-preserving property of F, we know that dom(On) ⊆
dom(O′n+1) and dom(On) ⊆ dom(O′′n+1), and also by definition dom(ϕ0) ⊆
dom(On). Hence, by definition PER(ϕ0)⊔O′n+1 = PER(ϕ0)⊔O′′n+1 = ∅.
Therefore, PER(ϕ0) ⊔On+1 = PER(ϕ0) ⊔O′n+1 ⊔O′′n+1. We now show
that PER(ϕ0) ⊔ ⌊TP ′
n+1
⌋ ⊑ PER(ϕ0) ⊔On+1.
We consider three cases based on how the boolean guard b evaluates.
Firstly, we note that I ′n and I ′′n partition the domain of In such that the
set of states in dom((En, I ′n,On)) and dom((En, I ′′n ,On)) evaluate b
to tt and ff respectively. This is clear since (see Definition 5.4.10) we
have that I ′n = ↑TVar(b ∶ T ⊔ In ⊔RE) and I ′′n = ↑TVar(b ∶ F ⊔ In ⊔RE).
Hence, since In ⊔ RE ∈ Rinit and because dom(ϕ0) ⊆ dom(In ⊔ RE)
by definition, then by (4) and (2) of lemma 5.7.3 we have that for all
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σ,σ′ ∈ dom(ϕ0), σ I ′n σ′ Ô⇒ σ(b) = σ′(b) = tt and σ I ′′n σ′ Ô⇒
σ(b) = σ′(b) = ff .
Now take any σ,σ′ ∈Σ such that σ(PER(ϕ0)⊔On+1)σ′, since PER(ϕ0)⊔
On+1 = PER(ϕ0)⊔O′n+1 ⊔O
′′
n+1 then we know that σ,σ′ ∈ dom(ϕ0) and
σ O′n+1 σ
′ and σ O′′n+1 σ′ hold.
(a) Suppose σ(b) = σ′(b) = tt, then σ,σ′ ∈ dom((En, I ′n,On)). But
by the induction hypothesis PER((En, I ′n,On)) ⊔ ⌊Tc1⌋ ⊑ O′n+1 ⊔
PER((En, I ′n,On)), hence σO′n+1σ′ Ô⇒ σ ⌊Tc1⌋σ′. Since σ(b) =
σ′(b) = tt and σ ⌊Tc1⌋ σ′ holds, then σ ⌊TP ′n+1⌋ σ′ holds.
(b) The proof in the case that σ(b) = σ′(b) = ff is similar to that of
the case when σ(b) = σ′(b) = tt.
(c) Now suppose σ(b) = tt and σ′(b) = ff . Thus, we have that σ ∈
dom((En, I ′n,On)) and σ′ ∈ dom((En, I ′′n ,On)). Since σ O′n+1 ⊔
O′′n+1 σ
′ holds, then there does not exist a write or while com-
mand along the execution paths of σ or σ′ within P ′n+1. Sup-
pose that there exist a write or while statement along the execu-
tion path of σ, then there exists in the information flow analy-
sis an expression e and a configuration (Ee, Ie,Oe) such that σ ∈
dom(flow(e ∶ id, (Ee, Ie,Oe))) andO′n+1 = O′n+1Fflow(e ∶ id, (Ee, Ie,Oe)).
By lemma 5.7.9 we have that dom(flow(e ∶ id, (Ee, Ie,Oe))) ⊆
dom(Ie) ⊆ dom(I ′n) and σ ∈ dom(I ′n). Furthermore, since σ′(b) =
ff then σ′ ∉ dom(I ′n) and hence we have that σ′ ∉ dom(flow(e ∶ id, (Ee, Ie,Oe))).
Therefore, by (3) of proposition 5.4.5 (σ,σ′) ∉ On+1 since O′n+1 =
O′n+1Fflow(e ∶ id, (Ee, Ie,Oe)), which contradicts our assumption
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that σO′n+1σ′ holds. Similarly, there does not exist a write or while
statement along the execution path of σ′ in P ′n+1. Thus, because
P ′n+1 neither produces an output (no write statement), nor diverges
(no while statement) along the execution paths of the states σ and
σ′ in P ′n+1 then σ ⌊TP ′n+1⌋ σ′ holds.
Thus, ∀σ,σ′ ∈ Σ, σ (PER(ϕ0) ⊔On+1) σ′ Ô⇒ σ ⌊TP ′
n+1
⌋ σ′, that is,
PER(ϕ0) ⊔ ⌊TP ′
n+1
⌋ ⊑ PER(ϕ0) ⊔On+1.
Now define ⌊TPn●P ′n+1⌋ as ∀σ,σ′ ∈ Σ, σ ⌊TPn●P ′n+1⌋σ′ iff σ ⌊TPn⌋σ′ and
if ⟨Pn, σ⟩⇓ σn and ⟨Pn, σ′⟩⇓ σ′n then also σn ⌊TP ′n+1⌋σ′n. By proposi-
tion 5.7.6 we know that ⌊TPn+1⌋ ⊑ ⌊TPn●P ′n+1⌋, and hence that ⌊TPn+1⌋ ⊔
PER((E, I,O)) ⊑ ⌊TPn●P ′n+1⌋⊔ PER((E, I,O)). Since by the induction
hypothesis we have ⌊TPn⌋⊔PER((E, I,O)) ⊑ On⊔PER((E, I,O)) and
also {σ′ ∣σ ∈ dom((E, I,O)), ⟨Pn, σ⟩⇓ σ′} ⊆ dom(ϕ0), and PER(ϕ0)⊔
⌊TP ′
n+1
⌋ ⊑ PER(ϕ0) ⊔ On+1, hence by lemma 5.7.7 we have ⌊TPn+1⌋ ⊔
PER((E, I,O)) ⊑ On+1 ⊔ PER((E, I,O)).
(B) By the induction hypothesis we already know that for the then branch
we have {σ′∣σ ∈ dom((En, I ′n,On)), ⟨c1, σ⟩⇓ σ′} ⊆ dom((E′n+1, I ′n+1,O′n+1)) ⊆
dom((E′n+1, In+1,O′n+1)) since by lemma 5.7.9 we have dom(I ′n+1) ⊆
dom(I ′n) and also by definition dom(I ′n+1) ⊆ dom(In+1). Similarly, for
the else branch {σ′∣σ ∈ dom((En, I ′′n ,On)), ⟨c2, σ⟩⇓ σ′} ⊆ dom((E′′n+1, In+1,O′′n+1)).
Since dom((En, I ′n,On)) = {σ ∈ dom((En, In,On)) ∣ σ(b) = tt} and
dom((En, I ′′n ,On)) = {σ ∈ dom((En, In,On)) ∣ σ(b) = ff}, therefore
the set of terminating states ofP ′n+1 starting from a state in dom((En, In,On))
satisfies the property {σ′ ∣ σ ∈ dom((En, In,On)), ⟨P ′n+1, σ⟩⇓ σ′} ⊆
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(En+1, In+1,On+1) since by the domain-preserving property of F, we
have that dom((E′n+1, In+1,O′n+1)) ⊆ (En+1, In+1,On+1) and also that
dom((E′′n+1, In+1,O′′n+1)) ⊆ (En+1, In+1,On+1). Hence, by the induc-
tion hypothesis, {σ′∣σ ∈ dom((E, I,O)), ⟨Pn, σ⟩⇓ σ′} ⊆ dom((En, In,On))
implies {σ′∣σ ∈ dom((E, I,O)), ⟨Pn+1, σ⟩⇓ σ′} ⊆ dom((En+1, In+1,On+1)).
(C) We have already shown by the induction hypothesis at the beginning of
the if proof that (E′n+1, I ′n+1,O′n+1), (E′′n+1, I ′′n+1,O′′n+1) ∈ Φinit. In the
updated post-configuration (E′n+1, In+1,O′n+1) of the then branch, and
for a given variable x ∈ TVar, E′n+1(x) may be E′n+1(x) ⊔ I ′n or E′n+1
according to the if rule. Hence, by applying (5) and (6) of lemma 5.4.8
we know that E′n+1(x) = ↑TVar/{x}(E′n+1(x) ⊔ I ′n) because E′n+1(x) =
↑TVar/{x}E′n+1(x) and I ′n = ↑TVar/{x}I ′n since I ′n = ↑TVarI ′n. Furthermore,
since ↑TVarI ′n+1 = I ′n+1 and ↑TVarI ′′n+1 = I ′′n+1 by the induction hypothe-
sis, then by (4) of lemma 5.4.8 havocTVar(dom(I ′n+1) ∪ dom(I ′′n+1)) =
dom(I ′n+1) ∪ dom(I ′′n+1), which implies that ↑TVarIn+1 = In+1. Hence,
(E′n+1, In+1,O
′
n+1) ∈ Φinit. Similarly, for the post-configuration of the
else branch, we have (E′′n+1, In+1,O′′n+1) ∈ Φinit. Finally, by applying




• Let P ′n+1 be while (b) do c, and let C0 ≜ if(b)then c else skip and
for all i ≥ 0 define Ci+1 ≜ Ci;C0. Furthermore, let ϕ0 = (En, In,On) and for
all i ≥ 0 let (E′i, I ′i ,O′i) = ϕi such that ϕ0 Ci ϕi+1, and define P in ≜ Pn;Ci.
We know that {σ′ ∣ σ ∈ dom((E, I,O)), ⟨Pn, σ⟩⇓ σ′} ⊆ dom(ϕ0) and that
for all i ≥ 0, {σ′ ∣ σ ∈ dom(ϕ0), ⟨Ci, σ⟩⇓ σ′} ⊆ dom(ϕi+1) by applying
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the induction hypothesis. Now let (E′′, I ′′,O′′) = Fi≥0ϕi. Furthermore,
define the E-component of the while post-configuration so that for any
x ∈ Var, X¯ = TVar/{x} and for all σ,σ′ ∈ Σ, σ EW (x) σ′ ⇐⇒ ∃i ∈
N, σ↑X¯(E′i(x) ⊔ I
′′
i ⊔ b ∶ F)σ′, where I ′′i = flow(b ∶ F, ϕi). Now define the I-
component and the O-component of the while statement post-configuration
to be IW = flow(b ∶ F, (EW , I ′′,O′′)) and OW = Fi≥0 flow(b ∶ id, ϕi) FO′′,
so that (En+1, In+1,On+1) = (EW , IW ,OW ).
Define the set of states that may occur before or after an iteration of the
while statement P ′n+1, starting from the set dom(ϕ0), as
Σ = dom(ϕ0) ∪ {σ′ ∣ σ ∈ dom(ϕ0), j ∈ N, ⟨Cj , σ⟩⇓ σ′} (5.1)
Now let the subset ofΣ under which the while statement terminates be given
by
Σ⇓ = {σ ∈ Σ ∣ ⟨P ′n+1, σ⟩⇓ σ
′}. (5.2)
Thus, the subset of Σ under which the while statement diverges is given by
Σ⇑ = Σ/Σ⇓.
We also identify the subset of Σ under which the outer while statement
diverges, excluding those under which the subprogram c diverges




j(b) = tt}. (5.3)






(A) We start by showing thatOn+1 contains termination information. More
specifically, that On+1 distinguishes any state in Σ⇓ from any state in
Σ⇑. This is shown in two steps, firstly that On+1 distinguishes states in
Σ⇓ from all other states in ΣW⇑ , and secondly, by induction on c, that
On+1 distinguishes all states in Σ⇓ from those in Σc⇑.
We now observe that for every σ ∈ Σ⇓∪ΣW⇑ there exists j ∈ N such that
⟨Cj, σ⟩⇓ σ′ and σ′ ∈ dom(ϕj+1) by the induction hypothesis. There-
fore, since the program does not modify the IVar-projection of states,
it is clear that σ ∈ havocTVar({σ′}), hence we have that Σ⇓ ∪ΣW⇑ ⊆
⋃j≥0 havocTVar(dom(ϕj)). Now, since b ∶ id is an equivalence rela-
tion, then for any j ∈ N dom(ϕj) ⊆ dom(flow(b ∶ id, ϕj)) by definition.
Furthermore, havocTVar(dom(flow(b ∶ id, ϕj))) = dom(flow(b ∶ id, ϕj))
and hence Σ⇓ ∪ ΣW⇑ ⊆ ⋃j≥0 dom(flow(b ∶ id, ϕj)) by the monotonicity
and idempotency of havocTVar(⋅). Hence, we have that Σ⇓ ∪ ΣW⇑ ⊆
dom(Fj≥0 flow(b ∶ id, ϕj)) by the domain-preserving property of F.
Now suppose σ,σ′ ∈ Σ⇓ ∪ ΣW⇑ , such that σ On+1 σ′ holds. Since
σ,σ′ ∈ dom(Fj≥0 flow(b ∶ id, ϕj)) and On+1 = Fj≥0 flow(b ∶ id, ϕj)FO′′
then σFj≥0 flow(b ∶ id, ϕj)σ′ holds by (2) of proposition 5.4.5. Now let
Σ′′ = dom(Fj≥0 flow(b ∶ id, ϕj)), then for all j ∈ N, σCΣ′′(flow(b ∶ id, ϕj))σ′.
That is, for all j ∈ N, we have that σ,σ′ ∈ dom(flow(b ∶ id, ϕj)) and
σ flow(b ∶ id, ϕj) σ′ or σ,σ′ ∈ Σ′′/dom(flow(b ∶ id, ϕj)). Now since
σ,σ′ ∈ Σ⇓ ∪ ΣW⇑ then there exists k ∈ N and σA, σB ∈ Σ such that
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⟨Ck, σ⟩⇓ σA and ⟨Ck, σ′⟩⇓ σB and σA, σB ∈ dom(ϕk) by the induc-
tion hypothesis. Now since σA, σB ∈ dom(ϕk) then σA, σB ∈ dom(R),
where R = b ∶ id ⊔ I ′k ⊔ RE and where ∀σ1, σ2 ∈ Σ, σ1 RE σ2 ⇐⇒
σ1, σ2 ∈ dom(⊔y∈FV (b)E′k(y)) since b ∶ id is an equivalence relation.
But we know that the program does not modify the IVar projection of
states and hence, σA ∈ havocTVar({σ}) and σB ∈ havocTVar({σ′}).
We now observe that flow(b ∶ id, ϕk) = ↑TVarR, which means that σ,σ′ ∈
dom(flow(b ∶ id, ϕk)) and hence that σ flow(b ∶ id, ϕk) σ′ holds. Since
σ ↑TVarR σ′ holds and σA, σB ∈ havocTVar([σ]↑TVarR), then by (4) of
lemma 5.4.8, σA ↑TVarR σB holds. Now we know that R ∈ Rinit by
applying (3) and (4) of lemma 5.7.3, since all variables are properly-
assigned before use and hence for all y ∈ FV (b),E′
k
(y) ∈ Rinit and
I ′k ∈ Rinit. Thus, σA ↑TVarR σB means that σA R σB holds by (2) of
lemma 5.7.3, since σA, σB ∈ dom(R), which implies that σA(b) =
σB(b) by the definition of R. Thus, there are only two cases to con-
sider. Case 1, σA(b) = σB(b) = ff , which means that the while state-
ment terminates, and hence that σ,σ′ ∈ Σ⇓ by the definition of Σ⇓.
This leaves only the case 2, where for all j ∈ N, ⟨Cj, σ⟩⇓ σj and
⟨Cj, σ′⟩⇓ σ′j and σj(b) = σ′j(b) = tt, which means that σ,σ′ ∈ ΣW⇑ .
Hence, ∀σ,σ′ ∈ Σ⇓ ∪ ΣW⇑ , σ On+1 σ′ implies σ,σ′ ∈ Σ⇓ or σ,σ′ ∈ ΣW⇑ ,
which shows that On+1 distinguishes the terminating states from the
nonterminating ones in Σ⇓ ∪ΣW⇑ .
We now show the second part that On+1 distinguishes terminating
states inΣ⇓, from those inΣc⇑, under which c diverges. This is achieved
by induction on c, in particular, because we know by definition ofOn+1
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that for all i ≥ 0, O′i⊑+On+1, and by the induction hypothesis we know
that {σ′ ∣ σ ∈ dom(ϕi, ⟨C0, σ⟩⇓ σ′)} ⊆ dom(ϕi+1) and that PER(ϕi) ⊔
⌊TC0⌋ ⊑ PER(ϕi) ⊔ O′i+1, and hence O′i+1 distinguishes terminating
states in dom(ϕi) from those that makeC0 diverge, because ⌊TC0⌋ does
also, as lemma 4.3.2 shows. When we combine this with the fact that
for all i, dom(ϕi) ⊆ dom(O′i) and O′i⊑+On+1, then by applying (2) of
proposition 5.4.5 we know that for all σ,σ′ ∈ dom(ϕi), σ On+1 σ′ Ô⇒
σ O′i σ
′
, and hence by the contrapositive, On+1 distinguishes the states
that O′i does. Thus, since Σc⇑ ⊆ Σ and Σ ⊆ ⋃i≥0 dom(ϕi) then σ,σ′ ∈
Σ⇓ ∪Σc⇑, σ On+1 σ
′ implies σ,σ′ ∈ Σ⇓ or σ,σ′ ∈ Σc⇑.
From the above we have that for all σ,σ′ ∈ Σ, σ On+1 σ′ implies σ,σ′ ∈
Σ⇓ or σ,σ′ ∈ ΣW⇑ ∪ Σ
c
⇑. Thus, On+1 distinguishes the set of states,
starting from dom(ϕ0), in which the while statement terminates, from
those in which the statement diverges. Furthermore, we observe from
the property of ⌊TCj⌋ which, for all j, distinguishes the states under
whichCj terminates from those under which it diverges (see lemma 4.3.2),
that for any pair of states σ,σ′ ∈ ΣW⇑ ∪Σc⇑, σOn+1σ′ implies σ,σ′ ∈ ΣW⇑
or σ,σ′ ∈ Σc⇑. This is because by definition for all starting states in
ΣW⇑ , Ci terminates for all i, whereas for all starting states in Σc⇑, there
exists a j where Cj diverges. Hence, by applying the induction hy-
pothesis and the definition of On+1, for any σ0, σ′0 ∈ ΣW⇑ ∪Σc⇑ such that
σ0On+1σ
′
0 holds, σ0 ⌊TC0⌋σ′0 holds and for all i ≥ 0, ⟨C0, σi⟩⇓ σi+1 and
⟨C0, σ′i⟩⇓ σ
′
i+1 implies σi+1 ⌊TC0⌋ σ′i+1. But, by lemma 4.3.2, for any i,
σi ⌊TC0⌋σ′i implies that C0 terminates under both σi and σ′i or diverges
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under both states. But since σj terminates and σ′j diverges when C0 is
executed, ⌊TC0⌋ does not relate them. Thus, for all σ,σ′ ∈ ΣW⇑ ∪Σc⇑, we
have that σ On+1 σ′ implies σ,σ′ ∈ ΣW⇑ or σ,σ′ ∈ Σc⇑. Combining this
with the earlier results, we have that for all σ,σ′ ∈ Σ, σOn+1σ′ implies
σ,σ′ ∈ Σ⇓ or σ,σ′ ∈ ΣW⇑ or σ,σ
′ ∈ Σc⇑.
Finally, we now show that the property PER((E, I,O)) ⊔ ⌊TPn+1⌋ ⊑
PER((E, I,O))⊔On+1 holds. By the induction hypothesis PER((E, I,O))⊔
⌊TPn⌋ ⊑ PER((E, I,O)) ⊔On and {σ′∣σ ∈ dom((E, I,O)), ⟨Pn, σ⟩⇓ σ′} ⊆
dom(ϕ0), and we know from the flow rules that On⊑+On+1. By apply-
ing proposition 5.7.6, it thus remains to show that PER(ϕ0)⊔ ⌊TP ′n+1⌋ ⊑
PER(ϕ0) ⊔On+1. Let ΣW⇑ = {σ0 ∈ Σ ∣ ∀i ∈ N, ⟨C0, σi⟩⇓ σi+1, σi+1(b) =
tt} be the set of all states under which the outer while loop diverges
and define W such that for all σ0, σ′0 ∈ Σ, σ0 W σ′0 iff (σ0, σ′0 ∈




⇑ ) and σ0 ⌊TC0⌋ σ′0 and ∀i ≥ 0, ⟨C0, σi⟩⇓ σi+1,
⟨C0, σ′i⟩⇓ σ
′
i+1 Ô⇒ σi+1 ⌊TC0⌋ σ
′
i+1. We know from lemma 5.7.8 that
⌊TP ′
n+1
⌋ ⊑W . We shall show that PER(ϕ0)⊔W ⊑ PER(ϕ0)⊔On+1. Sup-
pose σ0, σ′0 ∈ dom(ϕ0) and that σ0 On+1 σ′0, then from the partitioning
of states by On+1 shown above, we know that σ0, σ′0 ∈ ΣW⇑ ∩ dom(ϕ0)
or σ0, σ
′
0 ∈ dom(ϕ0)/ΣW⇑ . By the induction hypothesis, for all i ≥ 0 we
have that {σ′ ∣ σ ∈ dom(ϕ0), ⟨Ci, σ⟩⇓ σ′} ⊆ dom(ϕi+1) and PER(ϕi) ⊔
⌊TC0⌋ ⊑ PER(ϕi) ⊔O′i+1. Hence, by applying (2) of proposition 5.4.5,
since for all i ≥ 0 we have that dom(ϕi) ⊆ dom(O′i) and O′i FOn+1 =
On+1, and O′i⊑+O′i+1, then σ0On+1 σ′0 implies that for all j ≥ 0, σ0O′j σ′0.
Thus, σ0 On+1 σ′0 implies σ0 O′1 σ′0 Ô⇒ σ0 ⌊TC0⌋ σ′0 by the induction








i+1 Ô⇒ σi+1 ⌊TC0⌋ σ
′
i+1 by the in-
duction hypothesis and because of (4) of lemma 5.4.8 since C0 only
modifies TVar variables and hence σi+1 ∈ havocTVar({σ0}) and
σ′i+1 ∈ havocTVar({σ′0}), and we already know that σ0O′i+1 σ′0 holds.
Thus, σ0 W σ′0 holds, and hence PER(ϕ0) ⊔W ⊑ PER(ϕ0) ⊔ On+1.
Since by lemma 5.7.8 ⌊TP ′
n+1




(B) We know by the induction hypothesis that for all i ∈ N, and σ ∈
dom(ϕ0), ⟨Ci, σ⟩⇓ σ′ Ô⇒ σ′ ∈ dom(ϕi+1). But for any σ ∈ dom(ϕ0)
such that ⟨P ′n+1, σ⟩⇓ σ′, then σ′(b) = ff since the while statement ter-
minates and hence there exists a j ∈ N such that ⟨Cj , σ⟩⇓ σ′, which
means that σ′ ∈ dom(ϕj+1). Furthermore, since σ′(b) = ff , it cannot
be modified by further execution of C0, and hence for all k ≥ j + 1,
we have also that σ′ ∈ dom(ϕk). Since there exists a k ∈ N such that
σ′ ∈ dom(ϕk) and σ′(b) = ff , then it is easy to see that for all x ∈Var,
σ′ ∈ dom(En+1(x)) by definition. Furthermore, since σ′ ∈ dom(ϕk),
then σ′ ∈ dom(I ′′) defined as I ′′ = Fi≥0 I ′i . Hence, σ′ ∈ dom(In+1),
which is defined as In+1 = flow(b ∶ F, (En+1, I ′′,O′′)). Finally, since
σ′ ∈ dom(ϕk), by the domain preserving property of F, we know that
σ′ ∈ On+1, which is computed by taking the join F of O′k and some
other PERs. Hence σ′ ∈ dom((En+1, In+1,On+1)). That is, {σ′ ∣ σ ∈
dom(ϕ0), ⟨P ′n+1, σ⟩⇓ σ′} ⊆ dom((En+1, In+1,On+1)). By combining
this with the induction hypothesis on Pn, where we have that {σ′ ∣ σ ∈
dom((E, I,O)), ⟨Pn, σ⟩⇓ σ′} ⊆ dom(ϕ0), it then follows that {σ′ ∣σ ∈
dom((E, I,O)), ⟨Pn+1, σ⟩⇓ σ′} ⊆ dom((En+1, In+1,On+1)).
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(C) Since ϕ0 ∈ Φinit. We know from lemma 5.7.4 that (En+1, In+1,On+1) ∈
Φinit.
A corollary to (A) of Theorem 5.7.10 shows the soundness property of the
static analysis that links the information flow derived by the static analysis to the
semantic information flow.
Corollary 5.7.11. Let (E, I,O) P (E′, I ′,O′) be the static analysis of the
While program P . Then ⌊TP ⌋ ⊑ O′.
Proof. The proof follows easily from the (A) part of Theorem 5.7.10. Since
PER((E, I,O)) = all, we have that ⌊TP ⌋ ⊑ O′.
5.7.1 Flow Sensitivity
The information flow analysis is flow-sensitive [NNH99], which means that the
order of program execution matters to the analysis. For example, while the pro-
gram l ∶= 0; l ∶= h;write l; is insecure, it is easy to show that the program
l ∶= h; l ∶= 0;write l; is secure because it does not leak the secret h. Assuming
that h contains a secret value and l is public, conventional type-based analyses,
which are usually flow-insensitive, reject the latter program because of the initial
assignment of h to l.
5.7.2 Termination Properties
Under the semantic attacker model, the attacker may be able to gain informa-
tion when it determines that the program does not terminate. This information is
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captured by the static analysis by taking a join of the O-component in the post-
configuration of while statements with a PER which partitions states into those un-
der which the while statement terminates and those under which it does not termi-
nate. Furthermore, since subsequent statements after a diverging while statement
cannot cause further information flow, the definition of the E- and I-components
of the post-configuration of a while statement ensures that subsequent analysis is
restricted to only those states under which the preceding while statement termi-
nates. This is illustrated in the following program of Figure 5.17.
1 i f (h ≤ 10) then
2 whi l e (tt) do
3 skip
4 l ∶= h;
5 e l s e
6 l ∶= h;
7 w r i t e l;
Figure 5.17: Nontermination and unreachable code
It is clear that this program will reveal the value of h when h > 10, but when
h ≤ 10 the program diverges preventing the assignment statement on line 4 and
subsequent statements from being executed. Thus, the attacker only learns that
h ≤ 10 when the program diverges. Assume that the pre-configuration of the
analysis is (E, I,O), and that TVar = {l} and IVar = {h}. The static anal-
ysis derives the information release as follows. The implicit context on entering
the then branch is the PER I1 ≡ {{σ ∈ Σ ∣ σ(h) ≤ 10}}. Since tt ∶ F = ∅
is the empty PER, the post-configuration of the while statement is (E2, I2,O2)
where ∀x ∈ Var,E2(x) = I2 = ∅, and the attacker’s knowledge is given by
O2 ≡ {{σ ∈ Σ ∣ σ(h) ≤ 10},{σ ∈ Σ ∣ σ(h) > 10}}. The meaning of E2 and
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I2 is that the program points after the while statement are unreachable since the
PER ∅ relates no state, and O2 means that the attacker can distinguish between
the terminating and non-terminating trace of the program. Applying the assign-
ment rule on line 4 does not change the pre-configuration (E2, I2,O2). In fact,
for any statement whose pre-configuration is (E2, I2,O2), the post-configuration
is the same since for any expression e and PER φ on values and variable l we
have that flow(e ∶ φ, (E2, I2,O2)) = aflow(l ∶= e, (E2, I2,O2)) = ∅ such that
flow(e ∶ φ, (E2, I2,O2)) FO2 = O2 (since for any PER R, R F ∅ = R).
Now for the else branch of the program, the implicit context is given by I ′2 ≡
{{σ ∈ Σ ∣ σ(h) > 10}} and after the assignment we have the post-configuration
(E′2, I
′
2,), where E′2 = E[l ↦ aflow(l ∶= h, (E, I ′2,all))] and where aflow(l ∶=
h, (E, I ′2,all)) ≡ {{σ′ ∈ Σ ∣ σ′(l) = σ′(h) = σ(h)} ∣ σ ∈ Σ, σ(h) > 10}. Thus,
E′2(l) is the PER which requires that the value of h and l be the same (due to the
assignment) and that h > 10 (due to branching). Applying the if statement rule,
the post-configuration is thus (E2, I2,O2) ⊎(E,I,O) (E′2, I ′2,all) = (E3, I ′2,O2)
where ∀x, ∈ Var,E3(x) = E′2(x) ⊔ I ′2. This is the expected result, since E3 and
I ′2 both restrict the set of states to those where h > 10 (the terminating traces) and
where h = l (due to the assignment on line 6).
Finally, the write statements reveals the value of h whenever it is greater than
10. This is clear from the result (E3, I ′2,O2) write l (E3, I ′2,O3) where O3 =
O2 F flow(l ∶ id, (E3, I ′2,O2)) ≡ {{σ′ ∈ Σ ∣ σ′(h) = σ(h)},{σ′′ ∈ Σ ∣ σ′′(h) ≤
10} ∣σ ∈Σ, σ(h) > 10}. Thus, the final result demonstrates that the attacker either
learns the value of hwhenever h > 10 or learns that h ≤ 10 since ∀σ,σ′ ∈Σ, σO3σ′
iff σ(h) = σ′(h) ≥ 10 or σ(h), σ′(h) ≤ 10, which agrees with the intuition about
the information flow of the program.
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5.7.3 Dead Code Analysis
In program analysis, dead code (also known as unreachable code) refers to a por-
tion of program code that can never be executed [NNH99, Muc97]. Intuitively,
from an information flow perspective dead code should never cause information
flow. We encountered a dead code scenario in the previous analysis example be-
cause the code after the while statement is unreachable. Dead code may also arise
due to program branching, where the conditional guard always evaluates to false.
An example is shown in Figure 5.18. In this example, the implicit context in the
then branch is the empty PER, and therefore all the commands in that branch
are harmless because they cannot be executed. This is revealed by the analysis
of the program, where for any pre-configuration ϕ of the if statement, the post-
configuration of the analysis is also ϕ. This makes sense (from an information
flow perspective, and also from a semantic point of view) because this program
behaves exactly like a skip statement - revealing no information at all.
i f (ff ) then
w r i t e h;
e l s e
s k i p ;
Figure 5.18: A dead code scenario.
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5.7.4 Implicit Flow Approximation
Under certain circumstances implicit information flows are approximated by our
analysis. For example, the analysis of the program
(if(h = 10)then l ∶= 1 else l ∶= 1); write l
says that the attacker either learns that h = 10 or that h ≠ 10. However, since the
attacker cannot determine which program path is taken by observing the output
the result is only an approximation of the actual information flow.
Additionally, because the attacker’s knowledge may only increase in the anal-
ysis it is possible that the analysis may be less precise under certain program
compositions which, which does not increase the semantic attacker’s knowledge
about secrets, but where the individual programs themselves would reveal the in-
formation. For example, consider the programs
P1 ≜ if(h = 10)then write 1 else skip
and
P2 ≜ if(h ≠ 10)then write 1 else skip.
In both cases the analysis precisely determines that the attacker learns whether
h = 10 or not. However, if these programs are composed as P1;P2 then the attacker
cannot gain any information about h. By combining the information released
in both subprograms, the analysis overapproximates the information flow, and
determines that the attacker learns whether h = 10 or not. This is related to the
previous implicit flow problem since the program P1;P2 is observationally similar
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to the program if(h = 10)thenwrite1elsewrite1, which does not reveal
branching information. More generally, this problem is related to the proof of
observational and semantic equivalence of program branches in a given context,
for which techniques from [Ben04], presented in the next section, are useful.
5.8 Relational Correctness
Benton [Ben04] introduced proof techniques whereby the correctness of static
analyses and the program transformations that they enable may be shown by us-
ing relations, rather than predicates, to express program properties. The key ob-
servation is that one may view the semantics of types as a special kind of relation,
rather than as predicates. Thus, a typing judgement of the form:
Γ ⊢M =M ′ ∶ A
which asserts that under the assumptionΓ, the termsM andM ′ are equal at typeA
induces a relation over terms. In particular, types may now be interpreted as partial
equivalence relations over some untyped universe. The idea now is that types
extensionally specify properties that are preserved by program transformations,
and typing judgements identify terms that can be rewritten while preserving the
observable semantics specified by those extensional properties.
The language setting of [Ben04] is similar to While, with the exception of the
write construct and the fact that all variables are of integer data type. However,
boolean expressions are constructed from integer expressions and constants in the
usual way. Expression types are thus taken from {int,bool} ∋ τ , whose denota-
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tions are sets, and where JintK = Z and JboolK = B. The program semantics is
presented in the standard denotational style [Win93].
Some non-standard expression types were introduced in [Ben04] for τ -expressions:
φτ ∶∶= Fτ ∣ {v}τ ∣∆τ ∣Tτ .
Intuitively, Fτ is the empty expression type, {v}τ is the type of constant expres-
sions whose value is v ∈ JτK, ∆τ is the type of an expression that we do not know
its value, and Tτ is the type of an expression that we do not care about its value.
The metavariable eτ ranges over τ -expressions. The denotation of φτ is a relation
on JτK as follows:
JFτK = ∅, J{v}τK = {(v, v)}, J∆τ K = {(v, v) ∣ v ∈ JτK}, JTτ K = JτK × JτK.
It is clear that JφτK is a PER on JτK, we shall thus use our existing notations (drop-
ping the τ -subscripts when it is clear from the context) for these non-standard
types:
Fτ ≡ ∅τ , {v}τ ≡ idvτ , ∆τ ≡ idτ , Tτ ≡ allτ .
These are the PERs, where ∅τ relates no τ -values, idvτ only relates v to itself, idτ
only relates any v ∈ JτK to itself, and allτ relates all pairs of τ -values.
[Ben04] also introduced state types, which are finite maps from (int) variables
to int-expression types, and whose denotations are PERs on the set of states Σ.
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State types are written as lists1:
Θ ∶∶= − ∣Θ, x ∶ φint.
The interpretation of state types is a PER onΣ, where J−K = Σ×Σ andΘ, x ∶ φint =
JΘK ∩ {(σ,σ′) ∣ (σ(x), σ′(x)) ∈ JφintK}. The full inference system for program
analysis and transformation which tracks Dependency, Dead Code and Constancy
information DDCC is shown in Figure 5.19.
Expression and state types are ordered by a subtyping relation ≤ as follows:
∅τ ≤ φτ , idvτ ≤ idτ , φτ ≤ allτ , φτ ≤ φτ ,
φτ ≤ φ′τ φ′τ ≤ φ′′τ
φτ ≤ φ′′τ
for expression
types, and for state types we have Θ ≤ −, Θ, x ∶ ∅int ≤ Θ′,
Θ ≤ Θ′
Θ ≤ Θ′, x ∶ allτ
,
Θ ≤ Θ′ φint ≤ φ′int
Θ, x ∶ φint ≤ Θ′, x ∶ φ′int
. Note that the ordering ≤ is the dual of our ordering ⊑ on
relations.
In Figure 5.19 op stands for any applicable binary operation on τ expres-
sions and oˆp is an abstract interpretation of op over the domain of expression
types. As usual, oˆp is a sound abstraction of op if ∀(x,x′) ∈ JφτK, (y, y′) ∈
Jφ′τK.(x op y, x′ op y′) ∈ Jφτ oˆp φ′τK.
5.8.1 Judgements
There are two basic typing judgements in DDCC:
⊢ eτ ∼ e′τ ∶ Θ⇒ φτ




⊢ c ∼ c′ ∶ Θ, x ∶ ∅int ⇒ Φ′ ⊢ eτ ∼ e′τ ∶ Θ⇒ allτ ⊢ eτ ∼ e′τ ∶ Θ, x ∶ ∅int ⇒ φτ
⊢ eτ ∼ e′τ ∶ Θ⇒ φτ
⊢ e′τ ∼ eτ ∶ Θ⇒ φτ
⊢ eτ ∼ e′τ ∶ Θ⇒ φτ Θ′ ≤ Θ φτ ≤ φ′τ
⊢ eτ ∼ e′τ ∶ Θ′ ⇒ φ′τ
⊢ c ∼ c′ ∶ Θ⇒ Θ′
⊢ c′ ∼ c ∶ Θ⇒ Θ′
⊢ eτ ∼ e′τ ∶ Θ⇒ φτ ⊢ e′τ ∼ e′′τ ∶ Θ⇒ φτ
⊢ eτ ∼ e′′τ ∶ Θ⇒ φτ
⊢ c ∼ c′ ∶ Θ1 ⇒ Θ2 Θ′1 ≤ Θ1 Θ2 ≤ Θ
′
2
⊢ c ∼ c′ ∶ Θ′1 ⇒ Θ
′
2
⊢ c ∼ c′ ∶ Θ⇒ Θ′ ⊢ c′ ∼ c′′ ∶ Θ⇒ Θ′
⊢ c ∼ c′′ ∶ Θ⇒ Θ′
Expressions
⊢ x ∼ x ∶ Θ, x ∶ φint ⇒ φint ⊢ n ∼ n ∶ Θ⇒ idnint ⊢ b ∼ b ∶ Θ⇒ idbbool
⊢ eτ ∼ fτ ∶ Θ⇒ φτ ⊢ e′τ ∼ f ′τ ∶ Θ⇒ φ′τ
⊢ eτ op e′τ ∼ fτ op f ′τ ∶ Θ⇒ (φτ oˆp φ′τ)
Commands
⊢ skip ∼ skip ∶ Θ⇒ Θ
⊢ c1 ∼ c′1 ∶ Θ⇒ Θ′ ⊢ c2 ∼ c
′
2 ∶ Θ′ ⇒ Θ′′
⊢ (c1; c2) ∼ (c1; c′2) ∶ Θ⇒ Θ′′
⊢ e ∼ e′ ∶ Θ, z ∶ φint ⇒ φ′int
⊢ z ∶= e ∼ z ∶= e′ ∶ Θ, z ∶ φint ⇒ Θ, z ∶ φ′int
⊢ b ∼ b′ ∶ Θ⇒ idbool ⊢ c ∼ c′ ∶ Θ⇒ Θ
⊢ while (b) do c ∼ while (b′) do c′ ∶ Θ⇒ Θ
⊢ b ∼ b′ ∶ Θ⇒ idbool ⊢ c1 ∼ c′1 ∶ Θ⇒ Θ′ ⊢ c2 ∼ c′2 ∶ Θ⇒ Θ′
⊢ if (b) then c1 else c2 ∼ if(b′)then c′1 else c′2 ∶ Θ⇒ Θ′
Figure 5.19: Core DDCC System [Ben04].
which intuitively expresses that under the constraintΘ on states, the τ -expressions
eτ and e′τ are interchangeable as they both produce indistinguishable “observa-
tions” under φτ ; similarly, for commands,
⊢ c ∼ c′ ∶ Θ⇒ Θ′
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⊢ skip ∼ skip ∶ Θ⇒ Θ
⊢ c1 ∼ c′1 ∶ Θ⇒ Θ′ ⊢ c2 ∼ c
′
2 ∶ Θ′ ⇒ Θ′′
⊢ c1; c2 ∼ c1; c′2 ∶ Θ⇒ Θ′′
⊢ x ∶= e ∼ y ∶= e′ ∶ Θ[e⟨1⟩/x⟨1⟩, e′⟨2⟩/y⟨2⟩]⇒ Θ
⊢ c1 ∼ c′1 ∶ Θ ∧ (b⟨1⟩ ∧ b′⟨2⟩)⇒ Θ′ ⊢ c2 ∼ c
′
2 ∶ Θ ∧ not(b⟨1⟩ ∨ b′⟨2⟩)⇒ Θ′
⊢ if (b) then c1 else c2 ∼ if(b′)then c′1 else c′2 ∶ Θ ∧ (b⟨1⟩ = b′⟨2⟩)⇒ Θ′
⊢ c ∼ c′ ∶ Θ ∧ (b⟨1⟩ ∧ b′⟨2⟩)⇒ Θ ∧ (b⟨1⟩ = b′⟨2⟩)
⊢ while (b) do c ∼ while (b′) do c′ ∶ Θ ∧ (b⟨1⟩ = b′⟨2⟩)⇒ Θ ∧ not(b⟨1⟩ ∨ b′⟨2⟩)
c ∼ c′ ∶ Θ1 ⇒ Θ2 ⊧ Θ′1 ≤ Θ1 ⊧ Θ2 ≤ Θ
′
2
c ∼ c′ ∶ Θ′1 ⇒ Θ
′
2
c ∼ c′ ∶ Θ⇒ Θ′ ⊧ PER(Θ⇒ Θ′)
c′ ∼ c ∶ Θ⇒ Θ′
c ∼ c′ ∶ Θ⇒ Θ′ c′ ∼ c′′ ∶ Θ⇒ Θ′ ⊧ PER(Θ⇒ Θ′)
c ∼ c′′ ∶ Θ⇒ Θ′
Figure 5.20: Core Relational Hoare Logic [Ben04].
intuitively means that under the context Θ as the precondition of execution state
and the postconditional requirement Θ′ on states, c and c′ are can be interchanged.
We have the following semantic definitions:
JΘ⇒ φτK ≜ {(e, e′) ∣ ∀(σ,σ′) ∈ JΘK.(σ(e), σ′(e′)) ∈ JφτK}
and
JΘ⇒ Θ′K ≜ {(c, c′) ∣ ∀(σ,σ′) ∈ JΘK.(JcK(σ), Jc′K(σ′)) ∈ JΘ′K}.
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5.8.2 Relational Hoare Logic
One of the properties that cannot be expressed under the DDCC type system is
the knowledge of how the boolean guard evaluates when control is passed to a
particular branch of a conditional statement. This is addressed by the system
called Relational Hoare Logic (RHL) where one may specify such properties, and
is intended to be a basis for developing various specific program analyses and
transformations. This system is presented in Figure 5.20.
RHL defines generalised expressions and relational assertions as follows:
gexp ∋ GE ∶∶= n ∣ x⟨1⟩ ∣ x⟨2⟩ ∣ GE iop GE
relexp ∋∶∶= b ∣ GE bop GE ∣ not Θ ∣Θ lop Θ.
The semantics of generalised expressions and relational assertions are given
by:
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JGEK ∈ Σ ×Σ→ Z
JnK = n
Jx⟨1⟩K(σ1, σ2) = σ1(x)
Jx⟨2⟩K(σ1, σ2) = σ2(x)
Je iop e′K(σ1, σ2) = (JeK(σ1, σ2)) iop (Je′K(σ1, σ2))
JΘK ⊆ Σ ×Σ
= {(σ,σ′) ∣ χΘ(σ,σ′) = tt}
χtt(σ,σ′) = tt
χff(σ,σ′) = ff
χb bop b′(σ,σ′) = JbK(σ,σ′) bop Jb′K(σ,σ′)
χΘ lop Θ′(σ,σ′) = χΘ(σ,σ′) lop χΘ′(σ,σ′)
χnotΘ(σ,σ′) = ¬(χΘ(σ,σ′))
The basic RHL judgement is of the form c ∼ c′ ∶ Θ⇒ Θ′, and the meaning of this
judgement is given by
⊧ c ∼ c′ ∶ Θ⇒ Θ′ ≡ ∀(σ,σ′) ∈ JΘK.(JcK(σ), Jc′K(σ′)) ∈ JΘ′K.
The lift of JΘ′K is denoted by the bottom reflecting relation JΘ′K = JΘ′K∪{(,)}
and JcK ∈Σ→ Σ is the denotational semantics of c, which is given in the category
of predomains and continuous functions. Furthermore, we have the following
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auxiliary judgements and their meanings:
⊧ Θ ≤ Θ′ ≡ JΘK ⊆ JΘ′K
⊧ PER(Θ) ≡ (JΘK ○ JΘK) and (JΘK−1 ⊆ JΘK).
5.8.3 Static Analysis
The DDCC and the RHL system may be used to provide proofs of correctness of
program transformation as well as static analysis. For static analysis, emphasis
is laid on the semantics of (expression and command) types as a description of
program properties. Thus, ⊢ eτ ∼ eτ ∶ Θ⇒ φτ or simply ⊢ eτ ∶ Θ⇒ φτ describes
a property of the evaluation of eτ under the constraint Θ on states: that is, given
the context Θ, the evaluation of eτ is indistinguishable via the PER φτ . This
interpretation is the same as the definition e ∶ φ (dropping the τ subscripts) in the
information flow analysis, which is the greatest PER on states (using the order ≤)
for which the evaluation of e is indistinguishable under φ. In other words, for all
Θ ≤ e ∶ φ we have ⊢ e ∶ Θ ⇒ φ. As an interpretation of information released,
the attacker that cannot distinguish evaluations of e that are related by φ, gains
at most the information modelled by the PER e ∶ φ on program states. Thus,
for the semantic attacker in our analysis φ = id, being able to observe precisely
the evaluation of expressions as prescribed by the operational semantics. In the
following, we shall omit the τ subscripts.
For program commands, the static analysis of c is specified under the DDCC
and RHL system as ⊢ c ∼ c ∶ Θ ⇒ Θ′, or simply as ⊢ c ∶ Θ ⇒ Θ′, which may
be interpreted to mean that under the context prescribed by the pre-relation Θ, the
execution of c satisfies the properties described by the post-relation Θ′ on states.
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Under DDCC, the relationsΘ and Θ′ are PERs over program states, although they
may not necessarily be under the RHL system. We restrict our discussions to PERs
only.
5.8.4 Improving the Precision of Information Flow Analysis
The proofs from the DDCC and RHL may be used to improve the precision of our
information flow analysis. For example, the approximation of information flow
that may result due to equivalent branches in a conditional statement can be made
more precise. Suppose the subprograms c1 and c2 of a conditional if statement
contain no write statements and that ⊢ c1 ∼ c2 ∶ Θ ⇒ Θ′, then by this equivalent
branches property, the analysis of if(b)thenc1elsec2 under the configuration
ϕ such that dom(ϕ) ⊆ dom(JΘK) may be replaced with
dom(ϕ) ⊆ dom(JΘK) ⊢ c1 ∼ c2 ∶ Θ⇒ Θ′ ϕ c1 ϕ′
ϕ if(b)then c1 else c2 ϕ′
. (5.5)
This takes advantage of the fact that the subprograms are semantically equiva-
lent under the context provided by Θ. By applying this, the analysis of the earlier
program, if(h = 10)then l ∶= 1 else l ∶= 1;write l, becomes precise under
any starting pre-configuration. However, (5.5) does not help with the program
if(h = 10)then l ∶= h else l ∶= 10;write l, because l ∶= h and l ∶= 10 are
not equivalent under all contexts. In this case however, the program releases no
information about h because the value of l after the conditional is independent of
the execution path. We can improve the precision in such a case by taking ad-
vantage of the knowledge of how the boolean guard evaluates when conditional
subprograms are executed. This can be specified under the RHL system by using
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the common branch [Ben04] rule and the following:
dom(ϕ) ⊆ dom(JΘK) ⊢ c1 ∶ Θ ∧ b⟨1⟩⇒ Θ′ ⊢ c2 ∶ Θ ∧ not b⟨1⟩⇒ Θ′ ϕ c1 ϕ′
ϕ if(b)then c1 else c2 ϕ′
.
(5.6)
Although the language of RHL does not have an explicit output construct, we
can deal with write statements under the RHL system by extending state with fresh
(“output”) variables, which record the value of program output, by adding the rule
⊢ e ∼ x ∶ Θ⇒ id
⊢ write e ∼ write x ∶ Θ⇒ Θ, x ∶ id (5.7)
This rule extends state with the new variable x, which is observationally indistin-
guishable from the expression e under the context Θ. With this extension we can
specify when branches are observationally equivalent. For example, by combin-
ing (5.7) and (5.6) we are able to derive a more precise analysis for the program
if(h = 10)then write 1 else write 1.
Summary In this chapter we have presented a static information flow analysis
technique for While programs using lattices of PERs over the program state. This
analysis is developed relative to the semantic attacker model, which can observe
the execution of programs in the usual way, with the additional ability to determine
whether the program terminates or not. We proved the correctness of the analysis.
In the next chapter, we shall show how abstract interpretation techniques can be
employed to adapt the analysis to less precise lattices, which may be tailored
towards a particular policy to make the static analysis more tractable.
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Chapter 6
Abstract Information Flow Analysis
In the previous chapter we presented a static analysis technique based on PERs
for the analysis of information flow in While programs. In practice, on one hand,
we may not need the level of expressiveness, for example, “the attacker learns the
secret h when the input l = 10” that may be expressed by using the PER lattice.
Instead, for example, we may just be interested in knowing whether the secret h
may ever be released. Thus, depending on the policy to be enforced, it may be
possible to choose a less expressive lattice of information, which may lead to the
simplification of the analysis. On the other hand, a large or complex lattice of
information may be computationally prohibitive, necessitating the choice of a less
computationally expensive lattice to make the analysis of information flow more
tractable. This chapter demonstrates how abstract interpretation techniques may
be used to address this problem by allowing us to perform correct analyses over
simpler (but possibly less-precise) information lattices.
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6.1 Abstract Interpretation
Abstract interpretation is a standard formal framework in which a provably cor-
rect static analysis may be performed over a non-standard abstract domain [CC77,
CC79, CC92, NNH99]. The abstract domain is defined relative to a standard con-
crete domain, where elements of the abstract domain encode properties of ele-
ments in the concrete domain. The most important requirement for abstract inter-
pretation is that of correctness, so that program properties which are derived under
the non-standard abstract interpretation are satisfied by the standard concrete in-
terpretation. The notion of the “abstract domain”, however, is relative to a chosen
“concrete domain”, which may itself be abstract relative to another domain.
The process of selecting an abstract domain often involves approximations,
which may make the analysis less precise. For example, we might be interested
in studying the properties of a program, which computes with integer values, and
how it transforms these values over an abstract domain of sign and parity. Thus,
when the program output is 2, an abstract analysis which judges the output of
the program as a positive even integer is correct, although less precise than the
concrete analysis 2. We may choose an even more abstract domain relative to
the parity-sign domain, which contains only sign information and which judges
the output even less precisely as a positive integer. While some precision may
be sacrificed, the choice of the space over which analysis is performed can some-
times determine whether an analysis will be tractable or not. Traditionally, the
space over which an analysis is performed is often arranged as a complete lattice
such that the lattice order relation specifies the relative degree of precision of the
judgements of analysis [NNH99].
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6.1.1 Design Space for Approximate Analyses
The more precise an analysis is, usually the larger and more complex its prop-
erty space will be because fine-grained properties can be represented. In abstract
interpretation, the passage from more complex concrete domains to simpler, but
possibly less precise, abstract domains is usually formalised as a Galois connec-
tion [CC79]. A Galois connection between two complete lattices ⟨A1,⊑1⟩ and
⟨A2,⊑2⟩ is defined via a pair of adjoint functions (α,γ), where the abstraction
function α ∶ A1 → A2 maps elements in A1 to their abstraction in A2 and the con-
cretisation function γ ∶ A2 → A1 expresses the meaning of elements of A2 using
the elements of A1. The quadruple (A1, α, γ,A2) is said to be a Galois connection
iff α and γ are total and all a1 ∈ A1 and a2 ∈ A2 satisfy the property
α(a1) ⊑2 a2 ⇐⇒ a1 ⊑1 γ(a2). (6.1)
The meaning of this definition is that if a2 safely approximates the abstraction of
a1 (that is, α(a1) ⊑2 a2), then the concretisation of a2 must safely approximate a1
(that is, a1 ⊑1 γ(a2)) [NNH99]. Suppose idA is the identity function on set A, an
alternative, but equivalent, formulation of (6.1) is that (A1, α, γ,A2) is a Galois
connection iff α and γ are monotone and also satisfy the property
idA1 ⊑1 γ ○ α and α ○ γ ⊑2 idA2. (6.2)
It is sufficient to specify just one of the adjunction α, γ in a Galois connection
because one is uniquely determined by the other: for all a1 ∈ A1 and a2 ∈ A2,
α(a1) = ⊓{a′1 ∣ a1 ⊑1 γ(a
′
1)} and γ(a2) = ⊔{a′2 ∣ α(a′2) ⊑2 a2} [NNH99].
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6.2 Dependency Analysis
By applying abstract interpretation techniques we shall show in this section how
to transfer the information flow analysis of Chapter 5 to a suitable abstract lattice.
The main steps are standard and fairly mechanical, which involves the choice of
abstraction function from PERs to the chosen abstract lattice, and the definition of
sound abstractions for the operations on PERs. This is illustrated by the develop-
ment of a termination-sensitive dependency analysis for While programs.
6.2.1 Dependency Abstractions
PERs over the set of program states represent information about program vari-
ables. This information can be interpreted as variable dependencies, where the
dependency that a PER encodes is the set of variables that the PER contains infor-
mation about. We shall start by defining information abstractions mapping PERs
to lattices of variable dependencies, by which we can extract dependency infor-
mation from PERs.
Definition 6.2.1 (Dependency Abstraction). Let Var be the set of variables of a
program whose set of states is Σ. The set Var is assumed to be finite. Define
L ≜ ⟨P(Var),⊆⟩ and L2 ≜ ⟨P(P(Var)),⊆⟩ to be lattices ordered by the subset
inclusion order. Hence, the natural join operation on the lattices L and L2 is the
set union operation ∪.
Define the dependency operation∆ ∶ P(Σ)→ P(Var) such that for anyΣ ⊆Σ
∆(Σ) ≜ {x ∈Var ∣X = {x}, havocX(Σ) ≠ Σ}.
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Define the dependency abstractions αL ∶ PER(Σ)→ L and αL2 ∶ PER(Σ)→ L2 on





αL2(R) ≜ {∆([σ]R) ∣ σ ∈ dom(R)}.
Define a compositional join operation ⊔ on the lattice L2 such that for any
X,Y ∈ L2, X ⊔ Y = {Z ∪ Z ′ ∣ Z ∈ X,Z ′ ∈ Y } and X ⊔ ∅ = ∅ ⊔ X = X . The
natural extension of ⊔ to subsets of L2, for any X = {Xj ∣ j ∈ J} ⊆ L2, is given by
⊔X = {⋃j∈J Zj ∣Zj ∈ Xj}.
An elementX ∈ L2 is said to represent disjunctive dependency about variables
x, y ∈Var iff for all Z ∈X,x ∈ Z Ô⇒ y ∉ Z and y ∈ Z Ô⇒ x ∉ Z.
A non-disjunctive interpretation of elements of L2 on the lattice L is given by
the function α∪ ∶ L2 → L which is defined for any X ∈ L2 as the union α∪(X) =
⋃Z∈X Z.
The lattice L models variable dependency information. For example, in the
program l ∶= h1+h2+h3, the set {h1, h2, h3} models the dependency of l on h1 and
h2 and h3 after the assignment. The motivation behind the lattice L2 is to differen-
tiate this dependency from, for example, the dependency {{h1, h2},{h1, h3}} on
the lattice L2, due to the program if(h1)then l ∶= h2 else l ∶= h3, where the
dependency {{h1, h2},{h1, h3}} of l is interpreted to mean that l may be depen-
dent on h1 and h2, or on h1 and h3; but never on h2 and h3 at the same time. This
is a disjunctive dependency as defined above. Let us now show some properties
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of the definitions.
Lemma 6.2.2. Let Σ1,Σ2 ⊆ Σ be subsets of Σ. Then we have that ∆(Σ1 ∩Σ2) ⊆
∆(Σ1) ∪∆(Σ2) and ∆(Σ1 ∪ Σ2) ⊆ ∆(Σ1) ∪∆(Σ2) and ∆(Σ1/Σ2) ⊆ ∆(Σ1) ∪
∆(Σ2).
Proof. Define the complement of ∆ as ∆, which for any Σ′ ⊆ Σ is given by
∆(Σ′) = {x ∈ Var ∣X = {x}, havocX(Σ′) = Σ′}. It is thus clear that ∆(Σ′) =
Var/∆(Σ′). But for anyX = {x} ⊆Var, we have that havocX(Σ1)∩havocX(Σ2) =
havocX(havocX(Σ1) ∩ havocX(Σ2)) by (3b) lemma 5.4.8, and hence if havocX(Σ1) =
Σ1 and havocX(Σ2) = Σ2 then Σ1 ∩ Σ2 = havocX(Σ1 ∩Σ2). Therefore, x ∈
∆(Σ1) and x ∈ ∆(Σ2) implies that x ∈∆(Σ1∩Σ2) (sinceΣ1∩Σ2 = havocX(Σ1 ∩Σ2)),
that is, ∆(Σ1) ∩∆(Σ2) ⊆∆(Σ1 ∩Σ2). Hence, ∆(Σ1 ∩Σ2) ⊆∆(Σ1) ∪∆(Σ2).
Similarly, since havocX(Σ1)∪havocX(Σ2) = havocX(havocX(Σ1) ∪ havocX(Σ2))
by (3a) of lemma 5.4.8 , it follows that∆(Σ1)∩∆(Σ2) ⊆∆(Σ1∪Σ2), which means
that ∆(Σ1 ∪Σ2) ⊆ ∆(Σ1) ∪∆(Σ2).
Finally, by (3c) of lemma 5.4.8 we know that havocX(Σ1)/havocX(Σ2) =
havocX(havocX(Σ1)/havocX(Σ2)). By similar argumentation as above, we ob-
serve that x ∈ ∆(Σ1)∩∆(Σ2), implies x ∈∆(Σ1/Σ2) and thus ∆(Σ1)∩∆(Σ2) ⊆
∆(Σ1/Σ2), which shows that ∆(Σ1/Σ2) ⊆ ∆(Σ1) ∪∆(Σ2).
Proposition 6.2.3. For any PER R ∈ PER(Σ), ∆(dom(R)) ⊆ αL(R).
Proof. The proof follows from Lemma 6.2.2 since the domain of a PER is the
union of its equivalence classes, and the fact that by the definition of αL(R), for
every equivalence class [σ]R of R, we have ∆([σ]R) ⊆ αL(R).
The operation ∪ on the lattice L soundly abstracts ⊔ and F on PER(Σ).
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Lemma 6.2.4. For any R,R′ ∈ PER(Σ), αL(R ⊔ R′) ⊆ αL(R) ∪ αL(R′) and
αL(R FR′) ⊆ αL(R) ∪αL(R′).
Proof. Let R′′ = R⊔R′. By definition, for any σ ∈ dom(R′′) the equivalence class
of σ in R′′ is given by [σ]R′′ = [σ]R ∩ [σ]R′ . Hence by lemma 6.2.2 we have that
∆([σ]R′′) ⊆∆([σ]R) ∪∆([σ]R′). Hence, αL(R′′) ⊆ αL(R) ∪ αL(R′).
For the second part of the proof, now letR′′ = RFR′ and letΣ = dom(R)/dom(R′)
and let Σ′ = dom(R′)/dom(R). Then, by definition, we have that for any σ ∈
dom(R′′), [σ]R′′ = [σ]R ∩ [σ]R′ if σ ∈ dom(R)∩ dom(R′), and [σ]R′′ = [σ]R ∩Σ′
if σ ∈ dom(R) and σ ∉ dom(R′), and [σ]R′′ = [σ]R′ ∩ Σ if σ ∈ dom(R′) and
σ ∉ dom(R′). Now take any x ∈ Var such that X = {x} and suppose x ∉
αL(R) ∪ αL(R′). Then we know that for all σ ∈ dom(R), havocX([σ]R) =
[σ]R and for all σ ∈ dom(R′), havocX([σ]R′) = [σ]R′ . Thus, by applying
(3a) of lemma 5.4.8, havocX(dom(R)) = dom(R) and havocX(dom(R′)) =
dom(R′). Therefore, by applying (3c) of lemma 5.4.8, this means that Σ =
dom(R)/dom(R′) = havocX(Σ) and similarly, Σ′ = havocX(Σ′). Thus, we
have that [σ]R′ ∩ Σ = havocX([σ]R′ ∩Σ) and [σ]R ∩ Σ′ = havocX([σ]R ∩Σ′)
and [σ]R ∩ [σ]R′ = havocX([σ]R ∩ [σ]R′) by applying (3b) of lemma 5.4.8,
and hence that for any σ ∈ dom(R′′), [σ]R′′ = havocX([σ]R′′). Thus, x ∉
αL(R) ∪ αL(R′) Ô⇒ x ∉ αL(R F R′), which by the contrapositive means
that αL(R FR′) ⊆ αL(R) ∪ αL(R′).
Lemma 6.2.5. For any expression e and PER φ over the values of e, αL(e ∶ φ) ⊆
FV (e).
Proof. Take any variable x ∈Var such that x ∉ FV (e), it is clear that the value of
e at any state σ ∈ Σ is independent of the value of x in that state. That is, for any
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σ′ ∈ havocX({σ}), σ′(e) = σ(e), where X = {x}. Since a PER is reflexive on its
domain, we have that for any possible values v, v′ of e such that v φ v′ holds, then
v φ v holds and thus if σ(e) = v, then for all σ′ ∈ havocX({σ}), σ′(e) = v. Hence,
for any σ ∈ dom(e ∶ φ), [σ]e∶φ = havocX([σ]e∶φ), which means that x ∉ αL(e ∶ φ).
Thus, x ∉ FV (e) Ô⇒ x ∉ αL(e ∶ φ). Therefore, by the contrapositive, we have
αL(e ∶ φ) ⊆ FV (e).
Proposition 6.2.6. For any Z ⊆ Var, and x ∈ Var, and R ∈ PER(Σ), we have
that αL(↑ZR) ⊆ αL(R)/Z, and αL(
x∶=e
↝
R ) ⊆ αL(R) ∪ {x}.
Proof. We know from the definition that for any σ ∈ dom(↑ZR), there exist Σ ⊆
dom(R) such that [σ]↑ZR = ⋃σ′∈Σ havocZ([σ′]R). Furthermore, we know that,
by definition, for any σ′ ∈ Σ, ∆(havocZ([σ′]R)) ⊆ ∆([σ′]R)/Z and hence by
applying lemma 6.2.2, ∆([σ]↑ZR) ⊆ ⋃σ′∈Σ∆([σ′]R)/Z and, therefore, αL(↑ZR) ⊆
αL(R)/Z.
Now let X = {x} and let R′ =
x∶=e
↝
R . By definition, for any σ ∈ dom(R′),
there exist Σ ⊆ dom(R) such that [σ]R′ = ⋃σ′∈Σ{σ′′[x ↦ σ′′(e)] ∣ σ′′ ∈ [σ′]R}.
Since {σ′′[x↦ σ′′(e)] ∣σ′′ ∈ [σ′]R} is obtained from [σ′]R by modifying x alone,
we have that ∆({σ′′[x ↦ σ′′(e)] ∣ σ′′ ∈ [σ′]R}) ⊆ ∆([σ′]R) ∪ {x}. Hence, by





Lemma 6.2.7. For any (E, I,O) ∈ Φ, we have that αL(flow(e ∶ φ, (E, I,O))) ⊆
(⋃x∈FV (e)αL(E(x)) ∪ FV (e) ∪ αL(I))/TVar.
Proof. The definition of flow(e ∶ φ, (E, I,O)) is the PER ↑TVarR, where R =
e ∶ φ⊔I⊔RE and ∀σ,σ′ ∈Σ, σREσ′ ⇐⇒ σ,σ′ ∈ dom(⊔x∈FV (e)E(x)). By apply-
ing proposition 6.2.3 and lemma 6.2.4, we know that αL(RE) = ∆(dom(RE)) ⊆
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⋃x∈FV (e)αL(E(x)). Furthermore, by lemma 6.2.5, αL(e ∶ φ) ⊆ FV (e). Hence,
by lemma 6.2.4 and proposition 6.2.6, we have αL(↑TVarR) ⊆ αL(R)/TVar ⊆
(⋃x∈FV (e)αL(E(x)) ∪ FV (e) ∪ αL(I))/TVar.
Lemma 6.2.8. Let z ∈ TVar and let X = TVar/{z}. For any (E, I,O) ∈ Φ,
αL(aflow(z ∶= e, (E, I,O))) ⊆ (⋃x∈FV (e)αL(E(x)) ∪ FV (e) ∪ αL(I) ∪ {z}) /X .
Proof. By definition aflow(z ∶= e, (E, I,O)) = ↑X
z∶=e
↝
R , where R = e ∶ φ ⊔ I ⊔
RE and ∀σ,σ′ ∈ Σ, σ RE σ′ ⇐⇒ σ,σ′ ∈ dom(⊔x∈FV (e)E(x)). By applying
proposition 6.2.3 and lemma 6.2.2, we know that αL(RE) = ∆(dom(RE)) ⊆
⋃x∈FV (e)αL(E(x)). Furthermore, by lemma 6.2.5, αL(e ∶ φ) ⊆ FV (e). Hence,
by lemma 6.2.4 we have αL(R) ⊆ ⋃x∈FV (e)αL(E(x)) ∪ FV (e) ∪ αL(I). By
proposition 6.2.6 we have αL(↑X
z∶=e
↝
R ) ⊆ αL(
z∶=e
↝
R )/X ⊆ αL(R)/X ∪ {z}. How-
ever, since z ∉ X , then we have that αL(↑X
z∶=e
↝
R ) ⊆ (αL(R) ∪ {z})/X . Hence,
αL(aflow(z ∶= e, (E, I,O))) ⊆ (⋃x∈FV (e)αL(E(x)) ∪ FV (e) ∪ αL(I) ∪ {z}) /X .
Corollary 6.2.9. Let (E, I,O) ∈ Φ and ⟨E′, I ′,O′⟩ ∈ [Var→ L2] ×L2 ×L2 such
that for all x ∈ Var, αL(E(x)) ⊆ α∪(E′(x)) and αL(I) ⊆ α∪(I ′), then for any
expression over variables in Var we have that αL(aflow(z ∶= e, (E, I,O))) ⊆
⋃x∈FV (e)α∪(E′(x)) ∪ α∪(I ′) ∪FV (e) ∪ {z}.
Proof. The proof follows easily from lemma 6.2.8 since for all x ∈Var, αL(E(x)) ⊆
α∪(E′(x)) and αL(I) ⊆ α∪(I ′).
215
6.2.2 Semantics-Based Dependency Analysis
Let us now demonstrate how PERs in the static analysis of Chapter 5 semanti-
cally encode variable dependencies. Suppose h1, h2 ∈ {0,1} are input variables
to the program write e, where e ≜ h1 XOR h2 is the exclusive OR of h1 and h2.
The PER e ∶ id ≡ {{(0,0), (1,1)},{(0,1), (1,0)}} represents1 the information re-
leased by writee, whose analysis is given by (E, I,O)writee(E, I, e ∶ id)
(recall from Chapter 5 that for all x ∈Var,E(x) = I = O = all). It is thus clear
that the output of this program depends on both h1 and h2. This is shown by
the fact that αL(e ∶ id) = {h1, h2}, which is the dependency information released
to the output as encoded by the O-component of post-configuration of the static
analysis.
Now consider another expression e ≜ h1 +h2 −h2, where h1 and h2 are natural
numbers, where state is a pair of the form (h1, h2). Then, we obtain e ∶ id ≡
{{(n,m) ∣m ∈ N} ∣ n ∈ N}, and thus αL(e ∶ id) = {h1}, which shows that e’s
value is dependent on h1 but independent of h2. Thus, by using the dependency
abstraction αL on the PER e ∶ id induced by the evaluation of an expression e, we
can obtain a more precise (semantics-based) dependency abstraction of e on its
free variable, namely αL(e ∶ id) ⊆ FV (e). This is as opposed to the usual static
interpretation FV (e), which approximates the dependency of e as the set of free
variables of e.
Similarly to the treatment of outputs as demonstrated by the examples above,
we can derive a more precise dependency that is propagated during assignment to
the assigned variable from the PERs in the E-components of information config-
1This notation for PER representation, using the set of equivalence classes was introduced in
Chapter 5.
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urations. Consider the expression e ≜ h1+h2−h2 again, and the assignment l ∶= e,
under the pre-configuration (E, I,O), then we have the post-configuration (E, I,O),
whereE = E[l ↦ R] and (now representing state as triples of the form (h1, h2, l))
R ≡ {{(n,m,n) ∣m ∈ N} ∣ n ∈ N}. Hence αL(E(l)) = {l, h1}, which means again
that l depends on h1 but not on h2. The meaning of l in αL(E(l)) can be ex-
plained by the fact that R encodes the equality of h1 and l and since R contains
information about h1 it therefore also contains information about l.
The abstract analysis of implicit information flow due to control dependency
is the same by considering the abstraction of the I-component of information con-
figurations. Consider the programs of Figure 6.1. Again in this example state is
represented by triples of the form (h1, h2, l) and the variables are assumed to be
natural numbers. First, consider the left-hand-side program. Starting the analy-
sis at the pre-configuration (E, I,O), we have the implicit context in the then
branch as the PER I1 = ((h1 = h2) ∶ T) ≡ {{(n,n,m) ∣ n,m ∈ N}} and hence
αL(I1) = {h1, h2} showing the dependency on h1 and h2. Similarly, for the else
branch, the implicit context is I2 = ((h1 = h2) ∶ F) ≡ {{(n,n′,m) ∣ n,n′,m ∈
N, n′ ≠ n}} and hence αL(I2) = {h1, h2}. This implicit dependency is prop-
agated to l due to the assignments in the conditional branch. This is reflected
by the fact that the post-configuration of the if statement is (E, I,O), where
E = E[l ↦ R] and R ≡ {{(n,n,1) ∣ n ∈ N},{(n,n′,2) ∣ n,n′ ∈ N, n′ ≠ n}}.
Thus, αL(E(l)) = {h1, h2, l}. It is also clear that the output depends on h1 and
h2 on line 5 since (E, I,O)write l (E, I,O), where O ≡ {{(n,n,m) ∣n,m ∈
N},{(n,n′,m) ∣ n,n′,m ∈ N, n′ ≠ n}} and hence αL(O) = {h1, h2}.
The right-hand-side program of Figure 6.1 demonstrates flow sensitivity. In
this program, on line 5, the post-configuration (E, I,O) of the conditional state-
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ment in the previous example now serves as the pre-configuration of the assign-
ment as (E, I,O)l ∶= 3(E′, I,O), whereE′ = E[l ↦ R′] andR′ ≡ {{(n,n,3)∣n ∈
N},{(n,n′,3) ∣n,n′ ∈ N, n ≠ n′}}. Hence, the analysis of the following statement
is (E′, I,O) write l (E′, I,O′), where O′ ≡ {{(n,m,m′) ∣ n,m,m′ ∈ N}},
which shows that no information is released since αL(O′) = ∅.
i f ( h1 = h2) then
l ∶= 1;
e l s e
l ∶= 2;
w r i t e l;
1 i f ( h1 = h2) then
2 l ∶= 1;
3 e l s e
4 l ∶= 2;
5 l ∶= 3;
6 w r i t e l;
Figure 6.1: Dependency Analysis and Flow Sensitivity
6.2.3 Disjunctive Dependency, Nontermination, Dead Code
It was shown in Definition 3.5.9 how a PER over program states may describe
disjunctive information. A restatement of this definition in terms of variable de-
pendency is captured by the abstraction αL2 , which extracts the corresponding
disjunctive dependency. We say that a PER R contains disjunctive dependency
about variables x, y ∈ Var if αL2(R) represents a disjunctive dependency (see
Definition 6.2.1) about these variables. The intended meaning is that a PER R,
which contains disjunctive dependency about x and y does not reveal information
about x and y simultaneously. Consider the program listing in Figure 6.2, and
let us assume that l, h1, h2 ∈ IVar, and that l has a boolean data type, whereas
h1 and h2 are integers. The program either reveals the value of secret h1 or the
parity of secret h2 but never both at the same time - even if the attacker has con-
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trol over the choice of l. Thus, information is released about at most one of h1
and h2 during any given run. The analysis shows this, and consequently the in-
duced PER demonstrates the disjunctive dependency of the observed output on
h1 or h2. Let the program of Figure 6.2 be P , then its analysis is given by
(E, I,O) P (E, I,O), where O ≡ {{(n,m, tt) ∣ m ∈ Z},{(m,n,ff) ∣ m ∈
Z, n mod 2 = 0},{(m,n,ff) ∣m ∈ Z, n mod 2 = 1} ∣ n ∈ Z}. Hence, αL2(O) =
{{h1, l},{h2, l}} showing that O contains disjunctive dependency about h1 and
h2, that is, the output value of the program does not at any time depend on both
h1 and h2.
i f (l) then
write h1;
e l s e
write h2 mod 2;
Figure 6.2: Disjunctive Dependency
The semantic nature of the information flow analysis means that the PER ab-
stractions also capture when the value of a secret input affects termination be-
haviour. Furthermore, non-termination of a subprogram prevents further infor-
mation from being released in the trailing subprogram, because the program that
trails the diverging subprogram cannot be executed. These properties are illus-
trated in the dependency abstraction of the analysis of the program listing of Fig-
ure 6.3 (h1 is boolean and h2 is integer), where whenever h1 = tt the program
diverges, but the program terminates otherwise (that is, whenever h1 = ff ). Ap-
plying the flow rules and starting the program analysis with the pre-configuration
(E, I,O), the post-configuration of the while statement is (E,∅,O), where ac-
cording to the while rule the resulting implicit context is the empty PER, and also
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E(h1) = E(h2) = ∅ and O ≡ {{(tt, n) ∣n ∈ Z},{(ff , n) ∣n ∈ Z}}. Hence, we have
(E,∅,O) write h2 (E,∅,O) since O F flow(h2 ∶ id, (E,∅,O)) = O F ∅ = O.
Finally, applying the if rule, we obtain the post-configuration of the if statement
is (E′, h1 ∶ F,O), where E′(h1) = E′(h2) = h1 ∶ F. Now, the PER O shows that
the attacker only gains information about h1, but not h2, since αL2(O) = {{h1}}.
This is because, semantically, the write statement is dead code.
i f (h1) then
whi l e ( tt) do
s k i p ;
write h2;
e l s e
s k i p ;
Figure 6.3: Nontermination and Dependency
Another dead code example is if(h1 ≠ h1)then write h2 else skip,
where the dependency analysis shows that the attacker gains no information about
h1 or h2. This is because (h1 ≠ h1) ∶ T = ∅, which means the branch is never exe-
cuted. In fact, suppose this program isP , then we have that (E, I,O)P (E, I,O)
showing that the attacker gains nothing since αL(O) = ∅.
6.2.4 A Dependency Type System
We now present a type system that computes program dependency, and which im-
proves on existing flow-sensitive dependency type systems such as [AB04, HS06].
The improvements are in the identification of some disjunctive dependencies, ter-
mination sensitivity, and interactive outputs. This type system is shown to be
a sound abstraction of the information flow analysis of Chapter 5. Later on, in
220
section 6.4, we shall look at a technique that takes advantage of the dependency
abstraction of PERs to improve the precision of the dependency analysis.
For the analysis we shall use dependency configurations, as we did with infor-
mation configurations, to track dependencies. The analysis is performed over the
lattice L2 to identify disjunctive dependencies. Thus, a dependency configuration
is a typing environment which assigns dependencies to variables, the “program
counter”, and outputs; and is written in the form ⟨E, I,O⟩, where E ∶Var→ L2,
and I,O ∈ L2. The interpretation of the dependency of a variable x on the initial
values of program input under the configuration ⟨E, I,O⟩ is given by α∪(E(x)).
Similarly, the interpretations of the dependency of the implicit context and the
output under this configuration are α∪(I) and α∪(O) respectively.
Typing judgement are of the form ⟨E, I,O⟩ c ⟨E′, I ′,O′⟩, which represents
how the While command c transforms dependencies. Under a dependency config-
uration ⟨E, I,O⟩, the dependency typing judgement for an expression e is given
by
E ⊢ e ∶ t ⇐⇒ t = ⊔
x∈FV (e)
E(x). (6.3)
Definition (6.3) is fairly standard in dependency analyses, but more precise anal-
yses can be performed as demonstrated later by the semantic typing judgement of
(6.6), which uses PERs to compute expression types.
The full algorithmic dependency type system, which computes input depen-
dencies is shown in Figure 6.4. In the typing rules, the operation F on dependency
configurations is defined for any pair of dependency configurations ⟨E1, I1,O1⟩
and ⟨E2, I2,O2⟩ as ⟨E1, I1,O1⟩F⟨E2, I2,O2⟩ ≜ ⟨E′, I1 ∪ I2,O1 ∪O2⟩, where for all
x ∈Var,E′(x) = E1(x)∪E2(x). The dependency configurations are partially or-
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dered by ⊑+, such that ⟨E1, I1,O1⟩⊑+⟨E2, I2,O2⟩ iff for all x ∈ Var,E1(x) ⊆ E2(x)
and I1 ⊆ I2 and O1 ⊆ O2. Furthermore, the predicate W (c) on a command c
holds if c contains a conditional while statement. Similarly to the concrete anal-
ysis presented in Chapter 5, the implicit context can encode information about
branching and termination. In particular, after a while statement, the execution of
subsequent programs is dependent on the termination or not of the preceding while
statement. This information about termination dependency on program variables
is encoded in the I-component of the dependency configuration. The termination
dependency is calculated in the post-condition of the while statement by taking a
join with the dependency of the boolean guard at the fixpoint. The possibility of
information flow due to a non-terminating branch is also derived in the analysis
of if statements by checking for the presence of while statements in the branches
and retaining the dependency of the implicit context as necessary. Let us illustrate
the dependency type system with some examples.
6.2.5 Sample Analyses
We define a starting configuration ⟨Eα , Iα ,Oα ⟩ for dependency analyses, such
that for all x ∈ Var, Eα (x) = {{x}} and Iα = Oα = {∅}. The interpretation of
⟨Eα , Iα ,Oα ⟩ is that the execution of the program starts at a dependency configu-
ration where each variable depends only on its own initial value, but the implicit
context and output have no initial dependency.
Consider the program listing of Figure 6.5. By applying the if rule at the
starting configuration ⟨Eα , Iα ,Oα ⟩ we obtain the implicit dependency I1 = {{l}},
sinceEα ⊢ l ∶ {{l}}. Thus, the then branch analysis is ⟨Eα ,{{l}},Oα ⟩z ∶= h1⟨E1,{{l}},Oα ⟩,
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⟨E, I,O⟩ skip ⟨E, I,O⟩
E ⊢ e ∶ t
⟨E, I,O⟩ x ∶= e ⟨E[x ↦ I ⊔ t], I,O⟩
E ⊢ e ∶ t
⟨E, I,O⟩ write e ⟨E, I,O ⊔ I ⊔ t⟩
⟨E, I,O⟩ c1 ⟨E′, I ′,O′⟩ ⟨E′, I ′,O′⟩ c2 ⟨E′′, I ′′,O′′⟩
⟨E, I,O⟩ c1; c2 ⟨E′′, I ′′,O′′⟩
E ⊢ b ∶ t ⟨E, I ⊔ t,O⟩ ci ⟨Ei, Ii,Oi⟩ i = 1,2





Ii if W (ci)
I otherwise
⟨Ei, Ii,Oi⟩ if(b)then c else skip ⟨E′i+1, I ′i+1,O′i+1⟩




i+1⟩ F ⟨Ei, Ii,Oi⟩
∀x ∈Var,E′(x) = E′′(x) ⊔ I ′ O′ = O′′ ⊔ I ′
⟨E, I,O⟩ while (b) do c ⟨E′, I ′,O′⟩
⟨E0, I0,O0⟩ = ⟨E, I,O⟩
⟨E′′, I ′′,O′′⟩ = sqcupplusi≥0 ⟨Ei, Ii,Oi⟩
E′′ ⊢ b ∶ t, I ′ = I ′′ ⊔ t
Figure 6.4: An Algorithmic Dependency Type System
where E1 = Eα [z ↦ {{h1, l}}]. Similarly, for the else branch we have the analysis
⟨Eα ,{{l}},Oα ⟩z ∶= h2⟨E2,{{l}},Oα ⟩, whereE2 = Eα [z ↦ {{h2, l}}]. The post-
condition of the if statement is thus ⟨E1, Iα ,Oα ⟩ F ⟨E2, Iα ,Oα ⟩ = ⟨E3, Iα ,Oα ⟩,
where we have E3(z) = {{h1, l},{h2, l}}. The meaning of E3(z) is that after the
if statement, z either depends on l and h1 or it depends on l and h2. However, z is
disjunctively dependent on h1 and h2 since it is never at any one time dependent
on both h1 and h2. By applying the write rule, for the next statement we now
obtain ⟨E3, Iα ,Oα ⟩ write z ⟨E3, Iα ,O3⟩, where O3 = {{h1, l},{h2, l}} - which
means that the attacker gains information at most about l and h1 or l and h2 at any
one time.
Now consider the program (P ) shown in listing of Figure 6.6, which is similar
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i f ( l) then
z ∶= h1;
e l s e
z ∶= h2;
w r i t e z;
Figure 6.5: Assignments and Disjunctive Dependency
to the program of Figure 6.5 by replacing the assignments with write statements.
We now obtain ⟨E, I,O⟩P ⟨E, I,O3⟩. Thus, the program releases the same infor-
mation to the attacker as in the previous example, where the attacker (O3) either
gains information about h1 and l or h2 and l but the attacker cannot learn about h1
and h2 in the same run of the program.
i f ( l) then
w r i t e h1;
e l s e
w r i t e h2;
Figure 6.6: Outputs and Disjunctive Dependency
The static analysis is termination-sensitive. To demonstrate this, consider the
program of Figure 6.7, where a choice of h1 may lead to program divergence,
revealing information about h1 and also about l because nontermination reveals
which branch of the conditional if statement has been executed.
i f ( l) then
whi l e (h1) do
s k i p ;
e l s e
w r i t e h2;
Figure 6.7: Nontermination and Dependency
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Again, starting with the dependency configuration ⟨Eα , Iα ,Oα ⟩, the analysis
of the while statement is ⟨Eα , I1,Oα ⟩ while (h1) do skip ⟨E1, I ′1,O1⟩, where
I1 = {{l}} and I ′1 = {{l, h1}}, and for all x ∈Var,E1(x) = Eα (x)⊔ {{l, h1}} and
O1 = {{l, h1}}. The interpretation of O1 is that the attacker now gains information
about h1 (due to the possibility of nontermination) and l (due to the knowledge
of the path taken when the program diverges). The possibility of nontermination
along a path containing a while statement means that the value that a variable takes
after the while statement now depends on whether the while terminates or not,
which in turn depends on how the boolean guard of the while evaluates. Hence,
for any x ∈ Var, E1(x) reflects the possible dependency of the value of x on the
while guard, that is h1, and on l because of the fact that the execution of the then
branch is dependent on l.
For the else branch we have the analysis ⟨Eα , I1,Oα ⟩ write h2 ⟨Eα , I1,O2⟩,
where O2 = {{l, h2}}. The meaning of the dependency of O2 is clear since an
output from this program reveals the value of h2 and also reveals how l evalu-
ates. Hence, the post-condition of the if statement is ⟨E′, I ′1,O′⟩ = ⟨E1, I ′1,O1⟩ F
⟨Eα , Iα ,O2⟩. Since O′ = {{l, h1},{l, h2}}, the attacker may gain information
about l and h1 or about l and h2. The implicit context I ′1 of the if post-condition
also shows that the execution of commands after the if statement may depend on
the termination of the then branch and hence on l and h1.
The next example demonstrates the flow-sensitivity of the type system. Con-
sider the program listing of Figure 6.8, which does not reveal the secret h. Starting
at the configuration ⟨Eα , Iα ,Oα ⟩, the dependency of z after the first assignment
is {{h}} (which means that z depends on h at that point) and after the second
assignment the dependency of z is ∅ which means that z’s value is independent
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of any input value. Finally, we have ⟨Eα [z ↦ ∅], Iα ,Oα ⟩ write z ⟨E′′, Iα ,Oα ⟩
showing that the attacker gains no information about the secret input h.
z ∶= h;
z ∶= 0;
w r i t e z;
Figure 6.8: Flow-Sensitivity of Dependency Analysis
6.2.6 Correctness of Dependency Analysis
We now show the correctness of the dependency analysis by proving that it is a
sound abstraction of the semantics-based information flow analysis of Chapter 5,
whose correctness has been shown. This is a standard technique. Firstly, we
define an abstraction function from information configurations (Φ) introduced in
Chapter 5 to the dependency configurationsΦL ≜ [Var→ L] ×L ×L over L, and
show that the dependency computation over ΦL is a sound approximation of the
semantic analysis over Φ. The dependency configurations in ΦL are ordered by
⊑, which is the subset inclusion order applied in the usual way, such that for any
⟨E, I,O⟩, ⟨E′, I ′,O′⟩ ∈ ΦL, ⟨E, I,O⟩ ⊑ ⟨E′, I ′,O′⟩ iff ∀x ∈ Var, E(x) ⊆ E′(x)
and I ⊆ I ′ and O ⊆ O′.
The dependency analysis of Figure 6.4 is carried out over the dependency con-
figurations ΦL2 ≜ [Var → L2] × L2 ×L2, which is ordered by ⊑+ such that for any
⟨E, I,O⟩, ⟨E′, I ′,O′⟩ ∈ ΦL2 , ⟨E, I,O⟩⊑+⟨E′, I ′,O′⟩ iff ∀x ∈ Var, E(x) ⊆ E′(x)
and I ⊆ I ′ and O ⊆ O′. However, we only want to show that the dependency
computation is a correct abstraction of the concrete analysis of Chapter 5, but we
do not want to model the disjunctive aspect. It appears to be the case that the
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dependency type system also correctly abstracts the disjunctive information flow
model of Chapter 5, but we have not proved this. For the dependency analysis
correctness, we will extend αL2 and α∪ respectively to information configura-
tions and dependency configurations. This is defined for any (E, I,O) ∈ Φ as
αL2((E, I,O)) = ⟨E′, I ′,O′⟩, where for all x ∈Var,E′(x) = αL2(E(x))⊔{{x}}
and I ′ = αL2(I) andO′ = αL2(O). The interpretation of the extension of αL2 to in-
formation configuration means that every variable x depends also on its own value.
Similarly, the extension of α∪ to ΦL2 is defined such that for any ⟨E, I,O⟩ ∈ΦL2 ,
α∪(⟨E, I,O⟩) = ⟨E′, I ′,O′⟩, where for all x ∈Var, E′(x) = α∪(E(x)) ∪ {x} and
I ′ = α∪(I) and O′ = α∪(O). The extension of the abstraction function αL to infor-
mation configurations is now given by the composition of the extended functions:
αL = α∪ ○ αL2 . Hopefully, it will be clear from the context when we are referring
to the abstraction functions in Definition 6.2.1 or their extensions to information
or dependency configurations.
The statement of correctness is familiar from abstract interpretation.
Theorem 6.2.10. Let P be a While program, which does not modify its IVar pro-
jection of states and which properly-initialises all its TVar variables before use
as required by the concrete analysis of information flow (E, I,O)P (E, I,O).
Let ⟨E0, I0,O0⟩ ∈ ΦL2 , such that αL2((E, I,O))⊑+⟨E0, I0,O0⟩, then the ab-
stract dependency analysis ⟨E0, I0,O0⟩ P ⟨E′, I ′,O′⟩ of P satisfies the property
αL((E, I,O)) ⊑ α∪(⟨E′, I ′,O′⟩).
Proof. The proof proceeds by structural induction on the derivation trees. The in-
ductive step of the proof is that ifP = P0; . . . ;Pm; such that for any n ≤m,Pn is ei-
ther a skip statement, or an assignment, or a write statement, or a conditional if or
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while statement, and such that the inductive property holds for P0; . . . ;Pn−1, then it
holds also for P0; . . . ;Pn. Now suppose (E, I,O)P0; . . . ;Pn−1 (E1, I1,O1) and
(E1, I1,O1)Pn(E2, I2,O2) hold as the concrete analyses of these programs and let



















be their respective dependency analyses. We know by the induction hypothe-










1 ⟩, but we need to







• The proof when Pn is the skip statement is clear.
• Let Pn be the assignment statement z ∶= e, where z ∈ TVar, then we
have the concrete analysis of Pn as (E1, I1,O1) z ∶= e (E2, I1,O1), where
E2 = E1[z ↦ aflow(z ∶= e, (E1, I1,O1))]. Hence, it remains to show that
αL(E2(z)) ∪ {z} ⊆ EL2 (z) = α∪(E
L2
2 (z)) ∪ {z}. Let X = TVar/{z}. We
know thatαL(E2(z)) ⊆ (⋃x∈FV (e)αL(E1(x)) ∪FV (e) ∪αL(I1) ∪ {z}) /X
from lemma 6.2.8. Since P does not assign to IVar variables, we know that
for all x ∈ IVar,{{x}} ⊆ EL21 (x) since the starting dependency configura-
tion ofP has the property that ⟨Eα , Iα ,Oα ⟩ = αL2((E, I,O))⊑+⟨E0, I0,O0⟩.
Hence, ifEL21 ⊢ e ∶ t and Y = IVar∩FV (e), then we know that⋃x∈FV (e) α∪(E
L2
1 )∪
Y ⊆ α∪(t). By the induction hypothesis we know that for all x ∈Var, αL(E1(x))∪
{x} ⊆ α∪(E
L2
1 (x)) ∪ {x} and αL(I1) ⊆ α∪(I
L2
1 ), hence since z ∉ X , we





1 )∪ {z})/X ⊆ α∪(t)∪α∪(I
L2
1 )∪ {z} =
α∪(EL22 (z))∪{z}. By this we obtain the required property that αL(E2(z))∪
{z} ⊆ EL2 (z) = α∪(E
L2
2 (z)) ∪ {z}.
• Let Pn be the statement write e, whose concrete information flow anal-
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ysis is (E1, I1,O1) write e (E2, I2,O2). By lemma 6.2.7 we know that
αL(flow(e ∶ id, (E1, I1,O1))) ⊆ (⋃x∈FV (e)αL(E1(x))∪FV (e)∪αL(I1))/TVar.
By the induction hypothesis we have that for all x ∈ Var, αL(E1(x)) ∪
{x} ⊆ α∪(E
L2
1 (x)) ∪ {x} and αL(I1) ⊆ α∪(I
L2
1 ). Furthermore, suppose
EL21 ⊢ e ∶ t. Since P does not assign to IVar variables, we know that
for all x ∈ IVar,{{x}} ⊆ EL21 (x), and hence Y = IVar ∩ FV (e) ⊆
⋃x∈FV (e)α∪(E
L2










1 ). Since O2 = O1 F flow(e ∶ id, (E1, I1,O1)), and by the
induction hypothesis αL(O1) ⊆ α∪(OL21 ), then by applying lemma 6.2.4
we know that αL(O2) ⊆ αL(O1) ∪ αL(flow(e ∶ id, (E1, I1,O1))) ⊆ OL2 =
α∪(OL21 ) ∪ α∪(t) ∪ α∪(I
L2
1 ).
• Let Pn be if (b) then c1 else c2. Suppose EL21 ⊢ b ∶ t, we observe by in-

















1 ⟩) since by applying lemma 6.2.7 we know that the
property αL(flow(b ∶ φ, (E1, I1,O1))) ⊆ α∪(t)∪α∪(IL21 ) holds for any PER
φ over booleans. Hence, by applying the induction hypothesis to c1 and
c2 we know that the post-configuration of the if statement has the required
property, in particular, since the operation F over dependency configurations
preserves set union on the lattice L.
• Let Pn be while (b) do c. The proof of while rule is similar to the if rule
by applying the induction hypothesis to the derivation tree of Pn. Further-
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more, since by the definition of F forms an increasing chain on the lattice of
dependency configurations we know that the fixpoint of the while analysis
exists and is reached in a finite number of steps because ΦL2 is a finite, and
therefore complete, lattice due to the finiteness of the set Var.
The base case of the inductive proof, before any command is processed, holds
vacuously since for any ⟨E0, I0,O0⟩ such that αL2((E, I,O))⊑+⟨E0, I0,O0⟩, and
we have also that αL((E, I,O)) ⊑ α∪(⟨E0, I0,O0⟩).
6.3 Flow-Sensitive Type Systems
A flow-sensitive type system is presented in [HS06], which deems more pro-
grams secure than traditional flow-insensitive noninterference security type sys-
tems, such as [VSI96]. The family of type systems proposed in [HS06] is parametrised
by an arbitrarily chosen finite flow lattice. When the flow lattice is chosen to be the
powerset lattice of program variables, the type system is the De-Morgan dual of
the independency type system of [AB04]. While the type system of [AB04] com-
putes independencies between variables, the type system of [HS06] more directly
computes variable dependencies under the powerset lattice of program variables.
A command typing judgement in [HS06] has the following form
p ⊢LHS Γ {c} Γ
′. (6.4)
This describes how the command c transforms type environments (Γ to Γ′) under
a given context p. The inference system (⊢LHS) is parametric to a chosen finite
lattice LHS, and the type environments Γ,Γ′, . . . are maps from the set Var of
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variables to the lattice LHS. The implicit context type p ∈ LHS records the type of
a program point, and is used to eliminate implicit flows. For an expression e over
Var, the type derivation under the environment Γ is given by:
Γ ⊢LHS e ∶ t ⇐⇒ t = ⊔
x∈FV (e)
Γ(x). (6.5)
Although we can equally choose any arbitrary finite flow lattice under our depen-
dency approach, we shall choose the powerset lattice of Var to compare our type
system with that of [HS06] such that LHS = L = P(Var). The (algorithmic) type
system2 of [HS06] is presented in Figure 6.9.
Skip
p ⊢ Γ {skip} Γ
Assign Γ ⊢ e ∶ t
p ⊢ Γ {x ∶= e} Γ[x↦ p ⊔ t]
Seqp ⊢ Γ {c1} Γ
′ p ⊢ Γ′ {c2} Γ′′
p ⊢ Γ {c1; c2} Γ′′
If
Γ ⊢ b ∶ t p ⊔ t ⊢ Γ {ci} Γ′i i = 1,2
p ⊢ Γ {if (b) then c1 else c2} Γ′








i 0 ≤ i ≤ n
p ⊢ Γ {while (b) do c} Γ′n






Figure 6.9: Hunt-Sands Flow-Sensitive Type Rules (Algorithmic Version)
6.3.1 Comparing the Type Systems
The typing environment Γ serves a similar purpose to the E-environment of our
dependency configurations by considering the union α∪(E(x)) as the type of vari-
2The inference system (⊢LHS) of Figure 6.9 has not been parametrised by the choice of flow
lattice with the hope that the choice is clear from the context.
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able x under Γ. Furthermore, the “program counter” type p achieves the same
objective as our I-component of dependency configuration to rule out implicit
information flow. With the exception of the write construct in our analyses, the
main differences between our type system and that of [HS06] lie in the treatment
of while statements and in the detection of some disjunctive dependencies. We im-
prove on the type system of [HS06] by detecting some disjunctive dependencies
and by accounting for possible information release due to termination-sensitivity.
To illustrate the similarity, it is easy to see that for any while program, which
does not have a write statement or while statement, we have the property that
under any type environment Γ, and flow lattice L, and context p such that for
all x ∈ Var,Γ(x) = α∪(E(x)) and p = α∪(I), then p ⊢L Γ {P} Γ′ holds iff
⟨E, I,O⟩ P ⟨E′, I,O⟩ holds and Γ′(x) = α∪(E′(x)).
The treatment of while statement is different because the type system of [HS06]
does not take into account the ways in which values of variables may affect a pro-
gram’s termination behaviour. Specifically, our analysis keeps track of the depen-
dencies of the while guard and that of the implicit context in which while statement
is executed as a potential source of information leakage. This dependency is not
thrown away after the fixpoint of the while rule, but is retained in the I-component
of the post-condition, which intuitively means that the execution of statements af-
terwards is dependent on the termination or not of the preceding while statement.
This dependency is also passed on to the E- and O-components since the values
of variables after a while loop depend on the termination behaviour of the while
statement, and the observation of termination or nontermination may reveal the ex-
ecution path to the attacker. To illustrate these observations, consider the program
P ≜ (l ∶= 0; (if(h = 10)then (while (tt) do skip) else skip); l ∶= 1), which
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under the environment Γ where ∀x ∈ Var,Γ(x) = {x} and p = ∅ has the anal-
ysis p ⊢L Γ {P} Γ[l ↦ ∅]. However, the observation of the value of l as 1 on
termination reveals information about h, namely that its value is not 10, which
this analysis does not capture. Under the environment ⟨E, I,O⟩, where ∀x ∈
Var,E(x) = {{x}} and I = O = {∅}, the analysis of P is ⟨E, I,O⟩P ⟨E′, I ′,O′⟩,
where E′(l) = I ′ = O′ = {{h}}. The implicit context I ′ shows the dependency
of P ’s termination on h, and O′ reflects the fact that the attacker may obtain in-
formation about h by observing whether or not the program terminates, and since
the termination of P affects what final value l can take, E′(l) shows the possible
dependency of l on h.
Another area of improvement is in the identification of disjunctive depen-
dencies, where we may want to ensure that an attacker cannot gain informa-
tion about two chosen secrets at any one time. For example, consider the pro-
gram P ′ ≜ if(y)then l ∶= h1 else l = h2. Using Γ, p and ⟨E, I,O⟩ as
given above, we obtain p ⊢L Γ {P ′} Γ[l ↦ {y,h1, h2}] suggesting the possible
dependency of l on y, h1 and h2 on termination of P ′. However, the analysis
⟨E, I,O⟩ P ′ ⟨E[l ↦ {{y,h1},{y,h2}}], I,O⟩ makes explicit the fact that l does
not depend on both h1 and h2 on termination of P ′.
6.4 Improving the Precision of Expression Types
This section shows how to use the abstraction of PERs to improve the typing
judgement for expressions. The typing judgement of (6.3) uses the dependencies
of the free variables of an expression in a given context to compute the depen-
dency of that expression in the context. This approach is traditionally used in
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dependency analyses. However, some free variables in an expression may be ir-
relevant because their values do not affect the final value of the expression. For
example, although h2 is a free variable in the expression h1 +h2 −h2, the value of
the expression is independent of h2. The idea is to take advantage of the semantic
information, which identifies this kind of independency, in the typing judgement
of expressions, thereby improving the accuracy of analysis.
The equivalence relation construct e ∶ id in the information flow analysis of
Chapter 5 already provides us with a way to eliminate irrelevant free variables in
the expression e. Specifically, the abstraction αL(e ∶ id) ⊆ FV (e), which identi-
fies the set of variables that e may depend on in any context, can be used in the
typing judgement of e to provide a more precise analysis. This more precise typ-
ing judgement for the expression e, under a dependency configuration ⟨E, I,O⟩,
is given by
E ⊢ e ∶ t ⇐⇒ t = ⊔
x∈αL(e∶id)
E(x). (6.6)
The dependency αL(e ∶ id) induced by the equivalence relation e ∶ id in (6.6) is the
smallest subset of FV (e), elements of which the evaluation of e depends on un-
der any evaluation context. Using the earlier example, the expression h1 + h2 − h2
is dependent only on the variable h1 and hence αL((h1 + h2 − h2) ∶ id) = {h1}.
However, the expression (h1 −h1)× (h1 +h2) does not depend on any variable, as
shown by the fact that αL(((h1 − h1) × (h1 + h2)) ∶ id) = ∅. Also, for any two ex-
pressions e and e′ that are semantically equal (that is, for all σ ∈ Σ, σ(e) = σ(e′)),
it is easy to show that the boolean expressions e = e′ and e ≠ e′ are indepen-
dent of any variable and this is confirmed by the fact that αL((e = e′) ∶ id) =
αL((e ≠ e′) ∶ id) = ∅. In fact, any constant expression e has the property that
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αL(e ∶ id) = ∅, showing that its value is not dependent on any variable.
Proposition 6.4.1. For any expression e, αL(e ∶ id) ⊆ FV (e).
Proof. Since e ∶ id is an equivalence relation, for any X = {x} ⊆ Var, such that
x ∈ αL(e ∶ id), then by definition there exists σ ∈ Σ where havocX([σ]e∶id) ≠
[σ]e∶id. Since havocX(⋅) is extensive, hence there exists σ′ ∈ havocX([σ]e∶id)
such that σ′ ∉ [σ]e∶id and therefore σ′(e) ≠ σ(e). Since there exists a variation in
the value of x which causes a variation in the value e, then e is dependent on x
and therefore x ∈ FV (e).
The equivalence relation e ∶ id used to compute the dependency of e in (6.6)
enjoys a special status because it is the most informative PER with respect to the
dependency of e in any evaluation context. Formally, this means that for any PER
φ on the set of values of e, αL(e ∶ φ) ⊆ αL(e ∶ id). Furthermore, the abstraction
αL(e ∶ id) is the smallest set of variables under which the value of e remains
invariant when values of variables in this set are fixed. In other words, if a variable
x ∉ αL(e ∶ id), then a variation in the value of x cannot cause a variation in the
value of e.
Proposition 6.4.2. For any expression e and PER φ over the set of possible values
of e we have αL(e ∶ φ) ⊆ αL(e ∶ id). Furthermore, if X = {x} ⊆ Var and
x ∉ αL(e ∶ id), then for all σ,σ′ ∈ Σ such that σ′ ∈ havocX({σ}) we have
σ(e) = σ′(e).
Proof. Take any v ∈ dom(φ), since id is an equivalence relation v ∈ dom(id).
Now let Σv = {σ ∈ Σ ∣ σ(e) = v} be the equivalence class of e ∶ id where e
evaluates to v. Since PERs are reflexive on their domains then we have [σ]e∶φ =
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⋃v∈[σ(e)]φ Σv and hence ∆([σ]e∶φ) ⊆ ⋃v∈[σ(e)]φ ∆(Σv) by applying lemma 6.2.2.
Since the dependency of any equivalence class of e ∶ φ is smaller than the union
of the dependency of some equivalence classes of e ∶ id we have that αL(e ∶ φ) ⊆
αL(e ∶ id).
For the second part of the proof, now take any equivalence class [σ]e∶id of the
equivalence relation e ∶ id, for some σ ∈ Σ, then by definition for all σ1 ∈ [σ]e∶id,
σ1(e) = σ(e). Since x ∉ αL(e ∶ id), then havocX([σ]e∶id) = [σ]e∶id and since
σ ∈ [σ]e∶id then havocX({σ}) ⊆ havocX([σ]e∶id) by the extensivity of havocX(⋅),
it thus follows that for any σ′ ∈ havocX({σ}), σ′ ∈ [σ]e∶id, and hence σ′(e) =
σ(e).
By replacing the definition of ⊢ in the dependency type system of Figure 6.4
with the one given in (6.6) we can thus obtain a more precise analysis by elimi-
nating irrelevant free variables of expressions in typing judgements.
Summary In this chapter we have studied how abstract interpretation techniques
may be used to make the analysis of information flow more tractable by simplify-
ing the analysis space. A dependency analysis, developed in this chapter, which
is an abstract interpretation of the information flow analysis of Chapter 5, demon-
strates the application of the theory of abstract interpretation to information flow
analysis. The dependency analysis, which is termination-sensitive, can also detect
some disjunctive dependencies. To the best of our knowledge, the dependency
analysis is the first to account for information release due to nontermination. A
technique presented in this chapter shows how one can improve the precision of
expression dependency analysis by using PER abstractions induced by expres-
sion evaluations. The next chapter concludes the thesis with further examples and
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This chapter presents further examples, which illustrate the use of the modelling
and analysis techniques presented in this thesis. Examples such as models of au-
thentication, encryption, and statistical analysis are considered to highlight both
the theoretical and practical aspects of policy development, and the security anal-
yses of programs against such policies. The Chapter concludes with a review of
the main contributions and achievements of the thesis and identifies possible areas
of future work.
7.1 Policies for Authentication
Authentication is a fundamental security operation in many systems as the basis
of access control. However, by definition, authentication reveals some informa-
tion about secrets because, for example, a failed password authentication attempt
reveals what the password is not. Due to the necessity to release some informa-
tion about secrets, noninterference cannot be used as a policy for authentication.
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We shall therefore study information release policies for authentication, which en-
sures that only the intended information release is possible in the implementation
of the authentication program.
We start by considering an archetypal password authentication program, which
demonstrates the release of information about the stored secret. Clearly a real im-
plementation will be different and may perform additional steps, but the core step
which is of concern to us is the part where the user-supplied password (u) is com-
pared with a password (p), which has been previously stored1 in the system and
is supposed to be known only to the legitimate user. These secrets (or their im-
ages) are then compared for equality: if there is a match, the user is authenticated,
otherwise the authentication fails. A program modelling the authentication step
is shown in Figure 7.1, if the passwords match an output of 1 is produced and
otherwise an output of 2 signals authentication failure.
1 i f (u = p) then
2 w r i t e 1 ; // authenticated
3 e l s e
4 w r i t e 2 ; // not authenticated
Figure 7.1: A Model of Authentication
Intuitively, the authentication program is only allowed to reveal whether the
user-supplied password matches the stored password or not. The actual informa-
tion gained by the attacker during the authentication process however depends
on what the attacker knows. On one hand, if the attacker does not know the user-
supplied password (say by observing someone being authenticated, but cannot see
1In many modern operating systems a password is not directly stored, but its image, which is
usually a secure hash of the password itself. The authentication process involves checking the hash
of the user-supplied password against the hash of the stored password. In Unix-based systems,
salts are also used in order to make dictionary attacks less successful [MT79, Kle90, PS02].
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the value that is being entered), the attacker should not learn anything about the
password, regardless of the outcome of the authentication. On the other hand, if
the attacker knows the supplied password (say, by looking over the shoulder of
the user or by entering a guess himself or herself), the attacker can learn at most
that the password is equal to the (known) value or not. We can represent this
information flow with PERs.
The information released by the password test can be represented by the equiv-
alence relation (p = u) ∶ id, which relates only the states where the values of p and
u both agree or both disagree. Thus, the desired information flow policy for au-
thentication is Pauth = {fauth ∣R ∈ PER(Σ), fauth(R) ≜ R ⊔ ((p = u) ∶ id)}, which
allows the attacker to observe only whether the passwords match or not. Now let
the program of Figure 7.1 be P , then the analysis, (E, I,O)P (E, I,O), of this
program shows that it satisfies the authentication policy, since O = ((p = u) ∶ id).
To see that the policy Pauth captures the intuition about the authentication in-
formation release, consider an attacker which knows the user-supplied password.
This knowledge can be represented by the equivalence relation idu, which can
distinguish different user supplied passwords:
∀σ,σ′ ∈Σ, σ idu σ′ ⇐⇒ σ(u) = σ′(u).
Thus, the information that the attacker gains on observing the result of authenti-
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cation is represented by the PER fauth(idu), where for any σ,σ′ ∈Σ
σ fauth(idu) σ′ ⇐⇒ σ ((p = u) ∶ id ⊔ idu) σ′
⇐⇒ (σ(p = u) = σ′(p = u)) ∧ (σ(u) = σ′(u))
⇐⇒ (σ(p) = σ(u) ∧ σ′(p) = σ′(u)) ∨ (σ(p) ≠ σ(u) ∧ σ′(p) ≠ σ′(u))
∧ (σ(u) = σ′(u))
⇐⇒ (σ(p) = σ(u) = σ′(p) = σ′(u)) ∨ (σ(p) ≠ σ(u) = σ′(u) ≠ σ′(p)).
After observing the result of the execution of the authentication program, a pair of
states cannot be distinguished by the attacker that knows the supplied password u,
if it is related by the PER fauth(idu). Since σ fauth(idu) σ′ means that either p has
the same value as the known value of u under both states σ and σ′ (the case for
successful authentication), or (for the failed authentication attempt) p must have
a value that is different from the known value of u in both states, the attacker
therefore learns the value of p when the authentication is successful, otherwise
the attacker learns that the value of p is not the chosen value of u (since in this
case fauth(idu) relates all states except those in which the value of p agrees with
u). This agrees with the intuition.
Now consider the attacker which does not have any prior knowledge of p or
u before the authentication, for example, the attacker that is observing another
user’s attempt to log in but the attacker cannot see the user-supplied password.
This attacker’s knowledge is the equivalence relation all, which cannot distinguish
any pair of states. Thus the final knowledge of this attacker after observing the
authentication output is fauth(all) = (p = u) ∶ id. Since (p = u) ∶ id relates a pair of
states only if they both agree or both disagree on the values of p and u, the final
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knowledge of this attacker is consistent with the intuition that the attacker only
learns the fact that the supplied password and the stored password match in the
case of a successful login, or that they do not match in the case of a failed attempt.
This information has already been declassified by the policy Pauth, and hence the
information release is safe.
7.1.1 Authentication Attack
Let us now consider a rogue implementation of the authentication program, shown
in Figure 7.2, which contains a trailing attack that reveals the user-supplied pass-
word. It is clear that this program contains an attack since the attacker needs not
know the user-supplied password a priori in order to learn the stored password
when there is a successful authentication, or, what the stored password is not oth-
erwise.
i f (u = p) then
w r i t e 1 ; // authenticated
e l s e
w r i t e 2 ; // not authenticated
w r i t e u; // attack
Figure 7.2: A rogue authentication program
Let us call the program of Figure 7.2 PRogue, the information flow analysis
(E, I,O) PRogue (E, I,O) shows that PRogue does not satisfy the policy Pauth
since O = ((u = p) ∶ id) ⊔ idu /⊑ (u = p) ∶ id. Other variations of this program,
for example, where the statement write u is moved to different places in the




Now let us consider an information-theoretic policy for the authentication pro-
gram above. The use of information theory to model information release in this
scenario is reasonable because, for example, the security of password authentica-
tion systems is often based on the difficulty of obtaining the password by guess-
work, which has a sound information-theoretic justification. In the ideal setting,
the stored password should be selected with a uniform probability distribution
over a large space of possibilities (although this is usually not the case in prac-
tice because of human limitations with respect to remembering long or cryptic
passwords). A uniform distribution of the choice maximises the entropy of the
password space, and since the maximum entropy over a space of possible choices
increases with the size of the space, a large selection space further increases en-
tropy [Sha48].
Now since password authentication does not satisfy noninterference with re-
spect to the secret inputs, we expect some quantitative information to be released
by the authentication system. Our objective is to characterise the quantity that
may be legally released by the authentication system as a statement of its infor-
mation flow policy. This can be achieved by using Definition 3.8.5 to derive the
information flow of the genuine password authentication program, which gives us
a policy characterising the maximum information that may be released legally by
any implementation of the authentication program.
The input-output functional model2 of the authentication program is given by
2It does not matter that we did not model the observation of termination, so that the model
is g′ ∶ Σ → {⟨1, ↓⟩, ⟨2, ↓⟩}, because there exists an isomorphism between the range of the two
functions so that g′ = ι ○ g, so that the kernels of g and g′ coincide.
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⟨1⟩ if σ(p) = σ(u)
⟨2⟩ otherwise.
We shall consider two attackers, A and B. AttackerA is trying to obtain the stored
password by guesswork. Attacker B on the other hand is observing the result of
A’s authentication session, but cannot see the supplied password.
The view of B is defined by the function g because B can only observe the
outcome of the authentication - which is public. However, unlike B, A is able to
observe also supplied password since A is the one making the guess. So, A’s view





⟨1, i⟩ if σ(p) = σ(u) = i
⟨2, i⟩ if σ(p) ≠ σ(u) = i.
Thus, in addition to the ability to observe the outcome of the authentication pro-
cess, attacker A also knows the supplied input i = σ(u). Thus, the analysis of
information flow to the attacker A is the same as the analysis of the rogue au-
thentication program of Figure 7.2, which prints the user-supplied password in
addition to revealing the authentication status.
The remainder of the analysis is based on Definition 3.8.5. Let us assume,
for simplicity, that the password is chosen from the set {0,1,2,3} of possibilities,
which is publicly known. Furthermore, we assume that the choice is uniformly
distributed so that any of the four possibilities can be chosen with a probability
of 1
4
. Since A does not know the stored password, we can assume that A makes
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uniformly distributed random guesses on the remaining space of possibilities of
the stored password values. So, u is initially chosen by A from the set {0,1,2,3}
with a probability of 1
4
, and if the authentication fails, A makes the next choice on
the remaining set of possibilities with a probability of 1
3
, and so on.
For the attacker B, the initial probability measure µB ∈ M (Σ) describing B’s
uncertainty about the password is µB(σ) = 1
16
for any σ ∈ Σ, obtained as the joint
probability of choosing any p and u. Thus by the definition of g, the (marginal)
probability of observing output ⟨1⟩ for successful authentication is µB(⟨1⟩) = 1
4
,
and the probability of output ⟨2⟩ for failed authentication is µB(⟨2⟩) = 3
4
. The
conditional probabilities µi(σ) that input σ ∈ Σ was chosen, given the observed
output i ∈ {1,2} are given by






if σ(p) = σ(u)
0 otherwise,
and








Furthermore, µB(⟨1⟩) = 1
4
and µB(⟨2⟩) = 3
4
are the marginal probabilities of pro-
ducing the outputs under µB. Thus, the information released by the authentication
program P (modelled by the function g) under the assumption µB of B’s initial
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uncertainty is the mutual information (see Definition 3.8.5)
I⟨P,µB⟩ = H(µB) − ∑
v∈{1,2}
µB(v)H(µBv )








This value gives a measure of the information released by the genuine password
program under the assumption µB about the attacker’s initial uncertainty and it
provides us with a statement of policy against which we can measure an imple-
mentation of the authentication program. The calculation of the measure of ap-
proximately 0.8113 bits of information in (7.1) quantifies the loss in uncertainty
about the passwords by revealing their equality (which occurs 1
4
of the time) or
not (which occurs 3
4
of the time). Thus, the policy allows about 0.8113 bits of
information to be released by the implementation of the authentication program
to an attacker whose initial uncertainty is modelled by µB over the input space.
To see how this policy rejects the implementation PRogue, now consider the
information flow under the view of the attacker A. The view of A corresponds
to the implementation PRogue that reveals also the user-supplied password in ad-
dition to the result of authentication. The initial measure of uncertainty of A
is µA ∈ M (Σ), where for any σ ∈ Σ, µA(σ) = 1
16
. Thus, µA = µB , because
A is just making a purely random guess - having no initial knowledge which
makes it prefer the selection of a particular password over another from the set
of possible choices. Therefore, given the observation of the outputs i ∈ {1,2} and
u′ ∈ {0,1,2,3} of the possible outcome of the authentication and selected pass-
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word respectively, A can compute the conditional probability µ⟨i,u′⟩ that a given
input state was selected as follows:




1 if σ(p) = σ(u) = u′
0 otherwise,
and






if σ(p) ≠ σ(u) = u′
0 otherwise.
Furthermore, the marginal probability of observing the output sequence ⟨i, u′⟩







if i = 1
3
16
if i = 2.
Thus, the information released by the implementation PRogue is given by
I⟨PRogue,µA⟩ = 4 −
3
4
log(3) ≈ 2.8113. (7.2)
Thus, PRogue is rejected because it releases more than the allowed information
(that is, the 0.8113 bits specified by the genuine authentication model g) about
the secret inputs. The result of (7.2) demonstrates the fact that the attacker gains
complete knowledge of u (2 bits) in addition to the knowledge (about 0.8113 bits
on average) about the equality or not of p and u.
Under the information-theoretic analysis, we have represented the security
policy as the number of bits of information allow to be released. One argument
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against information-theoretic characterisation of secure information flow is the
fact that probability measures have to be assigned to each event in order to be able
to perform the analysis, and that such probability measures may not be available.
However, we note that although the approach requires the assignment of proba-
bility measures, the key idea is in the fact that we can compare programs, under
the same measures to determine their relative security. The information policy
actually specifies what information flow property the ideal (with respect to secure
information flow) program should have, and measuring a given program against
this policy is tantamount to comparing it to this ideal. This technique is what the
analyses above suggest, where the rogue implementation is rejected based on the
information-theoretic policy written for the genuine implementation (more pre-
cisely, its model g). In particular, in our view, the emphasis should not be on
the probability measures themselves, or how a specific program fares under dif-
ferent assumptions about the attacker’s uncertainty and the distribution of input
data. These assumptions may be wrong, and the results, which are dependent on
the choice of distributions may thus give us a false sense of (in)security. How-
ever, an insecure implementation of a particular system model cannot be made
more secure by the choice of the distribution with which analysis is performed.
When the precise probability distributions are known however, the argument for
information-theoretic analysis is strong.
7.2 Policies For Encryption
Encryption is an important security primitive that is used widely as a security
foundation in many systems. However, in order to protect the secrecy of sensitive
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data we require policies that permit encryption to be used safely. Noninterference
policies cannot be used for encryption since the resulting (public) cyphertext in
an encryption scheme will depend on the supplied plaintext and key which are
considered secret. Thus there remains the problem of the specification of policies
that allow safe use of encryption in programs. In this section we shall study the
development of information policies that allow the safe use of encryption and the
security analysis of programs which use the encryption functions.
We start by considering an encryption function E1 ∶K ×M → C, which ac-
cepts a key chosen from the set K of keys and message or plaintext chosen from
the set M , and produces a cyphertext in the set C. Now suppose that E1 is consid-
ered secure and that its implementation, which we shall denote by the expression
enc(k,m), is correct, so that under any state σ(enc(k,m)) = E1(σ(k), σ(m)).
Hence, we allow the attacker to observe the cyphertext enc(k,m) for any choice
of key k ∈ K and plaintext m ∈ M values. Hence we can define an equivalence
relation ⌊E1⌋ which captures the intended information release, where ⌊E1⌋ relates
every pair of states σ and σ′, where E1(σ(k), σ(m)) = E1(σ′(k), σ′(m)). Thus,
the required information flow policy PE1 ≜ {f ∣ R ∈ PER(Σ), f(R) = R ⊔ ⌊E1⌋}
allows the attacker to observe the ciphertext generated by a correct implementa-
tion of the encryption function. Firstly, since the implementation enc is secure,
it is easy to see that the information released by this implementation satisfies the
policy PE1 , because ⌊E1⌋ = enc(k,m) ∶ id.
Now consider a secure (as well as an insecure) data backup scenario (adapted
from [AHS08]) as shown in the program listings of Figure 7.3. The LHS pro-
gram securely releases the encrypted data (ctxt) to a public output channel after
encrypting the data (data) with the key k. However, the RHS implementation
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is insecure because the programmer releases the plaintext data instead of the ci-
phertext. The analysis detects that the RHS program violates the policy because
data ∶ id /⊑ enc(k,data) ∶ id - unless the encryption function by definition reveals
the encrypted data, which violates our assumption that enc is secure. Thus, the
analysis detects this flaw. This would be useful, for example, to the programmer
who can avoid such programming error by checking his or her implementation
against the desired policy.
ctxt : = enc(k, data);
w r i t e ctxt;
ctxt : = enc(k, data);
w r i t e data;
Figure 7.3: Secure versus Insecure Data Backup
The reason why the noninterference policy cannot be used for encryption lies
in the fact that noninterference prohibits any sort of variation in the observed out-
put from being induced by a variation in the secret input to the encryption func-
tion. However, one of the reasons why encryption is widely used as a security
primitive is the fact that the security lies in the ability to protect secret data even
when the encryption algorithm is known. Thus, a good encryption algorithm is
already designed so that it is not easily invertible into its constituent arguments,
although a variation in its input would cause a variation in its output for the algo-
rithm to be useful. The safe input-to-output variation caused by the definition of
the encryption function is captured by the enc(k,m) ∶ id construct in the example
above, which allows only the output variations due to the definition of the encryp-
tion algorithm to be observed by the attacker. This is safe since the encryption
algorithm is already assumed public.
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7.2.1 Nondeterministic Encryption
In nondeterministic encryption, such as cipher-block chaining encryption mode,
an initialisation vector (iv) is used along with the key and plaintext such that
if a different iv is used, a different ciphertext is generated under the same key
and plaintext pair. The term “nondeterministic” refers to the fact that the im-
plementation of such encryption algorithms generally have the property that en-
crypting the same plaintext several times using the same key would yield differ-
ent ciphertexts. Let the function E2 ∶ IV ×K ×M → C represent such an encryp-
tion scheme, where IV is the set of initialisation vectors, and let the expression
enc∗(iv, k,m) be a correct implementation of E2. As with the encryption policy
in the previous example above, the required PER modelling the safe release of the
ciphertext is enc∗(iv, k,m) ∶ id, which declassifies the ciphertext.
Now a known problem with declassification schemes is that of occlusion [SS05],
where a legitimately declassified information masks the release of other secrets.
Being a what policy model, our policy enforcement mechanism prevents such a
flow by permitting only the information release that is explicitly allowed by the
policy.
l1 ∶= enc∗(iv1, k,m);
i f ( h ) then
l2 ∶= enc∗(iv2, k,m);
e l s e
l2 ∶= l1;
w r i t e l1;
w r i t e l2;
Figure 7.4: The Occlusion Problem
To illustrate the occlusion problem, consider the program listing of Figure 7.4,
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which is adapted from [AHS08]. Suppose that we have declassified the encryption
result by the policy PE2 ≜ {f ∣ R ∈ PER(Σ), f(R) = R ⊔ ⌊E2⌋}, where, similarly
to the previous example, for all σ ∈ Σ, σ ⌊E2⌋ σ′ iff E2(σ(iv), σ(k), σ(m)) =
E2(σ′(iv), σ′(k), σ′(m)) and ⌊E2⌋ = enc∗(iv, k,m) ∶ id. Thus, revealing the con-
tent of l1 and l2 is permitted, however the value of the boolean secret h will be re-
leased additionally by this program because the inequality of l1 and l2 will reveal
the fact that the then branch was executed. Now let this program be P . Its analy-
sis, (E, I,O) P (E, I,O) shows that it does not satisfy the required policy be-
cause the equivalence relation O has the property that for any σ,σ′ ∈ Σ, such that
σ(enc∗(iv1, k,m)) ≠ σ′(enc∗(iv2, k,m)) then σ O σ′ Ô⇒ σ(h) = σ′(h) = tt,
which reveals the value of the secret h. Hence the analysis shows that P has inse-
cure information flow, because O /⊑ ⌊E2⌋. Specifically, ⌊E2⌋ requires, for example,
that for any choice of σ ∈ Σ, σ[h ↦ ff] must be indistinguishable from σ, but
O distinguishes any pair of states which disagree on the produced ciphertext and
which also disagree on h, which means that the attacker gains illegal information
about h through P which the policy does not allow. Thus, P is rejected.
7.2.2 Disjunctive Key-Ciphertext Release
This example demonstrates policies for the disjunctive release of information. For
this we shall consider a symmetric-key encryption system, where on one hand we
intend to distribute the key on a secure channel, but we do not want this channel to
receive messages encrypted by the key to protect the message from being accessed
on this channel. On the other hand, we want to distribute the ciphertext on another
channel which may not have access to the key. Now suppose that the encryption
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module is implemented as a single program which can be used both to encrypt
data and to distribute the key. However, we wish to separate what can be observed
on the output channel so that, depending on the usage scenario (indicated by a
parameter to the program), the program serves exclusively the purpose of key
distribution or exclusively the purpose of encryption. A key release parameter r is
used to specify the intention, so that when the value of r is set to true only the key
is allowed to be released, but when it is false only the ciphertext may be released.
Such a program is shown in Figure 7.5.
i f ( r) then
w r i t e k;
e l s e
w r i t e enc(k,m);
Figure 7.5: Disjunctive Key-Ciphertext Release
The required disjunctive release policy is captured by the equivalence relation
D ∈ PER(Σ), which is defined as the disjoint union of two PERs:
D = (k ∶ id ⊔ r ∶ T) ∪ (enc(k,m) ∶ id ⊔ r ∶ F)
The PER k ∶ id ⊔ r ∶ T in the definition of D allows the key to be released when
r has a value tt only, while the PER enc(k,m) ∶ id ⊔ r ∶ F allows the ciphertext
to be released only when r has the value ff . This leads to an information flow
policy PD = {f ∣R ∈ PER(Σ), f(R) = R ⊔D}, which is satisfied by the program
of Figure 7.5. The programs of Figure 7.6, which can release both the key and
ciphertext at the same time are however rejected by this policy.
Alternatively, we may want to force separate implementations of the key dis-
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w r i t e k;
w r i t e enc(k,m);
w r i t e enc(k,m);
i f ( r ) then
w r i t e k;
e l s e
skip;
Figure 7.6: Non-Disjunctive Key-Ciphertext Release
tribution and the encryption sub-modules via another disjunctive policy which
is not predicated on the key release parameter r. Such a policy is given by
PD2 = {f, f ′ ∣ R ∈ PER(Σ), f(R) = R ⊔ k ∶ id, f ′(R) = R ⊔ enc(k,m) ∶ id},
which allows either the release of the key or the ciphertext but not both. This
is possible because k ∶ id and enc(k,m) ∶ id are incomparable for a secure en-
cryption function enc - which means that enc(k,m) does not release the key
(k ∶ id /⊑ enc(k,m) ∶ id), and variations will occur in the ciphertext due to a
variation of m even under a fixed key (enc(k,m) ∶ id /⊑ k ∶ id). The programs of
Figure 7.7 which implement key release module separately from the encryption
module both satisfy the policy PD2 , whereas all the programs of Figure 7.5 and
Figure 7.6 do not satisfy this disjunctive key-ciphertext release policy. The pro-
gram of Figure 7.5 fails because it also releases information about r in addition,
while the programs in Figure 7.6 fail because they have non-disjunctive flows.
w r i t e k; w r i t e enc(k,m);
Figure 7.7: Separate Key-Ciphertext Release
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7.2.3 Perfect Secrecy
Shannon [Sha48], defined a notion of perfect secrecy which describes informa-
tion flow during encryption where the attacker can observe encrypted messages
directly but cannot gain any information about the plaintext or the key. A neces-
sary and sufficient condition for an encryption scheme to satisfy perfect secrecy
is that the probability of generating a particular ciphertext c given that a message
m was encrypted (under some key) is the same as the probability of generating c
given that some other message m′ was encrypted (under a different key) [Den82].
The one-time pad is an encryption system with such a property, where the en-
cryption key is completely random and is at least as long as the message. Let the
relation encotp ⊆M ×C represent such an encryption scheme, where the plaintext
messages in M are of a fixed length n, and are encrypted with a completely ran-
dom key of the same length to generate the ciphertext. In the following, encotp is
defined for any message m ∈M as (m,c) ∈ encotp iff there exists a key k ∈K such
that mXOR k = c.
In this encryption scheme, the required information flow policy on the message
is that it reveals 0 bits of information when observing the ciphertext. Now let
µc(m) be the conditional probability that m was encrypted given the observation
of ciphertext c and let µ(m) be the (marginal) probability of selecting the message
m. Then, the perfect secrecy requirement is that µc(m) = µ(m) since the attacker
does not gain any additional information about the message given any ciphertext.
Thus, µc = µ. Furthermore, let the probability of generating the ciphertext c
be given by µ(c). By applying Definition 3.8.5 to encotp, for any given initial
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probability measure µ over M we obtain







Thus our quantitative information analysis of the encryption function encotp shows
that it does indeed have the required information flow property and satisfies flow
policy which requires no information release.
We may also describe the information flow of encotp in possibilistic terms only
using the lattice FAM(M) of possibilistic information flow over the set M . Since
the length of the key is the same as the message length, then by definition for any
ciphertext c all messages are possible. Thus the inverse image of encotp for any
c ∈ C is M and therefore, by using Definition 3.7.1, the information released by
encotp is {M}, which is the least element of the lattice FAM(M) containing no
information about the secret message. Thus, as expected, the nondeterministic
model of encotp of the one-time pad encryption function releases no information
about the message under the possibilistic definition of information flow.
7.3 Policies for Statistical Analysis
Issues of secure information release also arise in statistical analyses where we
want to permit the safe use of statistical operation on confidential data. Again,
noninterference policies cannot be used because the results of statistical compu-
tation on sensitive inputs, which we intend to make public, will depend on those
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inputs. In this section we shall demonstrate the use of our policy framework for
the enforcement of secure information flow in statistical analysis.
Suppose an organisation intends to publish the average salary (its arithmetic
mean) of its employees in different sections. This information may be sensitive if
it discloses too much information about particular individuals’ salaries in a given
section. Thus, suppose the organisation wishes to specify a policy which allows
the average salary of a section to be published only if the section has at least
n employees. Now let hi be the salary of the ith employee in a given section
of m employees, the intention is to release the average salary em = 1m ∑
m
i=1 hi
only if m ≥ n. Thus, if we define the flow function fm such that for any R ∈
PER(Σ), fm(R) = R ⊔ em ∶ id, which allows the release of the average salary of
m employees, the intended information flow policy is Pavg-n ≜ {fm ∣m ≥ n}. The
policy Pavg-n requires at least n employees to be considered in the computation
of the average salary.
Now suppose n = 10, so that the intended policy is Pavg-10. The analysis of the
program listing of Figure 7.8 is accepted as safe by this policy, because it considers
the salary of at least (actually, exactly) 10 different employees (we assume that
hi corresponds to the salary of a unique employee i). However, both programs
of Figure 7.9 are rejected. The LHS program of Figure 7.9 is rejected because
it reveals h3 and the RHS program is rejected because there are inputs to this
program (when m < 10), which violate the policy. Although, the RHS program
of Figure 7.9 may be executed safely when m ≥ 10, the policy however rejects
it because it statistically contains insecure executions. An interesting approach
would be a combination with a runtime enforcer, which checks the parameter m
and allows the program to run if it will result in a safe execution (that is, whenever
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m ≥ 10). Such a technique is used in the runtime monitor of [GBJS06], which




whi l e ( i < 10) do
sum:=sum+hi;
i ∶= i + 1;
w r i t e sum / i;
Figure 7.8: Average Salary Calculation
sum:=0;
i ∶= 0;
whi l e ( i < 10) do
sum:=sum+h3;
i ∶= i + 1;
w r i t e sum / i;
sum:=0;
i ∶= 0;
whi l e ( i <m) do
sum:=sum+hi;
i ∶= i + 1;
w r i t e sum / i;
Figure 7.9: Insecure Average Salary Calculation
7.4 Electronic Wallet
This example demonstrates the prevention of information laundering by using the
pattern of the declassified expression (in a while loop). Assume that the setting is
that of a privacy-conscious customer engaging in an electronic transaction. In or-
der to process the electronic purchase the vendor needs to verify that the customer
has sufficient funds in customer’s electronic wallet to proceed with the transac-
tion. The customer is however not willing to divulge more than the fact that he or
she has sufficient funds in the electronic wallet. So, the relevant policy is based on
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the PER (balance ≤ cost) ∶ id which declassifies the boolean test (balance ≤ cost)
to check whether the customer has sufficient funds (balance) for the amount of
the transaction (cost).
The program listings of Figure 7.10 are both accepted by the policy. The RHS
program of Figure 7.10 in particular uses program divergence to signal the result
of the electronic wallet check. This is detected by the analysis, but the information
flow due to the divergence is safe and is accepted by the policy. However, the two
programs of Figure 7.11 are both rejected. On one hand, the LHS program of
Figure 7.11 is rejected because it releases the wallet balance in one branch after
performing the legitimate check. On the other hand, by modifying the variable mid
(originally containing the cost) in the RHS program of Figure 7.11, the attacker
is able to essentially perform a binary search on the secret in the interval 0 and
N without explicitly copying the secret. However, the analysis shows that the
attacker indeed gains more than the policy allows and thus rejects the program.
i f ( balance ≤ cost) then
w r i t e 1 ;
e l s e
w r i t e 2 ;
whi l e ( balance ≤ cost) do
skip;
Figure 7.10: Electronic Wallet Check
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i f ( balance ≤ cost) then
w r i t e balance;
e l s e




whi l e ( bot ≤ top) do
i f ( balance ≤ mid) then
i f ( balance = mid) then
result:=mid;
e l s e top:=mid-1;
e l s e bot:=mid+1;
mid:=(bot+top)/2;
⋯
w r i t e result;
Figure 7.11: Electronic Wallet Attacks
7.5 Conclusions
In conclusion, we shall summarise the main achievements of this thesis and sug-
gest possible directions for future work.
7.5.1 Main Contributions and Achievements
We have presented a new semantic framework for the analysis and enforcement
of secure information flow based on lattices of information. The lattice-theoretic
model of information and information flow has the advantage that the approach to
the enforcement of secure information flow can be applied independently of the
particular representation of information chosen. Representations of information
based on PERs, families of sets, and information-theoretic characterisations have
been shown to fit into the lattice model of information, and various examples show
that the security enforcement technique is the same - relying only on information
levels as encoded by a given representation of the information lattice. The lattice-
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based approach is simple to understand because it fits well with basic intuitions
about information ordering. The view of the lattice structure of information as
a general approach to the enforcement of secure information flow has not been
systematically studied before. Although lattice-based techniques are commonly
used in language-based information flow security, the lattices are usually of secu-
rity classes in a multilevel system rather than lattices of information. An area of
future work is to study how the lattice of information approach presented in this
thesis can be integrated with a multilevel security system.
The development of the input-output relational model of systems in Chapter 3
as a foundation for the semantic analysis of information flow is a contribution to
the theory of information flow analysis. The relational model was shown, by var-
ious definitions and examples, to be a quite general model for information flow
analysis in both deterministic and nondeterministic systems. Various represen-
tations of information based on PERs, families of sets, and information-theoretic
characterisations were developed by using the input-output relational model as the
basic primitive. The relational model also shows how the semantics of a system,
captured by how it transforms its inputs to outputs as observed by an attacker, can
be linked directly to lattices of information under either a qualitative or a quanti-
tative representation of information. Various examples in Chapter 4 demonstrated
that reasoning about information flow in nonterminating systems does not pose
additional difficulty to the relational model primitive. In particular, a semantic at-
tacker model, defined in Chapter 4, provided a basis for studying information flow
under nontermination. As shown by the results, the definitions of information flow
under the relational model, induced by the semantic attacker model, account very
well for information flow in diverging programs.
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Chapter 4 introduced a notion of an attacker’s observational power as a func-
tion of what the attacker can see during the traces of a program. The definition
provided a framework for the study of information flow under various attacker
models in relation to the operational semantics of the underlying system. The
relationship of this definition to the input-output relational model was shown by
relating each input state to what the attacker may observe in the ensuing pro-
gram execution. The semantic attacker model of Chapter 4 shows how to define
a concrete attacker model in a language-based setting, and demonstrates how to
derive the relational model from the operational semantics of the language. The
approach, applied to the deterministic While language, and the nondeterministic
While-ND and While-PND, which feature possibilistic nondeterminism and prob-
abilistic nondeterminism respectively, illustrated the application of the relational
model definition from a language-based perspective. We demonstrated that our
attacker observational model is more general than the attacker models of [GM04],
showing how to obtain the Narrow Abstract Noninterference and the Abstract
Noninterference definitions under our information flow definition by choosing
suitable observational power functions.
Chapter 5 contributed a PER-based static information flow analysis for While
programs with output. The analysis, which is flow-sensitive and termination-
sensitive can also detect disjunctive information release as defined in Chapter 3.
Although PERs were conjectured to be incapable of modelling disjunctive infor-
mation release [SS05], we showed in Chapter 3 how PERs can represent disjunc-
tive information. Various examples throughout the thesis were used to demon-
strate the application of disjunctive information flow, where we want the assur-
ance that a recipient can receive at most one of two secrets during the run of a
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program. More specifically, the example of section 7.2.2 showed how disjunctive
policies based on PERs can be used to model the disjunctive release of the secret
key and ciphertext in a symmetric encryption module.
In Chapter 6 a dependency analysis of While programs with outputs was pre-
sented to demonstrate the application of abstract interpretation techniques to se-
cure information flow. This dependency analysis was shown to be an abstract
interpretation of the concrete analysis with PERs presented in Chapter 5. The de-
pendency analysis is flow-sensitive, termination-sensitive, supports intermediate
program outputs, and can detect some disjunctive dependencies. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first dependency type system applied to secure information
flow that is termination-sensitive.
7.5.2 Future Work
A lattice-based approach to information and policy modelling has been presented
in this thesis for the enforcement of what declassification policies. A useful ex-
tension to the policy model would be to incorporate it with other lattices, such as
the lattice of security clearances in a multilevel security environment. This, for
example, would provide a platform to express policies based on what and who
properties [SS05], which is a useful combination of declassification dimensions.
By incorporating the who dimension, we can express policies such as who is able
to gain what information via a system or whose information a system is permitted
to release, as well as who is capable of releasing what information in a system.
This will involve, at the static analysis level, mechanism for annotating program
inputs with the (security clearance of the) owner of the input data, and program
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outputs with the associated (security clearance of the) observer.
The core While language used in this thesis and its extensions to While-ND
and While-PND only have support for buffered input, where all the inputs are
supplied at the beginning of program execution. An extension with construct for
intermediate input will be a useful step towards the analysis of fully interactive
systems. Other language extensions to model, for example, exceptions and object-
orientation will also be appropriate steps towards the analysis of real programs.
A basic implementation of the static analysis of Chapter 5 is being developed.
A potential application is to embed this analysis into a compiler, which can be
used by application writers to certify their applications against policies, for ex-
ample, under a proof-carrying code [NL97] framework. The full analysis of large
programming language sources such as Java, C#, or C++ is still a very distant
objective, because of the very rich set of constructs such as exceptions, object-
orientation, threading, and so on, that our very basic language models did not
study. However, intermediate languages such as the Java bytecode, or the .NET
Framework Common Intermediate Language, or machine assembly language are
possible initial targets because of the fewer number of language constructs under
these intermediate representations. By targeting lower-level representations, there
is also the potential to apply the analysis techniques to disassembled programs to
check the conformance of a program to policies at the code consumer site, espe-
cially when the source of the program, which has access to sensitive information,
is not available.
The dependency analysis of Chapter 6 is useful because it is less costly com-
putationally than the PER analysis of Chapter 5, and can be used when one is
interested in quickly making noninterference-style checks, or as a front-end to a
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richer analysis, since if the dependency abstraction determines that a program has
secure flow, then a more expensive analysis of information flow can be avoided.
The abstraction functions for the analysis of Chapter 6 were defined with non-
interference checks in mind. It will however be useful to study frameworks that
can systematically derive efficient abstractions and information flow type systems,
which are based on a given policy to be enforced. To give an example, a policy
which checks whether at most the parity of a given secret may be released can
model all information levels strictly greater than the parity of this secret with one
abstraction, leading to far fewer elements in the abstract domain. Thus, a poten-
tial area of future work is the study of patterns for generating smaller abstractions,
based on the policy to be enforced, which permit partial information flow. Such
smaller information lattice abstractions, and the resulting security type systems,




Proofs from Chapter 5
Lemma 5.4.8. Let Σ be the set of all states, which are maps from Var to values.
Suppose Σ,Σ′ ⊆ Σ and that Z ⊆ Var and let R,R′ ∈ PER(Σ). Then we have the
following properties:
1. Let X,Y ⊆ Var such that X ∪ Y = Z, then havocZ(Σ) ∪ havocZ(Σ′) =
havocZ(Σ ∪Σ′), and havocX(havocY (Σ)) = havocZ(Σ) .
2. The operator havocZ(⋅) is an upper closure operator on the powerset lattice
⟨P(Σ),⊆⟩ with respect to the subset inclusion order.
3. The following identities hold
(a) havocZ(Σ) ∪ havocZ(Σ′) = havocZ(havocZ(Σ) ∪ havocZ(Σ′)).
(b) havocZ(Σ) ∩ havocZ(Σ′) = havocZ(havocZ(Σ) ∩ havocZ(Σ′)).
(c) havocZ(Σ)/havocZ(Σ′) = havocZ(havocZ(Σ)/havocZ(Σ′)).
4. For all σ ∈ dom(↑ZR) we have [σ]↑ZR = havocZ([σ]↑ZR) .
5. For any X,Y ⊆Var we have ↑X↑YR = ↑Y↑XR = ↑X∪YR.
6. ↑ZR ⊔ ↑ZR′ = ↑Z(↑ZR ⊔ ↑ZR′).
7. ↑ZR F ↑ZR′ = ↑Z(↑ZR F ↑ZR′).
8. R ⊑ R′ Ô⇒ ↑ZR ⊑ ↑ZR′.
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Proof.
1. The proof is straightforward from the definition.
2. We show that havocZ(⋅) is extensive, monotone and idempotent on the
powerset lattice P(Σ). Extensivity, Σ ⊆ havocZ(Σ), is clear from the def-
inition. Now suppose Σ ⊆ Σ′ ⊆ Σ and let Σ′ = Σ ∪ Σ′′. Applying (1),
we have havocZ(Σ′) = havocZ(Σ) ∪ havocZ(Σ′′). Thus, havocZ(Σ) ⊆
havocZ(Σ′) showing monotonicity. For idempotency, we first observe that
extensivity shows that havocZ(Σ) ⊆ havocZ(havocZ(Σ)). Now, suppose
σ ∈ havocZ(havocZ(Σ)), then there exists σ′ ∈ havocZ(Σ) such that for
all y ∈ Var/Z,σ(y) = σ′(y). Hence, there exists σ′′ ∈ Σ such that for all
y ∈ Var/Z,σ′(y) = σ′′(y). Since ∀y ∈ Var/Z,σ(y) = σ′(y) = σ′′(y),
then it is clear that σ ∈ havocZ(Σ), which implies havocZ(havocZ(Σ)) ⊆
havocZ(Σ), showing the idempotency of havocZ(⋅).
3. (a) This property follows directly from the idempotency of havocZ(⋅)
since by (1) havocZ(Σ) ∪ havocZ(Σ′) = havocZ(Σ ∪Σ′).
(b) Let Σ′′ = havocZ(Σ)∩havocZ(Σ′). It is clear that Σ′′ ⊆ havocZ(Σ′′)
by the extensivity of havocZ(⋅). It now remains to be shown that
havocZ(Σ′′) ⊆ Σ′′. Take any σ ∈ havocZ(Σ′′), then there exists σ′ ∈
Σ′′ such that for all y ∈Var/Z,σ(y) = σ′(y). Furthermore, there exist
σ1 ∈ Σ and σ2 ∈ Σ′ such that for all y ∈Var/Z, σ′(y) = σ1(y) = σ2(y)
by the fact that σ′ ∈ havocZ(Σ) ∩ havocZ(Σ′). Hence for all y ∈
Var/Z, σ(y) = σ′(y) = σ1(y) = σ2(y) and therefore σ ∈ havocZ(Σ)
and σ ∈ havocZ(Σ′), that is, σ ∈ Σ′′. Hence, havocZ(Σ′′) ⊆ Σ′′.
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(c) LetΣ′′ = havocZ(Σ)/havocZ(Σ′). We haveΣ′′ ⊆ havocZ(Σ′′) by the
extensivity of havocZ(⋅). Thus, it now remains to show that havocZ(Σ′′) ⊆
Σ′′. Take any σ ∈ havocZ(Σ′′), then there exists σ′ ∈ Σ′′ such that for
all y ∈Var/Z,σ(y) = σ′(y). Furthermore, by definition of havocZ(⋅)
and set difference, there exists σ1 ∈ Σ, but there does not exist σ2 ∈ Σ′,
such that for all y ∈ Var/Z, σ′(y) = σ1(y) = σ2(y). Hence, we have
that σ ∈ havocZ(Σ), but σ ∉ havocZ(Σ′) by definition, and therefore,
σ ∈ havocZ(Σ)/havocZ(Σ′). Thus, havocZ(Σ′′) ⊆ Σ′′.
4. Since havocZ(⋅) is extensive, it is clear that [σ]↑ZR ⊆ havocZ([σ]↑ZR). Now
take any σ′ ∈ havocZ([σ]↑ZR), then there exists σ′′ ∈ [σ]↑ZR such that for all
y ∈Var/Z,σ′(y) = σ′′(y). Since σ′′ ∈ [σ]↑ZR then σ ↑ZR σ′′ holds. It is thus
clear from the definition of ↑ZR that σ′′ ↑ZR σ′ holds since σ′ is be obtained
from σ′′ possibly by modifying values of variables in Z. Transitivity of ↑ZR
means that σ ↑ZR σ′ also holds and hence σ′ ∈ [σ]↑ZR, which means that
havocZ([σ]↑ZR) ⊆ [σ]↑ZR.
5. We shall start by showing that ↑X↑YR = ↑X∪YR. Let Z = X ∪ Y . Then from
the definition of ↑X(⋅) we have that for any σ,σ′ ∈ Σ, σ ↑X↑YRσ′ iff there ex-
ist sequences σ1, . . . , σn ∈ Σ and τ1, . . . , τn−1 ∈ dom(↑YR), such that σ = σ1
and σ′ = σn and for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1 implies σi, σi+1 ∈ havocX([τi]↑YR) =
havocZ([τi]↑YR) since by (4) [τi]↑YR = havocY ([τi]↑YR). Hence, for all i,
1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1 there exist σ′i, σ′i+1 ∈ [τi]↑YR such that σi ∈ havocZ({σ′i}) and
σi+1 ∈ havocZ({σ′i+1}) and since σ′i and σ′i+1 are related by ↑YR then by def-
inition there exist sequences σi1, . . . , σimi ∈ Σ and τ i1, . . . , τ imi−1 ∈ dom(R)
such that σ′i = σi1 and σ′i+1 = σimi and ∀j,1 ≤ j ≤ mi−1 − 1 Ô⇒ σij , σij+1 ∈
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havocY ([τ ij ]R). Since σ′i ∈ havocY ([τ i1]R) and σi ∈ havocZ({σ′i}) hence
σi ∈ havocZ([τ i1]R). Similarly, σi+1 ∈ havocZ([τ imi−1]R). Hence for any
i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1 we obtain the sequences σi, σi1, . . . , σimi−1, σi+1 ∈ Σ and
τ i1, . . . , τ
i
mi−1
∈ dom(R) such that σi, σi1 ∈ havocZ([τ i1]R) and σi+1, σimi−1 ∈




j+1 ∈ havocY ([τ ij ]R) ⊆
havocZ([τ ij ]R). Since σ = σ1 and σ′ = σn, hence by definition, σ ↑ZR σ′.
The reverse implication is straightforward because by definition σ ↑ZR σ′
holds iff ∃σ1, . . . , σn ∈ Σ and τ1, . . . , τn−1 ∈ dom(R) and σ = σ1, σ′ = σn
such that for all i, i ≤ i ≤ n − 1 Ô⇒ σi, σi+1 ∈ havocZ([τi]R). Now,
since for any τ ∈ dom(R), [τ]R ⊆ [τ]↑YR and dom(R) ⊆ dom(↑YR) then
τ1, . . . , τn−1 ∈ dom(↑YR) and hence by replacing [τi]R above with [τi]↑YR
for all i, we obtain σi, σi+1 ∈ havocX(havocY ([τi]↑YR)) = havocX([τi]↑YR)
by applying (4). Hence, σ ↑X↑YR σ′ holds.
Since ↑X↑YR = ↑X∪YR, then the fact that set union is commutative means that
↑X↑YR = ↑X∪YR = ↑Y ∪XR = ↑Y↑XR.
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6. From the definition we have that ∀σ,σ′ ∈Σ, σ ↑Z(↑ZR ⊔ ↑ZR′) σ′
⇐⇒ ∃σ1, . . . σn ∈ Σ,∃σ′′1 , . . . , σ
′′
n−1 ∈ dom(↑ZR ⊔ ↑ZR′).σ = σ1, σ′ = σn.
∀i,1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1 Ô⇒ σi, σi+1 ∈ havocZ([σ′′i ]↑ZR⊔↑ZR′)
⇐⇒ ∃σ1, . . . σn ∈ Σ,∃σ′′1 , . . . , σ
′′
n−1 ∈ dom(↑ZR ⊔ ↑ZR′).σ = σ1, σ′ = σn.
∀i,1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1 Ô⇒ σi, σi+1 ∈ havocZ([σ′′i ]↑ZR ∩ [σ′′i ]↑ZR′)
⇐⇒ ∃σ1, . . . σn ∈ Σ,∃σ′′1 , . . . , σ
′′
n−1 ∈ dom(↑ZR) ∩ dom(↑ZR′).σ = σ1, σ′ = σn.
∀i,1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1 Ô⇒ σi, σi+1 ∈ havocZ([σ′′i ]↑ZR) ∩ havocZ([σ′′i ]↑ZR′)
(by (3b) since by (4) havocZ([σ′′i ]↑ZR) = [σ′′i ]↑ZR and havocZ([σ′′i ]↑ZR′) = [σ′′i ]↑ZR′ )
⇐⇒ σ ↑Z↑ZR σ′ and σ ↑Z↑ZR′ σ′
⇐⇒ σ ↑ZR σ′ and σ ↑ZR′ σ′. (by applying (5))
7. Let Σ = dom(↑ZR) ∪ dom(↑ZR′). Now define the PERs ↑ZR and ↑ZR′ such
that ∀σ,σ′ ∈ Σ, σ ↑ZR σ′ ⇐⇒ σ,σ′ ∈ Σ/dom(↑ZR) and σ ↑ZR′ σ′ ⇐⇒
σ,σ′ ∈ Σ/dom(↑ZR′). The PERs ↑ZR and ↑ZR′ both have only one partition,
which respectively are the sets Σ1 = Σ/dom(↑ZR) and Σ2 = Σ/dom(↑ZR′).
Therefore, by (3c) we have that havocZ(Σ1) = Σ1 and havocZ(Σ2) = Σ2
since by (4) we know that dom(↑ZR) = havocZ(dom(↑ZR)) and dom(↑ZR′) =
havocZ(dom(↑ZR′)) and hence by (1) thatΣ = havocZ(Σ), since havocZ(⋅)
is idempotent. That is, ↑Z(↑ZR) = ↑ZR and ↑Z(↑ZR′) = ↑ZR′. By defini-
tion CΣ(↑ZR) = ↑ZR ∪ ↑ZR, and hence by applying (4), we know that for
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any σ ∈ dom(CΣ(↑ZR)), [σ]CΣ(↑ZR) = havocZ([σ]CΣ(↑ZR)), because [σ]↑ZR =
havocZ([σ]↑ZR) and [σ]↑ZR = havocZ([σ]↑ZR). Therefore, for any σ,σ′ ∈Σ,
σ ↑ZCΣ(↑ZR)σ′ iff ∃σ1, . . . , σn ∈Σ, σ′1, . . . , σ′n−1 ∈ dom(CΣ(↑ZR)), such that
σ = σ1, σ′ = σn and ∀i, i ≤ i ≤ n − 1 Ô⇒ σi, σi+1 ∈ havocZ([σ′i]CΣ(↑ZR)) =
[σ′i]CΣ(↑ZR). Hence, we have that ↑Z(CΣ(↑ZR)) = CΣ(↑ZR). Similarly, we ob-
tain ↑Z(CΣ(↑ZR′)) = CΣ(↑ZR′). Since by definition, ↑ZR F ↑ZR′ = CΣ(↑ZR) ⊔
CΣ(↑ZR′), hence we obtain ↑Z(↑ZR F ↑ZR′) = ↑ZR F ↑ZR′ by applying (6).
8. It follows by definition that σ ↑ZR′ σ′ holds iff there exist σ1, . . . , σn ∈
Σ and σ′1, . . . , σ′n−1 ∈ dom(R′) such that for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1 Ô⇒
σi, σi+1 ∈ havocZ([σ′i]R′) and σ = σ1, σ′ = σn. Since R ⊑ R′, we know that
dom(R′) ⊆ dom(R) and for all σ′i ∈ dom(R′), we have that [σ′i]R′ ⊆ [σ′i]R.
Hence, σ ↑ZR′ σ′ implies by the monotonicity of havocZ(⋅) that there ex-
ist σ1, . . . , σn ∈ Σ and σ′1, . . . , σ′n−1 ∈ dom(R) such that for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤
n − 1 Ô⇒ σi, σi+1 ∈ havocZ([σ′i]R) and σ = σ1, σ′ = σn, which implies
that σ ↑ZR σ′ holds. This shows the required property that ↑ZR ⊑ ↑ZR′.
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Lemma 5.7.3. Let Z ⊆ TVar, and let e be an expression such that FV (e) ⊆Var,
and let R,R′ ∈Rinit ⊆ PER(Σ).
1. For all σ ∈ dom(R), havocZ([σ]R) = [σ]↑ZR.
2. For all σ,σ′ ∈ dom(R), σ ↑ZR σ′ Ô⇒ σ R σ′.
3. R ⊔R′ ∈Rinit.
4. Let X ⊆ TVar and Y = TVar/X such that ∀σ,σ′ ∈ dom(R), σ↓IVar =
σ′↓IVar Ô⇒ σ↓X = σ
′
↓X and havocY ([σ]R) = [σ]R. Furthermore, suppose
FV (e)∩TVar ⊆ X . Then for any PER φ over the values of e, we have that
e ∶ φ ⊔R ∈Rinit.
Proof.
1. Since R ∈ Rinit, then there exist X ⊆ TVar and Y = TVar/X such that for
all σ,σ′ ∈ dom(R), σ↓IVar = σ′↓IVar Ô⇒ σ↓X = σ′↓X and havocY ([σ]R) =
[σ]R. Now take any σ1, σ2 ∈ dom(R) and suppose that (σ1, σ2) ∉ R, then,
[σ1]R ∩ [σ2]R = ∅. Hence, havocTVar([σ1]R) ∩ havocTVar([σ2]R) = ∅.
This is straightforward to show, since if there exist σ ∈ [σ1]R and σ′ ∈ [σ2]R
such that havocTVar({σ}) ∩ havocTVar({σ′}) ≠ ∅, then σ↓IVar = σ′↓IVar
and therefore σ↓X = σ′↓X . However, σ′ ∈ havocY ([σ]R) = [σ]R = [σ1]R
violates our initial assumption that [σ1]R and [σ2]R are disjoint.
Now since Z ⊆ TVar, we have that for all σ1, σ2 ∈ dom(R) then (σ1, σ2) ∉
R implies havocZ([σ1]R) ∩ havocZ([σ2]R) = ∅ and hence, by definition,
σ↑ZRσ′ iff there exists σ′′ ∈ dom(R) such that σ,σ′ ∈ havocZ([σ′′]R). That
is, for any σ ∈ dom(R), [σ]↑ZR = havocZ([σ]R).
2. We have shown from (1) that for any σ1, σ2 ∈ dom(R) (σ1, σ2) ∉ R im-
plies havocTVar([σ1]R) ∩ havocTVar([σ2]R) = ∅. Furthermore, since
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Z ⊆ TVar, we know that havocZ([σ1]R) = [σ1]↑ZR and havocZ([σ2]R) =
[σ2]↑ZR. Therefore, [σ1]↑ZR ∩ [σ2]↑ZR = ∅. That is, for any σ1, σ2 ∈ dom(R),
(σ1, σ2) ∉ R Ô⇒ (σ1, σ2) ∉ ↑ZR. The contrapositive of this shows that for
all σ,σ′ ∈ dom(R), σ ↑ZR σ′ Ô⇒ σ R σ′.
3. Since R,R′ ∈ Rinit, then there exist X,X ′ ⊆ TVar and Y = TVar/X and
Y ′ = TVar/X ′ such that for any σ,σ′ ∈ dom(R),havocY ([σ]R) = [σ]R
and σ↓IVar = σ′↓IVar Ô⇒ σ↓X = σ′↓X , and such that for any σ,σ′ ∈
dom(R′),havocY ′([σ]R′) = [σ]R′ and σ↓IVar = σ′↓IVar Ô⇒ σ↓X = σ′↓X .
Let Xˆ = X ∪ X ′ and let Yˆ = Y ∩ Y ′, then it is clear that for all σ,σ′ ∈
dom(R) ∩ dom(R′) = dom(R ⊔R′), σ↓IVar = σ′↓IVar Ô⇒ σ↓Xˆ = σ′↓Xˆ . Fur-
thermore, we also know that for any σ,σ′ ∈ dom(R ⊔R′), havocYˆ ([σ]R) =
[σ]R and havocYˆ ([σ′]R′) = [σ′]R′ , hence by (3b) of lemma 5.4.8, we have
that havocYˆ (havocYˆ ([σ]R) ∩ havocYˆ ([σ′]R′)) = havocYˆ ([σ]R ∩ [σ′]R′) =
havocYˆ ([σ]R) ∩ havocYˆ ([σ′]R′) = [σ]R ∩ [σ′]R′ . This means that for any
σ ∈ dom(R ⊔ R′),havocYˆ ([σ]R⊔R′) = [σ]R⊔R′ . Since Xˆ ⊆ TVar and
Yˆ = TVar/Xˆ , then R ⊔R′ ∈Rinit.
4. Firstly, because dom(e ∶ φ ⊔ R) ⊆ dom(R), then it is clear that ∀σ,σ′ ∈
dom(e ∶ φ ⊔ R), σ↓IVar = σ′↓IVar Ô⇒ σ↓X = σ′↓X . Now let FV (e) ∩
TVar = X ′ and let Y ′ = TVar/X ′. Then, by definition, for any σ ∈
dom(e ∶ φ), havocY ′([σ]e∶φ) = [σ]e∶φ since e has no free variable in Y ′
and thus its evaluation is not affected by the Y ′ projection of states. Since
X ′ ⊆ X and hence Y ⊆ Y ′, by applying (3b) of lemma 5.4.8 then for any
σ ∈ dom(e ∶ φ ⊔R), havocY ([σ]e∶φ⊔R) = havocY ([σ]e∶φ ∩ [σ]R) = [σ]e∶φ ∩
[σ]R = [σ]e∶φ⊔R. Thus, e ∶ φ ⊔R ∈Rinit.
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